Tag: history

“Crisis of the Common Good” (Chris Murphy)

24.6.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

I was recently watching Chris Murphy, the US Democratic Senator from Connecticut, presenting his new book “Crisis of the Common Good” and thought it was a very timely development given our new era. I always found Chris Murphy not ego-centric and flavoured with common sense, so was delighted he had written a book about the key issues that could potentially destroy America – the focus of his book, but also our world and which I have covered many times since Trump 2.0. In his book, aimed at American voters ahead of the November mid-terms and 2028 presidential race, Murphy promotes finding again the Common Good while stressing the ill-fated cults of profit, “everywhere”, technology, credentialism, consumption and corruption in American society, all furthered by Trump 2.0. Murphy, being a very good communicator, says it all in a useful summary in the first 25 pages with detailed chapters then covering each of the cults with many personal anecdotes.  

America, a great country, which was naturally never perfect, has changed in no time much for the worse under Trump 2.0, making it a quasi-combined autocracy-kleptocracy where money and obedience to the leader matter first. The combination of horrific developments under Trump are simply unbelievable and of the never-seen-before-in-a-US-presidential kind. The list is very long, from a billion-dollar ballroom, destruction of the White House East Wing, renaming of key institutions like the Kennedy Center (now soundly rejected by a judge giving America some institutional hope), building of 280-foot-high pharaonic monuments, self-dealing and insider trading (investing prior to enacting key policy decisions) at times driven by a never seen but now very open family enrichment. All while many government officials, who in the main have been selected for their obedience rather than their competence, are often very rich individuals, if not a billionaire club with American policy and personal business naturally combined. The club membership is rather long, with peace deal-maker Steve Witkoff, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum or even the billionaire US Ambassador to Italy who is just doing a mega-deal … for himself. And let’s not forget Jared Kushner’s business father, a former jailed felon, as US Ambassador to France. 

And then, as one should not stop given the lack of real opposition, a now abandoned $1.8bn fund that would compensate Trump’s political allies as well as January 6 US Capitol rioters (In fact, $1776m to nicely match the 250th American anniversary which would infuriate my ancestors at Yorktown.) The list of democratic deviations and issues with political sanity under Trump 2.0 cover all aspects of American life as seen with ICE in Minnesota as well as the various gerrymandering efforts and attempts to change the mail-in electoral process. It should be noted that some moves can be funny, like having his face on a $250 bill (Treasury Bessent found it publicly fine), this during his lifetime unlike clear statesmen such as Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Grant as well as Franklin and Hamilton. One of the key Trump strengths is that there are too many insane decisions taken at the same time at too many levels, making it too hard to follow them. And sheer incompetence is obviously also seen at the geopolitical level. Undermining the Western Alliance and NATO (even if Europeans should be more involved in their defence as they now will) while having threatened to take over Greenland (like he de facto did Canada) or starting an ill-devised Iranian regime change from the air leading Teheran to realise their key advantage in the world-affecting Strait of Hormuz says a lot about the changing times in America and the loss of its sound leadership. And now we enjoy a never ending and always unclear Iranian war peace process (now clearly focused on minimizing the unexpected war costs to American voters ahead of the mid-terms) that shows Trump going back and forth on what it means and even lying to our faces as to its actual conclusion and the fact it stresses a defeat of sorts for America in terms of war aims. This insane flood of developments is also linked to the loss of “common good” that historically defined America, even if never perfect in nature, hence the good timing of Chris Murphy’s book.

In his introduction, Murphy, being on many hockey game journeys with his fourteen-year-old son, tells us about youth sports and how it has been maximised for profit by organisers in recent years making it far away from what it was in his own youth and reflecting our new and sadder times. His book is focused on the crises that American (and to some extent Western) society fell into in developing various bad cults focused on profit, “everywhere”, technology, consumption, credentialism and corruption leading him to hope for a renewed cult of Common Good that made America, even if never perfect, what it was. As a US Senator and a Democrat, Murphy also focuses on the six bad cults naturally being enhanced by the Trump era given the unusual nature and persona of the last US president.  To him the 1980s started to reflect a new era of greed, leaving old American values behind, that were personified by the then shockingly grandiose Manhattan Trump Tower in 1983 and Gordon Gekko in the movie “Wall Street” in 1987.  TV shows like Dallas or Dynasty glamourised wealth at the highest level. To Murphy, that period, which also saw America becoming wealthier, reflected a shift from the common good to a me-first individualism in most spheres of society.  The new era marked a retreat from shared prosperity, social contracts and strong communities with a new focus on profit, efficiency, consumer culture, technology, elite credentialism and corrupt politics leading to many Americans feeling adrift, alone and hopeless; and driving them eventually after short decades to elect a “megalomaniacal con man peddling division and empty promises” if not more. 

