“Ten steps to prevent World War Three” (Tobias Ellwood)

21.8.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

Given the challenging geopolitical times we know, there is a new book that all should read. “Ten steps to prevent World War Three” has a clear focus in its title and was written by a man who was UK foreign minister, Defence Minister, Chair of the House of Commons Defence Committee and an officer in the Royal Green Jackets. Tobias Ellwood knows very directly about the matter at hand. The timing of his book reflects a new era of substantial wars led by Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia but also the aggressive Chinese approach to Taiwan and many major (but at times forgotten) conflicts such as Sudan. Existential and revanchist imperialism (with Putin) or the need to bring the focus on other matters (with Trump) are often the conflict drivers and do not result in clear and quick victories but in never-ending wars often with wider regional if not global impacts at all levels. A review of past major regional wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan share the same long waging and unclear outcomes, especially for the West and often for local populations as many in Kabul would secretly concur. More than eighty years after World War Two, many of us in the West have no memory, direct or indirect, of a global war as we now gradually realise the key always-forgotten fact that history can easily repeat itself. 

As a senior British politician and geopolitical expert having served in several conservative governments, Ellwood provides us with a real experience and analysis of the impact of these key conflicts to the world and how we – or our Western governments – should deal with them to prevent a descent into what would be World War Three.  He sees us in a multi-facetted Cold War of sorts that could slide into a global conflict we have known in the 20th century. Ten steps are then offered over 400 pages to manage and then prevent that potential descent into hell.  

In his preface, Ellwood covers three past and future periods such as “a golden age of complacency” (1991–2025), “a world conditioned by insecurity” (2025–2040) and “a new dark age” starting in 2040. He wrote his book as global coordination weakened and instability rose also as the result of a withdrawing Trump 2.0 America that its allies could no longer trust and the rise of a pragmatic but assertive China many countries turned to. His preface showing a gradual descent to hell is not a forecast but a caution about a future that can be avoided if we learn from the past and apply the right steps to prevent the worst future. His subsequent introduction keeps stressing that the global order and indeed globalisation created post-Cold War has gradually weakened (if not yet totally collapsed), recreating a 1930s atmosphere but without a Churchill in the waiting. As Blaise Metreweli, the head of MI6, stressed a few months ago, Britain “is in a space between peace and war” as is the West as a whole. Ellwood’s bleak analysis of our times and the Western slide we all know makes it imperative to raise our game, which his recipe could help achieve.     

The ten steps with their sharp headings (“our” and “we” referring to Britain but also the West) are as follows:  

Step 1: Stand for something

We need to know what we believe in and are willing to stand for. 

Step 2: Know your enemies

We need to understand the goals, fears and resentments of our enemies. 

Step 3: Stop repeating history

We need to learn from wars won and lost.

Step 4: Spot the new battlefields

We need to understand where conflicts will grow and how they will be fought.

Step 5: Regroup with our allies

We need to back old friends and make new ones.

Step 6: Get stronger and smarter

We need to rebuild our soft and hard power.

Step 7: Move to a war footing

We need to align security and defence strategy while preparing society.

Step 8: Put our house in order

We need to strengthen democracy at home to counter growing authoritarianism abroad.

Step 9: Build the off-ramps

We need to halt the slide toward conflict and create conditions for co-existence.

Step 10: Reassert statecraft 

We need to lead or we will drift into conflict.

This very rich book is drawn from Ellwood’s experience, but also from the accumulated wisdom from many historians, strategists, legislators, diplomats and scholars. It provides a journey into history and the many big wars the world has known for centuries, trying to draw lessons as to how they erupted and what to do to avoid them in the future. The focus is naturally on getting ready for war and its new features like cyber space and trade and information, as rivalries and regional wars will still occur – but also ensuring that overall peace prevails, based on a rejuvenation of the old global order we knew built on the ashes of WW2 with pillars of security, trade, law, and development to prevent a return to chaos. 

International institutions like the United Nations and others helped deal with many problems the world faced in the past. Such a global order was never perfect, but avoided major conflicts, all while countries were interacting on key issues, usually in a productive way. There is now a need to update, strengthen and rebalance the world order we enjoyed and which was built on centuries of hard-won experience and too many conflicts. Similarly, Ellwood stresses that the existential danger is not war itself but the unbounded escalation leading to it in a less globalised world. Stability strengthens the positive aspects of world development based on agreed norms, rules and institutions. To Ellwood, the choice is not between peace and conflict but between shaping the next order or inheriting one imposed by others.          

