Strengthening European defence with a key partnership with Britain

21.7.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

Ten years after the Brexit referendum, a clear majority of British citizens regrets its outcome and what it did not bring or indeed brought their country at many economic and social levels, even if many (about 30% so far, broadly reflecting the Farage-led Reform UK party polling, compared with the winning 52% referendum vote) still feel, mostly emotionally, that it was the right move. All public data show today that the UK is worse off economically and socially than it was in 2016 with an estimated GDP decline of 6% to 8% making it the worst-off G7 economy while the much heralded “Singapore-on-Thames” never happened and its global goods exports have seriously declined. Immigration, that was naturally a key feature of Brexit, even surprisingly experienced a major boost during the premiership of Boris Johnson, one of its key architects. Brexit did not help British political leadership and its stability either as seen with the seventh Prime minister arriving at Number Ten in ten years. Emotions put aside and while the EU may be too bureaucratic at times and not enjoying the best of voting rules, which created unanimity havoc too many times, the main EU rationale today, which Britain would agree to, is to be “stronger together”, especially in uncertain Trump geopolitical times and with an existentially driven and lost imperialistic Russia. 

While it might make sense for all for Britain to rejoin the EU, this process would be still too arduous and cause painful disagreements at too many levels today both in the UK and many of the EU member states. While the British return could eventually take place in a few years from now as it would make sense and younger voting generations will increasingly support it, it would make more sense for the UK and the EU to work together on sensible partnerships in key areas, defence being an obvious and natural one given our new challenging times created by a more nationalistic America First under Trump 2.0 and its erratic developments.  

Many European countries have clearly neglected a focus on defence as the US was providing both the leadership and tools to make them less active in ensuring their own defence through NATO since 1949. The habit perdured following the Cold War as the years went by, also as the threat of Russian aggression was limited until the mid-2010s. The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, following “the little grey men” raids in the Donbass in 2014, changed the cards. Germany, the leading EU country economically had clearly withdrawn from shaping any defence agenda outside a US-led and powered NATO given its own challenging past. Within continental Europe only France, given its historical roots developed its own defence capabilities and industry even if not the way a superpower or aggressively existential country like Russia would. Britain, due to its history and imperial days, had also developed a strong defence infrastructure post-WW2, which gradually declined in terms of power in the 21st century even if it was able some years ago to lead a victorious and far-away conflict against Argentina in the Malvinas or indeed Falklands – as the World Cup recently reminded us. Today Europe is faced with the clear need to be more independent from the US following the many Trump 2.0 attempts at weakening NATO with a strange and not fully forgotten (clearly on both sides) plan to take over Greenland. While Europe needs to take control of its future with a more independent defence, it is also clear that it should work with London to ensure a sound and powerful coordinated partnership in defence. Such a move would also cement a rapprochement that could eventually lead to a return of Britain into the EU, a step that, even if natural and sensible ten years after a failed Brexit, would again be too challenging to make happening today, both for Britain and the EU. 

To make a defence partnership viable and a win-win, Britain will need to focus on redeveloping its defence and related funding, the latter that was not a key matter for too long while other social needs were targeted by various British governments. British defence, while always a quality sector in terms of its leadership and capabilities, is not what it used to be decades ago even if legendary initialisms like SAS and its “who dares wins” motto still resonate well. Britain is currently suffering from an unusual “military unpreparedness” that led its well-respected defence secretary, Josh Healey, to resign recently as he felt that both Number Ten and the Treasury in Starmer times had not been focused on giving Britain the appropriate defence funding the Strategic Defence Review and our new times required. Defence budgets were continuously delayed despite the gradually approaching NATO summit in Ankara in early July while the military leadership stressed a budget equipment shortfall of GBP28bn (USD 38bn) until 2030. While a new Germany and even Poland would now spend between nearly 3.5% and 5% of GDP on defence, the once powerful British military that used to lead the NATO league table on defence spending, would only reach 2.7% of GDP by 2030, representing an annual increase of 0.08% by 2027, this despite a bold but hard to believe pledge to reach 3.5% by 2035. 

As of today, the British forces need to secure modern armoured vehicles, replace their old navy (once the symbol of British power as Admiral Horatio Nelson would agree) with new frigates and destroyers that will no longer be docked for repairs while the RAF should be in a position to get its needed F-35A nuclear fighter jets and finally implement its Global Combat Air Programme with Japan and Italy. Many leading strategists share the view that a defence rethink needs to be taken, also in the context of the defence of Europe and knowing that Russia may be able to attack it by 2028 even if still a low probability. The Russian threat and Trump’s relative abandonment of its allies have created the need for a renewed British defence focus that has also stressed a governmental lack of funding abilities. Investments and a budget refocus will be needed, especially given the new faces of warfare and its drone capacity and technology, which would also support a close cooperation with battle-tested Ukraine. It was good news that Keir Starmer tried to focus on the highly sensitive and long-delayed British ten-year defence plan as a key project before he left Number Ten, hoping that a new Burnham administration could finalise it even if they may have different views on its set-up.        

There is no doubt that many initiatives, some inconclusive, were developed in Britain in recent times like with the European Rearmament Bank, a project led by General Sir Nick Carter, a former Chief of the Defence Staff, strategic thinkers and even former senior representatives of multilateral financial institutions like my old EBRD. Other projects that were seen starting in Britain migrated to Canada like the DSRB or Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, much funded by leading banks including many Canadian institutions, this reflecting the new times the country is also facing with its Southern neighbour and formerly forever strategic partner. Even specific defence partnerships between Britain and the EU or among key European countries have not been easy to implement as seen with the recent Paris drive to exclude London from Safe, the EU rearmament fund or, even within the EU, Berlin’s rejection of cooperating with Paris on a key joint fighter jet project. Nothing is easy in this field but the imperative is to still work together for Europe to be stronger, regardless of its often sensitive institutions and their complex operational rules.       

As the well-known Oxford scholar, Timothy Garton-Arsh recently published, “the Europeanisation of Nato is ever more important”, this also involving Britain working with the EU – 23 countries also belonging to both organisations – on making us “stronger together”. While I would personally prefer Britain back into the unperfect but improvable EU, I realise it is not the right time. Today a new strategic and clear focus on key British military segments that need both time-efficient improvements and funding is needed. The strategic UK-EU alliance would then provide the required momentum for all parties to focus on the best directions to cement a viable collective defence in the right spirit, especially in our challenging geopolitical times. This could be the natural start of a new relationship that could grow over time into a more structured partnership or even membership. 

Warmest regards,

Serge