The Cult of Profit is a natural development of the greed era that most of us could see and feel in many areas of life and business, even if America was an entrepreneurial nation with “climbers and doers” that made a difference, also for the common good. Murphy feels, not wrongly, that the drive for wealth changed the nature of the social contract focused on broad prosperity – as seen with the Big Tech mega-billionaires, which are the obvious leading example of this American demise. At the same time, governments stood aside while corporations grew stronger and unions weaker, ensuring a transfer of power with capitalism being mainly if not only focused on maximising profit. It is clear that Murphy’s take on the cult of profit would fit the approach of European socialists and even centrists (the former I have also grown closer to due to this drastic change in capitalism, a step which is odd for a member of a Gaullist family, very involved with Chirac’s party and its national youth team in the early 1980s when my boss was a mid-twenties Nicolas, who unexpectedly then would become President of France.)    

The Cult of Everywhere, linked to that of profit, reflects a strong feeling of repulsion against the adverse impact of globalisation that many of us saw as a good thing, also in terms of ensuring global peace indeed through trade. This cult naturally hurt local businesses throughout America, especially in states that were dependant on very local activities for jobs and customers where owners abandoned their moral obligations to local “workers”. Globalisation, which started 25 years ago, was aimed at promising a golden age without actual borders when everybody would benefit as technology and trade would build a more integrated and better world. While this ambitious development never fully and happily happened, this cult led to a loss of national and local identity while jobs were lost, especially in remote American areas while a rising and once forgotten China took advantage of a new manufacturing era. 

The Cult of Technology led by strong business leaders brought smartphones, social media and now AI which strongly impacted human relations and likely job prospects for the latter. Americans stopped socialising very fast with friends and started to isolate themselves (a global feature  we can all thank Big Tech for), all the more for teenagers (It would not be likely that the Big Tech-captured US administration would pass legislation to keep teenagers away from social media as in the visionary Australia and soon Britain and France.) Murphy also stressed that technology led to a decline of attendance in institutions like churches, unions and civic clubs that once cemented sound collective purposes and shared societal values. While he sees that technology brought many life improvements, he finds this cult as having led the Great Withdrawal also hurting humanity while furthering loneliness and fulfilment at a time when the US was too lax on regulations, a latter feature we can find enhanced by Big Tech’s de facto capture of Trump 2.0 through massive donations and political support.       

The Cult of Consumption is exemplified, perhaps unfairly, by George W Bush telling his citizens after 9-11 to go down to Disney World in Florida, this stressing enhanced market participation to deal with huge societal issues if not nightmares at the time. It is clear that this example is targeting a leading GOP man, which might be seen as overly partisan, all the more as George W Bush, while not a perfect leader for many, is not a Trump friend and carries values and principles of US leadership that we always saw in the past (seeing him with Bill Clinton and Barack Obama at the latter’s presidential centre inauguration in Chicago last week made me easily feel that there was another, sounder American leadership at some point not so long ago.) Murphy also stresses the change of contactless “buying” with local retailers being forgotten for the likes of Amazon and Walmart while creating huge fortunes for its leaders. He stressed the depersonalisation of commerce with the rise of tens of millions of “influencers”, all while consumption became stratified with the wealthy buying into preferred, easier and faster ways of buying goods and services, this creating a deepening of societal resentment.  

The Cult of Credentialism is focused according to Murphy on the divide between those with college degrees and those without, as society increasingly rewarded the former while neglecting the latter. A degree has become essential to achieve societal well-being and has become challenging to secure at many levels. According to him, the promise of sharing education costs is one that has been gradually broken as tuition became very expensive in all colleges and especially the top names we know, all while government became disinterested in higher education. To worsen the poor picture, many colleges, also among the top ones, favoured donors (ask Harvard graduate Jared Kushner) and alumni over applicants from modest backgrounds resulting in a monopolisation of access to enrolment opportunity.  As a funny side note, I wonder what Murphy’s neighbour, Yale, would think of his approach – even if I agree with him (On a more positive note, let’s not forget that US colleges also introduced “affirmative actions in the 1970s to help minorities access higher education – a policy Trump supporters clearly never liked.) On an additional thought, one can also wonder what the future of higher education will become a few years from now with the rise of AI, which may make Murphy’s points historical in nature or no longer relevant but we should hope that universities keep going in spite of this self-enriching Big Tech-led AI invasion that is changing our world in uncontrollable and potentially terrible ways at too many levels.   