While I stressed the ten steps on offer and as the devil is in the detail, I recommend you read the book and enjoy the highly detailed analysis and Ellwood’s very pertinent suggestions to ensure that global peace, even if never very quiet, keeps going and we avoid his “new dark age” in 2040 after years of irresponsible and easier passivity.   

Warmest regards,

Serge     

Strengthening European defence with a key partnership with Britain

21.7.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

Ten years after the Brexit referendum, a clear majority of British citizens regrets its outcome and what it did not bring or indeed brought their country at many economic and social levels, even if many (about 30% so far, broadly reflecting the Farage-led Reform UK party polling, compared with the winning 52% referendum vote) still feel, mostly emotionally, that it was the right move. All public data show today that the UK is worse off economically and socially than it was in 2016 with an estimated GDP decline of 6% to 8% making it the worst-off G7 economy while the much heralded “Singapore-on-Thames” never happened and its global goods exports have seriously declined. Immigration, that was naturally a key feature of Brexit, even surprisingly experienced a major boost during the premiership of Boris Johnson, one of its key architects. Brexit did not help British political leadership and its stability either as seen with the seventh Prime minister arriving at Number Ten in ten years. Emotions put aside and while the EU may be too bureaucratic at times and not enjoying the best of voting rules, which created unanimity havoc too many times, the main EU rationale today, which Britain would agree to, is to be “stronger together”, especially in uncertain Trump geopolitical times and with an existentially driven and lost imperialistic Russia. 

While it might make sense for all for Britain to rejoin the EU, this process would be still too arduous and cause painful disagreements at too many levels today both in the UK and many of the EU member states. While the British return could eventually take place in a few years from now as it would make sense and younger voting generations will increasingly support it, it would make more sense for the UK and the EU to work together on sensible partnerships in key areas, defence being an obvious and natural one given our new challenging times created by a more nationalistic America First under Trump 2.0 and its erratic developments.  

Many European countries have clearly neglected a focus on defence as the US was providing both the leadership and tools to make them less active in ensuring their own defence through NATO since 1949. The habit perdured following the Cold War as the years went by, also as the threat of Russian aggression was limited until the mid-2010s. The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, following “the little grey men” raids in the Donbass in 2014, changed the cards. Germany, the leading EU country economically had clearly withdrawn from shaping any defence agenda outside a US-led and powered NATO given its own challenging past. Within continental Europe only France, given its historical roots developed its own defence capabilities and industry even if not the way a superpower or aggressively existential country like Russia would. Britain, due to its history and imperial days, had also developed a strong defence infrastructure post-WW2, which gradually declined in terms of power in the 21st century even if it was able some years ago to lead a victorious and far-away conflict against Argentina in the Malvinas or indeed Falklands – as the World Cup recently reminded us. Today Europe is faced with the clear need to be more independent from the US following the many Trump 2.0 attempts at weakening NATO with a strange and not fully forgotten (clearly on both sides) plan to take over Greenland. While Europe needs to take control of its future with a more independent defence, it is also clear that it should work with London to ensure a sound and powerful coordinated partnership in defence. Such a move would also cement a rapprochement that could eventually lead to a return of Britain into the EU, a step that, even if natural and sensible ten years after a failed Brexit, would again be too challenging to make happening today, both for Britain and the EU. 

To make a defence partnership viable and a win-win, Britain will need to focus on redeveloping its defence and related funding, the latter that was not a key matter for too long while other social needs were targeted by various British governments. British defence, while always a quality sector in terms of its leadership and capabilities, is not what it used to be decades ago even if legendary initialisms like SAS and its “who dares wins” motto still resonate well. Britain is currently suffering from an unusual “military unpreparedness” that led its well-respected defence secretary, John Healey, to resign recently as he felt that both Number Ten and the Treasury in Starmer times had not been focused on giving Britain the appropriate defence funding the Strategic Defence Review and our new times required. Defence budgets were continuously delayed despite the gradually approaching NATO summit in Ankara in early July while the military leadership stressed a budget equipment shortfall of GBP28bn (USD 38bn) until 2030. While a new Germany and even Poland would now spend between nearly 3.5% and 5% of GDP on defence, the once powerful British military that used to lead the NATO league table on defence spending, would only reach 2.7% of GDP by 2030, representing an annual increase of 0.08% by 2027, this despite a bold but hard to believe pledge to reach 3.5% by 2035. 