The Cult of Corruption is focused on the gradual rise of money in politics which a Supreme Court 2010 Citizens United decision probably unwittingly created by seeing political donations as free speech, which led to a flood of corporate and billionaire cash into campaigns. These donations have had an impact on election results and the legislative process while the common citizen was gradually de facto left on the side and powerless. Over the years, Americans got used to this development that Donald Trump exemplified at many levels including for him and his family’s self-enrichment while in power (How many billions since his second term?). The extent of monetization of political power and the US presidency via the stock market or dealings with business leaders or even foreign countries seeking US support is a clear first in American history.           

Having described the five cults and the gradual move from communitarianism to me-first individualism that started in the1980s, Murphy explains how Trump exploited the spiritually disgruntled many and their nostalgia for better times to get into the White House and then worsened the very six cults. Trump tapped into “memories of a time before globalized markets, profit fundamentalism, addictive technologies and corporate-captured government”. He built a new MAGA community for those longing for gatherings and social interactions while tariffs were meant to punish globalization while promoting nationalism first. He stressed that outsiders like immigrants, Muslims, LGBTQ individuals and the traditional elites stole communities from “true Americans” implying that diversity was not compatible with common-good America. He promised to “drain that swamp” to get back to the old America. However, Trump did not curb corporate power or profit-worship nor did he rein in technological excesses while he cut corporate taxes and deregulated industries, also as he was supported by the likes of society-destructive Big Tech. And instead of “draining the swamp” as he had promised his MAGA base, he used it to enrich himself and his family through a long list of avenues from cryptocurrency, Middle Eastern investments to government contracts in ways that had been unseen so far with any US President. In many ways, Trump exemplified the six cults (even if one would argue that he was not an easy friend of globalisation with his never-ending tariff wars). 

While his core base does not fully grasp – or does not want to see what he has done, his popularity is clearly and expectedly in great decline today, this regardless of any polls. Were he able to run, he would not win the presidency in 2028, but he and his team are still there for two and half years, even if he does seem to care for what his policies and the state of the GOP are today and is clearly keener on his posterity. This short decline was sadly accompanied by a physical decline as easily seen with his erratic speeches full of words never heard from a US leader. His MAGA base support, largely opposed to wars abroad, appears to still support him “come what may” even with the strategic Iranian disaster as they prefer to follow the leader, while their clout, as a shrinking minority usually not equipped to understand policy impacts, is also declining (all while they are the first to pay for war-related oil and other goods). 

Murphy’s book provides the reader with many detailed chapters on each of the six cults while hoping for a challenging return to a sensible sense of communitarianism in US society, if ever possible given the damages done, when Trump and his allies would be gone. Murphy is promoting a dedication to an economy and society focused on dignity and meaning for everyone, this not only via sheer politics but through government reform, corporate accountability and stronger communities, the latter being a key feature also away from technological isolation. As a key side note, non-US readers would sadly easily notice that the book focuses very little on Trump’s destruction of the Western alliance or poor foreign policy developments as these matters are not the prime focus of the American voter unless there is a cost involved.        

 Chris Murphy would be a great presidential candidate given his sensibly moderate style and the dearth of leading and appealing figures among Democrats today, Governors Gavin Newsom and Abigael Spangerger (the latter a sound potential VC choice) excepted. The other Democratic party leaders are either too old, like US Senate party leader Chuck Schumer, or lacking the persona or profile that would fit a majority of voters (I will avoid stressing names out of courtesy). The Democrats are struggling to find the candidate who could win and be a great President and hopefully be a badly needed old style leader of a returning, post-Trump, Western world we are all missing. It is also clear that Democrats should tactically rethink their strong and at times excessive focus on diversity, that opponents call “woke”,  as it also helped Trump and his willingly highjacked GOP (now much less happy) to seize power a second time in 2024 in a scenario few would have thought possible post-Trump 1.0. 

As of today, Murphy is not yet seen as a top presidential candidate (even if on the list), though his focus on key societal matters should say a lot to the American electorate as we would hope. In his conclusion, Murphy provides us with no less than 30 proposals for reversing what he sees as a spiritual American decline and focused on dealing with the six cults to go back to a forgotten era of the Common Good. Amusingly, his last chapter starts with the famous Reagan line about  America being “the shining city on the hill” that was borrowed from John Winthrop, the first Governor of Massachusetts, making us realise that American politics should not be about partisanship but indeed focused on the Common Good with great leaders that even the world can benefit from.     