As of today, the British forces need to secure modern armoured vehicles, replace their old navy (once the symbol of British power as Admiral Horatio Nelson would agree) with new frigates and destroyers that will no longer be docked for repairs while the RAF should be in a position to get its needed F-35A nuclear fighter jets and finally implement its Global Combat Air Programme with Japan and Italy. Many leading strategists share the view that a defence rethink needs to be taken, also in the context of the defence of Europe and knowing that Russia may be able to attack it by 2028 even if still a low probability. The Russian threat and Trump’s relative abandonment of its allies have created the need for a renewed British defence focus that has also stressed a governmental lack of funding abilities. Investments and a budget refocus will be needed, especially given the new faces of warfare and its drone capacity and technology, which would also support a close cooperation with battle-tested Ukraine. It was good news that Keir Starmer tried to focus on the highly sensitive and long-delayed British ten-year defence plan as a key project before he left Number Ten, hoping that a new Burnham administration could finalise it even if they may have different views on its set-up.        

There is no doubt that many initiatives, some inconclusive, were developed in Britain in recent times like with the European Rearmament Bank, a project led by General Sir Nick Carter, a former Chief of the Defence Staff, strategic thinkers and even former senior representatives of multilateral financial institutions like my old EBRD. Other projects that were seen starting in Britain migrated to Canada like the DSRB or Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, much funded by leading banks including many Canadian institutions, this reflecting the new times the country is also facing with its Southern neighbour and formerly forever strategic partner. Even specific defence partnerships between Britain and the EU or among key European countries have not been easy to implement as seen with the recent Paris drive to exclude London from Safe, the EU rearmament fund or, even within the EU, Berlin’s rejection of cooperating with Paris on a key joint fighter jet project. Nothing is easy in this field but the imperative is to still work together for Europe to be stronger, regardless of its often sensitive institutions and their complex operational rules.       

As the well-known Oxford scholar, Timothy Garton-Arsh recently published, “the Europeanisation of Nato is ever more important”, this also involving Britain working with the EU – 23 countries also belonging to both organisations – on making us “stronger together”. While I would personally prefer Britain back into the unperfect but improvable EU, I realise it is not the right time. Today a new strategic and clear focus on key British military segments that need both time-efficient improvements and funding is needed. The strategic UK-EU alliance would then provide the required momentum for all parties to focus on the best directions to cement a viable collective defence in the right spirit, especially in our challenging geopolitical times. This could be the natural start of a new relationship that could grow over time into a more structured partnership or even membership. 

Warmest regards,

Serge 

A new and stronger Europe in the making 

16.12.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

2025 will be remembered as a year of drastic change in terms of the world which we knew, all the more so in relation to the post-WW2 transatlantic alliance, which kept us away from war, and then brought us many features of a peace through trade in a globalised world. Trump 2.0 and its autocratic and nationalistic 1930s America First approach is gradually destroying the sound Western world we knew, while America is rejecting the benefits of its leadership as seen with the new US National Security Strategy. While not making America stronger, as it will keep paying for the erratic and self-harming Trump policies, the new era that Europe is abruptly faced with should not be seen as the decline of a continent which once led the world. Trump, while destroying a civilisation, is in fact giving the opportunity to Europe to be more unified and stronger by taking sound political, economic and defence directions.

The US National Security Strategy is critical of a weak Europe that relied upon the US for its defence while not focusing on being militarily independent enough, preferring to devote funding to economic and social matters. There is no doubt that Europe, before and after the EU, chose to give America the leadership of the Western world, including its own defence, even if some countries like France and the UK developed serious military forces on their own. The weight of the WW2 tragedy was deeply felt across the continent and the desire of a strong America to take the Western defence leadership, also for its many geostrategic and economic benefits, strengthened with the 1949 creation of NATO as the Cold War took off, were serious drivers. European countries did indeed follow the clear US lead on defence matters while participating as much as they could, given their relative strengths and abilities. The European approach to its own defence is now seen as unacceptable and cheap complacency by today’s America as that view also fits the America First nationalistic agenda and focus on its own Southern hemisphere. However, this unexpected change in a key 80-year policy should lead Europe to reshape its own approach to geostrategic and related priorities. 