Warmest regards,

Serge

The Triangle of Power (Alexander Stubb)

17.2.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

I thought I would keep my focus on Book Notes dealing with the nature of our new geopolitical times, so would like to cover a new book by Alexander Stubb: The Triangle of Power – Rebalancing the New World Order. Mark Carney, recently known as a driven leader of what the West should be, following his exchanges with Donald Trump and his memorable Davos speech, has been very keen on Stubb’s “values-based realism” shown in his book.  

Alexander Stubb is the Finnish President and one of the best leaders Europe can enjoy today in relation to leading his country and adjusting to our new geopolitical times. He draws on decades of experience in diplomacy with political, finance and academic positions that give him an unparalleled view of the world and the history of its order and disorder. His acumen also reflects the long frontier he shares with Russia, now as the leader of a recent NATO member. His book dealing with the current changes in our world order has been very well received by many foreign policy experts of all types like Jess Stoltenberg, Niall Ferguson, Timothy Garton Ash, Fiona Hill, Fareed Zakaria or Gideon Rachman. 

His long introduction section covers the key features of international affairs as we have known them since the end of WW2 with the uncontested American-led post-Cold War era through rules-based cooperative multilateralism fostered by a unified West. This world order was gradually followed by multipolarity defined as “an oligopoly of powers” and now the emergence of three global power groups in the West, East and South, hence the Triangle. It is clear that the driver of the book was Trump 2.0 and its dislocation of the world order we knew to go back to a 19th century approach of world power rivalry, also with defined controlled geographies. The end of the world order we knew, initially confirmed by Secretary of State Rubio arriving at the Munich Security conference this past weekend, was already felt by most European NATO allies with the Trump threats of invading Greenland so the US could “protect” it and benefit from its critical minerals. To be fair, Rubio, unlike Vance at the last Munich conference in February 2025, did not stress European decay while promoting needed far right populism, but stressed the need for a stronger Europe so the NATO alliance could work to its best. To the happy surprise of many attendees, Rubio also gave the audience, likely unwittingly, a back and forth feeling à la Trump’s TACO with tariffs, in stressing his “we belong together” US position to European “friends” and allies of decades. Sadly, his following meetings with Fico in Bratislava and Orban in Budapest clarified matters.   

Stubb meticulously covers the various periods the world went through since the end of WW2, with the ascent of the liberal world order following the Cold War and what became globalisation – or also peace through trade. He admits that multilateral cooperation is now gradually forgotten for multipolar rivalry and conflict, the Ukraine war being a clear and new example in Europe. Global norms that international organisations, led by the United Nations, set up are also eroding. He stresses that the need to search for a new global framework is made urgent as we live through a hinge moment of history, like in 1918, 1945 or 1989. A globalised world led by a UN spirit and clear rules agreed by most if not all countries in the world (whether they liked them or not) to contain self-interest is now indeed replaced by the three major power groups described in detail in distinct and very rich chapters, each covering politics, economics, technology and geopolitics and could be a book in itself. 

The three mega-world players are the still-leading and democratic Global West (in a potential phase of self-destruction with Trump policies), the autocratic Global East (combining an existentially-driven Russia and a pragmatic China not always on the same page, along with the challenging Iran, North Korea and a number of African and central American countries driven by regime preservation or old alliances) and the once-forgotten and at times controlled, if not colonised, Global South (led by India, Brazil or South Africa and even Saudi Arabia). The Global West and East are often engaged in a fierce competition led by bilateral deals and alliances while the Global South represents the once often-forgotten developing world, which will also be the great arbiter and determine whether the future tilts toward cooperation or fragmentation. The coming years will decide what the new order will be for the rest of the century, which also requires democratic and especially mid-sized European powers – hence the EU – to help reform institutions and give a new life to multilateralism.     

Stubb, who gives us a detailed course on the development of multilateral institutions and their historical benefits via discipline and not idealism (order requiring structure), is still very committed to its system, especially the United Nations. Recognising the weaknesses of such a system today (like the World Bank and IMF led by the West) and the veto-bound old-fashioned UN Security Council with its five permanent members selected in another age (even if many will like it), he quotes Winston Churchill’s famous line about democracy that “the UN was the worst form of governance, save all the others”. He feels that dismantling multilateralism will lead to chaos but it could be improved in its set-up, to ensure that the key Global South feels part of the decision-making and guarantees a sounder world order. 

Stubb sees rule-based globalisation after the Cold War as a resounding success with its quadrupling of GDP, six-fold trade expansion and a billion people away from starvation, even if inequality and power asymmetry hurt its clear success, as seen today with the rise of mega-billionaires and one per cent controlling half of the world’s wealth. 9/11 made security more important than freedom and affordability, while the global financial crisis of 2008 did not help, also at a time when Russia changed its approach to world affairs with its invasion of Georgia, and China became more assertive as a rising superpower. Today, Stubb sees our era as one where we do not know where we are, not helped by the blurring of war and peace and forgotten invasions like in Ukraine, all the more so in (so far) peaceful Europe. He sees the various features of our increasingly broken world, such as energy, technology, currency and information, also used as a form of coercion in international affairs.   

Stubb sees multilateralism as projecting and guaranteeing order, while self-interested multipolarity creates disorder and eventually conflict while pushing aside the small and medium-sized countries which had a say in the era of multilateralism. As such, he would like a more engaged Global South and a better-balanced Security Council. One of the main challenges facing multilateralism is distrust from many citizens living in democracies regarding their institutions that leads to an appealing extremist populism that also rejects international cooperation that is deemed as serving the interests of the elites and attacks national sovereignty. He believes that key features like dignity, dialogue and institutional reform should restore the legitimacy of international cooperation in an era of strong disinformation, economic insecurity and identity politics.  Stubb addresses in different chapters the three dynamics of power as “competition” that may lead, if unhealthy, to “conflict” (also notably with hybrid warfare when not conventional) while it should promote “cooperation” on key issues like climate change, trade and security – in a rules-based world order suitably reshaped so all three groups feel heard.   

“Values-based realism”, that Stubb promotes, is a compromise between naive idealism and cynical realpolitik. It is “a set of universal values based on freedom, fundamental rights and international rules that reflect the world’s global diversity, culture and history”.  Stubb sees it as a tool to keep liberal values alive while engaging with those who do not share them. As such, he thinks middle-power diplomacy (reflecting Europe) should show leadership by example while also being principled without being preachy, pragmatic without being amoral and clearly led by dignity – all while avoiding moral lecturing. Stubb believes that free and democratic societies are the basis for national success while regional cooperation should be strengthened, reflecting his strong EU adherence. Lastly, Stubb, as he told the UN general Assembly in 2024, would want to expand the UN Security Council with five additional permanent members to welcome Latin America, African and Asian nations while eliminating single-state veto power and – key – suspending the voting rights of any Security Council member that violates the UN charter. Such an approach would have the benefits of the Global South adhering more easily to principles often shaped by the Global West, while the latter could point to China real-world evidence of the benefits that Western-fashioned liberal markets, capitalism and free trade brought to Beijing and its ample workforce. Russia, lost in its past, is clearly a challenging party to deal with but relationships could be restored or actually created once the Ukraine war stops, its responsibility admitted and international rules and order committed to – clearly still a rather hard if not unreachable objective today.    

On a lighter note, and thinking about Stubb’s cultural background, we should realise that the Finns are the happiest people on earth according to the World Happiness Report. Perhaps we should all take Stubb’s recipe to deal with our drastically changing times: “Stay calm. Be a Finn. Take an ice bath, visit a sauna and reflect”. All without forgetting our values and principles and facing the world as it is but addressing its issues in the right and sensible way. On the same light note, Stubb is silent about the Trump-led Board of Peace with a logo that amusingly only shows the Western hemisphere unlike that of the UN with its full globe.  

“The Triangle of Power” is definitely a rare book that could be multiplied in many more given all the topics it covers, going back to the roots of a world order we knew and is now endangered. It is a must-read to understand the issues we are facing today and what could be done to ensure an organised and peaceful world, hopefully also dealing with the governing features that are necessary. We should hope that a cooperation-driven Global West happily endures, all the more so given its freedom and democratic essence, even if it will never be perfect in its management, as no system could ever be.

Warmest regards,

Serge

On the changing nature of the Western democratic landscape

24.11.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

While being a gifted amateur on matters of political science, all the more when they touch the essence of domestic politics in the Western democratic world, it is hard not to notice both in the US and across Europe a real shift of the political landscape. Adults living in the second half of the 20th century would find it hard to relate to political forces opposing each other today at the electoral booth, in the streets and at the dinner tables. 