It is now time for Europe to be in charge of its defence while keeping working with the US as part of NATO. It is likely that the Trump era will be seen as a strategic mistake, also by America at the polls, given the impact on their own society. On a personal note, and having grown up shaped by the old American values and principles we all knew while having many American friends who are like me, there is no doubt that the US will eventually come back to the sound country and Western leader it was. A strong majority of Americans will realise that the Trump adventure is self-destroying at too many levels, even if some key Trump topics, like immigration and its key link to national identity, should be better managed, also in the whole West. While we should all hope that the Americans will wake up in the mid-terms and later in 2028, it does not change the fact that Europe needs to show more resolve regarding its own future at the level of the EU – Europe today and tomorrow – in terms of decision-making and notably defence. 

The clearest show of independence for Europe will be to devote more funding to its defence, and indeed technology sectors, in focusing on the right segments and develop start-ups that will be instrumental in developing Europe’s strength and independence – again in partnership with an America which should gradually find itself again. A new balance in the US-European relationship is needed. This new focus on defence will also need to be done in real partnership among EU members and in ways that need to be fully understood by the European populations that are Europe. There will also be a need to change EU decision-making and avoid being stopped by one or a few member states that happen to have geostrategic links to the obvious threat that is represented by an aggressive Russia once again searching for its lost existence. Europe and the EU have the financial means to ensure its future (ten times Russia’s GDP) but need to redefine the proper mechanisms to achieve sound and time-efficient decisions. While improving its decision mechanisms, now should be a time on both sides of the Channel to welcome back Britain as a key member of the EU as we are simply stronger together, this regardless of the fact that working in a group, however sensible, is not always as easy as staying alone. It is time to forget the mistakes Brexit caused, often led by personal political ambitions, and are seen by many in the UK today, including increasingly in government and legislative circles. We are simply stronger together, all the more so in a divisive and unproductive Trump world.   

One of the main European challenges in the short term will be to manage the current poll rise of the hard-right populist parties, some of its leaders – but not all – of whom find Russia not the threat that it is. However, and while Europe and its key countries like Britain, France and Germany should be better off with experienced mainstream parties at their lead, it is clear that hard right populist parties’ foreign policy programmes have meaningfully evolved, as seen with Giorgia Meloni in power in Italy even if the German AfD still shows its young age and inexperience. There are indeed critical matters that should get all Europeans to want to be more united and stronger in defence.      

The road is clear and we should hope for the right focus to prevail, and soon. There is no other choice for Europe to exist and indeed build a great future for its new generations. 

Warmest regards,

Serge               

What is Russia and where is it going today?

23.7.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

Given the Russian developments we experienced over the last three decades and the clear peak represented by the old and almost forgotten style invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, I thought it would make sense to understand better what Russia really is today.

Russia’s economy is one of war today, with its key strengths based on oil and gas resources only liked by China and India. It is hard to see where Russia’s real strengths are today. Its inflation rate at 10% (deemed to be well understated) and central bank policy rate of 20% would nearly kill any government in the Western world. It is indeed a war economy with 7% of its GDP spent on defence, a figure that would make Trump happy if Russia were part of NATO. Its population is also shrinking, and its birth rate rapidly decreasing.

Many ultra-conservatives, as well as plenty of those from the MAGA base, who see themselves as true Christians, see Putin as the leader of Christendom in a world void of values and principles that the Russian leader would keep embodying. Russia is being seen by many extremist Christians as the real frontline against an ever-terroristic Islam, a secular and rising China and all that represents Woke and perceived extremist diversity today. For many of its few Western admirers, Russia is simply the Europe of the 1950s.

Russia today is another form of Soviet Union, impelled by an historical imperial need and drive that also gives Putin a reason to exist. It is far more corrupt than the Soviet Union, even if the world got used to an oligarchic model which, even if not right, is accepted for what is Russia. Russia today is not driven by ideology, even if for practical purposes, as was the case in the Soviet era, but by a need to count as the superpower it has no longer been since the late 1980s.