The world evolves as we see with Big Tech (and now, even more so, AI), bringing drastic changes that supporters explain is akin to previous industrial revolutions. It is a fact, even if a dauting one, all the more for those who will be AI-jobless while the mega-tech billionaires will keep thriving. It would appear that our political landscape has gradually changed too over recent decades. There is no more of the usual fight between the once traditional right and left as they have actually also changed in nature and the left-right terminology no longer fully applies. Today some would argue that the divide is more between pro-democracy parties and mild autocracy ones. Others would see the divide between traditional centrist parties against hard right parties, the old social democratic left having been marginalised (like Mitterrand’s once powerful Socialist Party in France) if not taking a hard but unsuccessful version of its former self. Polarisation has also become the word of the day. And it is clear that many voters increasingly dissatisfied by traditional democratic parties in power have shifted their votes to hard right ones that have also gradually and smartly moderated their stances when closer to power, looking at the rare but so far highly practical and effective Meloni example in Italy. 

It is clear that old right-wing parties like the Republican Party in the US under Trump have had to deal with a combination of White House autocratic leadership flavour with endless executive orders and retribution lawsuits against opponents, while experiencing an unexpected and odd left-wing protectionist shift against free trade that was a key historical tenet of the Grand Old Party. It is clear that Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush would be rather perplexed when looking at their own party today, even if many elected officials may gradually refocus on their core values as Trump’s poll rating keeps going down (35% post recent elections) – and they follow their natural job preservation mantra as already seen. The Democratic Party also went more left in a country where the word did not really exist, in order to accommodate at times the cultural and societal needs of its big urban centre voters, losing some of its centrism appeal on the way and paying for it dearly nationwide. 

Unwanted immigration, regardless of any criminal feature and as it was perceived by many as altering national identity (even in a country of immigrants like the US), became a key factor in changing the Western political landscape. Fifteen years ago, the economy and “affordability” were the key issues for many voters (it still is as we see with Trump) but immigration waves, at times welcome by the likes of Angela Merkel due to the need to boost the national economy, brought many issues that gradually focused the voters’ minds and gave rise to hard-right parties, often led by good marketers, to increase their share of the vote. Today, they lead in the polls in the UK, France or even Germany (some even arguing, not crazily, that they even won in the US, historically the first democracy in the world). 

As an aside, and even if potentially seen as a far-fetched point by some (if not many), one could argue that Osama bin Laden won in the end. While 9-11 was a horrible tragedy, it led to various US military operations in the Middle East that many felt warranted but led, years later, to the Arab Spring and a total dislocation of some of the regimes and countries in the region that fostered mass immigration waves with societal impacts, like security-related ones, that we keep seeing today. (Even the UK Labour government is now dealing with a change in its refugee asylum policy.) The current upheaval in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, following the retreat of the former French colonial power and its replacement by the new Wagner Group (interestingly named Africa Corps), allowed for regional Jihadists to be on the verge of seizing control of these countries, which might lead to another wave of immigration towards Europe as the horrific civil war in Sudan and the horrific Tanzanian developments easily could – and strengthen its far-right parties. As already stated, these far-right parties, that offer easy solutions to complex issues, provide new avenues for many easily swayed voters. These voters are frustrated by the often-slow pace and absence of clear results of democratic European governments that are also culturally attached to values and principles like human rights and a natural aversion to racism, making them struggle with managing issues like mass immigration from Africa and the Middle East, illegal or not, in the 21st century.  In some ways, and while American agriculture experiences strong labour shortages, the Trump team combined the fight against unwanted immigration with that against crime but also the drug trade, this also leading to drastic geostrategic and military developments as seen in Venezuela.  

The new political landscape is linked to the fact that elections are a game today where the hard-right has shown uncanny excellence. Ideology matters less than dealing with some issues like immigration and affordability – at least in words, usually strong. The problem with hard-right parties, even if they can win elections, is that they are usually ill-equipped to manage governments efficiently while their programmes create strong, if not always violent, opposition, changing the very nature of life in some countries. An additional feature of some far-right parties, especially in Europe, is their closeness to Russia, which is today the natural enemy of democratic Western governments in the context of the Ukraine war and multiple daily disruptions led by Russian intelligence. It is clear that the rising AfD in Germany, Fico in Slovakia, Orbán in Hungary or some unexpected and unfit Babiš coalition partners in Czechia are not anti-Russian (to say the least), at times on energy grounds, even if Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France (in spite of her 2017 campaign previously funded by a Prague-based Russian bank) and clearly Meloni in power in Italy took their distance from Moscow, all the more as they know where their voters stand on the matter. 

We live in a Western world where winning elections is the end game while governing has to be done but is often mismanaged, notably by hard-right leaders, with back and forth moves à la TACO as seen with Trump in less than one year. At least, we still benefit from a democratic environment and set-up which at times can put a stop to the overreach of some of the hard-right leaders as seen in America – but for how long? It is clear that it is key for increased voter participation in elections, as long as they are free and fair, especially from the younger generations who should focus more on their own future and manage their love of social media, if not video games, in a better self-preserving way. On the same note and as Erdoğan’s opposition leader and Mayor of Istanbul, now facing “2000 years” in jail for running a criminal organisation (real democracy in Istanbul?), said, it is key to “communicate” with everybody of all ages and political inclinations to foster dialogue and better understanding of what matters. As Ekrem İmamoğlu stressed in a great way all should remember: “People-ism against populism”.      

Warmest regards,

Serge                                         

Understanding why the centre is failing 

14.7.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

As we live in a new world marked by the resumed and unpredictable Trump era and the rise of populism and its autocratic style across the West, I thought it was interesting to understand why the political centre is failing today. 

Today the so-called centre comprises centre-left and centre-right political parties and governments that used to be simply seen as left and right since the end of WW2 when extremist parties, notably of the hard-right populist type, were by and large non-existent. The difference with the past is that populist parties that would have been put aside by any electorate in the second half of the 20th century have risen to levels where today they are potentially in positions to win general elections and run key countries in Europe. It could be argued that the hijacking of the Republican party by a populist Trump, even if he did not have a hard-right party to support him in the US election, is akin to a drastic change of the political landscape that led to populism and an autocratic style in power (this shown by executive decisions and little supervision from a politically captured US Supreme Court). 

No doubt, liberal democracy can be seen as too complex and slow-moving for many, all the more so if coalitions are in power (as seen in France today – as the only way to keep the hard right out). Centrist parties are also not known to be decisive when in power, creating a combination of features that result in slow motion and little if any solutions to problems societies face today (as seen by many British voters with the Labour government after one year in Britain).  The priorities of centrist governments may not be seen as aligned with many voters’ concerns due to a lack of desired and at times needed change combined with the complexity of governing.

Beyond the eternal key voter concerns linked to the cost of living, two issues have invaded the minds of many voters across the West, prompting electoral wins like that of Trump in November 2024. The major one is linked to immigration, legal or illegal, even if many economies depend on it while most voters fixated on it would never take up the jobs that need this workforce. The problem is also linked to national identity, a sensitive topic that can have flavours of racism, but is felt vividly by many across the West, this especially following the aftermath of the Arab Spring and implosions of a few countries in the Middle East that triggered mass-immigration. The second issue for many voters who followed populist parties, was excessive diversity that seemed to decrease the prospects of many voters to reach what they saw as their natural roles in society, especially among white males – again, as seen in the US. 

Populist parties have exploited these two sensitive issues for electoral gains as they saw them as an easier way to deal with voter resentment in order to increase their positions and eventually win power. As previously stated, the problem is that, while such an approach can help populists win votes, it does not change the fact that most, if not all, populist leaders are ill-equipped to manage governments, all the more so in our intricate times. The French have always enjoyed graduates of top graduate schools to eventually manage their country (especially ENA or Ecole Nationale d’Administration since 1945) while the would-be hard-right populist presidential candidate in 2027, Jordan Bardella, a very nice and appealing young man of 29, is only a high school graduate. Populists focus on the message (borrowing much from the show business world to make it more appealing) and the resentment, also playing on an anti-elite feeling often with candidates who seem culturally and socially closer to their electorates. There is little doubt that populists are good salesmen as seen with an ever-present Nigel Farage and his new post-Brexit Reform UK or with Alice Weidel for the AfD in Germany (with Prussia or eastern Germany being a new and for some historically natural home for the party). The focus of populist parties is clearly on easy-to-understand harsh policies that should respond quickly and drastically to the resentment of many voters who feel societally lost and forgotten by what they see as the established elite of our times. 

One of the key tools, at times not planned but certainly exploited by the populists, has been the rise of social media with its influencers and the sad fact that younger generations do not read as much as older ones when they read at all (also explaining the demise of traditional newspapers and magazines and the rise of subscription prices many of us witness). People do not “think” as they did when they ever do and, as such, are more prone to being influenced, all the more by easy solutions to complex issues, also where their management is not the core focus of the primarily attractive message. The perceived inability of getting things done by traditional politicians and parties and radical game-changing options are the core and increasingly well-received message of populists, enhanced by new and constant social media, to gain power today.    