Russia is not like any other country today, being close to marginalised states like Iran or North Korea (as seen with a recent pact passed between the Kremlin and Kim Jong Un). Russia is also the sole state that has recognised Afghanistan, and indeed the women-erasing Taliban, a move that would incidentally make Leonid Brezhnev and his immediate successors also turn in their graves. Russia is not liked by many African states today, barring those who recently left the old French orbit and are helped by the Wagner successor mercenary platform. Russia needs to be “pragmatic” as few countries would willingly side with it today.

Russia’s strategic strengths are not many, as seen in its inability to defeat Ukraine after nearly three and a half years while losing one million soldiers. Only one area where it is shining is in opaque and intelligence-driven disinformation and wild acts of destabilisation across the West, even if some, like Trump, would disagree since the US presidential elections of 2016.

One of Russia’s rare strengths, linked to its autocratic style and a population largely muzzled or in any case historically and understandably silent (but for one million of its citizens, usually well-qualified professionals, who left due to the last war, creating serious shortcomings for its economy) is that it plays, even if unduly, a very long-term card strategically, like in Ukraine, thinking that the West will get tired as all democracies do.

Many populist leaders across Europe, including in its central and eastern parts for historical reasons, are liking Putin, who is indeed seen and promoted as defending key civilisational values and principles, key features also used to artfully grab votes. Andrej Babiš, the Czech EU scandal-ridden billionaire, who may return as Premier in Prague later this year, is keen on stressing he works first for Czech citizens and their social needs (which voter would not want to hear this?) making it clear that the new NATO 5% of GDP on defence is not warranted, all while he is known to be “soft” on Putin, even if not of Slovakia’s Fico or Hungary’s Orban kind. Babis was just turning 13 when the Russians invaded Prague in 1968 and, as a Prague resident, I wish I could take him by the hand to show him the Red Army tank left near my house for the sake of memory.

The AfD in Germany, very strong in the former Prussia or Eastern Germany, is quite keen on Putin and very understanding of his Ukrainian adventure. To be fair, other softer populist leaders, like Giorgia Meloni in Italy or Marine Le Pen in France (even if she was funded by a Russian bank in the 2010s) or her junior, Jordan Bardella, are not known to be pro-Russian, as it would still be a bridge too far in their own countries. As for Britain, while Farage is a true populist and does not seem to suffer yet from the Brexit debacle he co-led, it could never be a Putin aficionado based on history, values and principles. As for Central Europe, Poland is clearly a leader in getting Europe ready to oppose Russia in new attempts to recreate a new Soviet Union or Empire starting by absorbing the NATO Baltic state members.

Russia is facing a real problem, as it has no viable way to what Putin would see as clear victory, be it in Ukraine or in making Russia the power it once was – notwithstanding that it still oddly commands a seat at the UN Security Council, even if Trump made sure the world order was in any case changing. The world gradually witnessed a downfall of an internationalist post-Cold War Russia since the invasion of part of Georgia in August 2008. Who remembers Putin, a former lieutenant of liberal St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, singing “Blueberry Hills” with Hollywood stars at an event benefitting children with cancer? While no excuse, it is likely that Putin grew impatient with Russia’s progress and the perceived Western post-Cold War condescendence combined with his country’s gradual subservience to Western interests – be they political or economic – this even if Muscovites always enjoyed eating at McDonald’s.

Russia is positioning itself on a road where it cannot come back unless it enjoys a total but de facto impossible victory at all levels. This situation may prompt the Kremlin to go too far, eventually leading to a state of world war that would be devastating for all parties involved and indeed the whole world. However, the only way to avoid such a bad, but not impossible, scenario, is for the West to rearm and for Europe to understand what matters for its own survival. In the face of a Russia that Trump may seem to understand better of late, it is key that the new America also gets that the real threat to world peace is not China but Russia and its closest allies and that Europe would be the epicentre of World War 3 and not Taiwan, even if the latter should not be neglected nor the wrong signs given to an opportunistic Beijing.

While being ready for the worst, it would also be best for the West and the world to try influencing change in Russia so it comes back to what we all hoped it would be in the early 1990s, where a new world started, also helped by a nascent globalisation and peace through trade. Vladimir Putin will not lead Russia forever, and many forces within the country could make change happen – this for the benefit of all Russians and the world at large. Russians would also deserve for once to enjoy the benefits of true democracy and a peaceful home, while Europe would benefit from a strong and mutually beneficial partnership. It is a case where “trying harder” is a key modus operandi, all the more so today.

With warmest regards,

Serge