The centre is seen as reflecting a broken society where nothing voters want can happen efficiently, due to the slow and sub-efficient process often attached to democratic institutions. Voters who vote for populist candidates and parties want quick policy results, often not realising that such regimes they want will likely one day stop asking for their votes. It is actually possible today, however, that many voters – hopefully a minority – would not miss democracy and their voting rights if they saw their key wishes being implemented, though populist management efficiency is not likely to be there in the first place. However, with time, lasting autocracy and its likely features like official and natural corruption, would likely be resented even by those who brought it to power.   

Managing government in Western democracies will always be a complex enterprise mixing short- and long-term issues, often delicate in nature and taking time to get results seen by electorates.  The system is not broken, but is facing a new social media era combined with a breed of politicians across the West primarily focused on winning elections at all costs and not thinking about what it means to be in power in a democratic context. Easy populism and government efficiency are de facto antinomic, all the more in a true democratic context. Managing government may be increasingly seen as inefficient and boring but only reflects a very involved process and set of steps that are today needed to keep democracy alive and indeed working. It is the work of centrist parties and politicians to get this message across, also using the new media tools of our times. 

Warmest regards,

Serge                          

Trying to understand and cure the rise of populism across the West

8.4.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

As there is a global flood of much-needed pieces written about the Trump 2.0 chaotic developments and their expected negative impact on the world, I thought that it was useful to take a pause from the matter and instead, explore their root causes in the US but also across the West. Why have we seen such a rise in populism or essentially extreme-right programs and leaders across the West over the last 15 years with an acute focus today? 

Before the Trump era, especially from the 2.0 vintage, America never experienced populism, at least since the 20th century. If anything, America stood for democratic values and principles, both as leader and guarantor of what was known as the Free World. America greatly benefitted from its leadership at many cultural, political and economic levels. Europe was naturally deeply hurt by Hitler, Mussolini and Franco and others who led autocracies, at times not wholly rejected by their own populations (this leading to major wars and conflicts), while the Cold War ended with a victory for the West and democracy. The 1990s brought peace within the whole West including the whole of Europe as well as incremental globalisation linked to peace through trade; but gradually, while Russia operated a return of history, old and new extremist political platforms rebuilt their appeal among an increasing share of the Western populations. 

Trump’s MAGA base or indeed “cult”, a most successful populist gathering focused on one leader, who “represents” about 25% of the actively voting electorate and 50% of the Republican voters (as of early March, so just before the recent chaos), was a new development not seen since Charles Lindbergh and his America First in the 1930s. France’s National Rally is the child of the National Front created by Jean-Marie Le Pen (with former Vichy government and terrorist OAS partners) in the late 1960s and now led by his daughter Marine Le Pen – much in the news following her recent court conviction. While Reform UK may espouse some extremist views, and is led by Nigel Farage, an ill-fated Brexit-maker, a rapidly rising Alternative for Germany, led by Alice Weidel, with an unusual gay profile for far-right parties, also reflects its Prussian if not Soviet-controlled past given its core geographic base. And then we see the likes of Victor Orban, formerly a rather liberal politician, who seized upon autocratic features to help him keep securing his 15-year hold over Hungary, this with all the geopolitical implications we know. All those parties and individuals either secured power via elections, like with MAGA and Trump in the US (while hijacking a traditional party) or are in a position to win one like with Marine Le Pen in France, if not for her embezzlement conviction and ineligibility pre-mid-2026 appeal outcome. While the extreme right was always there and a medium to promote the career of its leaders, the political landscape of the West has drastically changed in recent years, now allowing them to win elections. It is good to attempt an understanding of why, and to see what could be done to reverse this trend. 

The political landscape has changed mainly as politics and elections, as well as society, have changed too. Winning elections today is increasingly a show business endeavour where party leaders, all the more coming from extremist and populist groups, need to appeal to voters who want simple solutions to complex issues and some degree of flamboyance. The desired simplicity is often driven by voters not being equipped to understand how societies and indeed governments are being managed, or how the world actually works. The lack of education for many is also mixed with a feeling of disgruntlement against an established elite that would have deprived them of many benefits they would have kept for themselves. This approach is often associated with a reading inability (the illiteracy rate in America is amazingly high even if not often mentioned) – this while traditional media readership is declining – and an excessive reliance on social media and podcasts that fit their desire to hear what they want. This fact is also often combined with an increased isolation rate and the inability to “exchange” on issues, especially among the younger generations, that worsens the drive for simple and game-changing solutions to their perceived problems. 

Most populist party voters are not neo-Nazis, even if they can be found among them. Voters are often driven by topics that one can understand, even if the populist solutions on offer are not the best ones to achieve what they want and keep the essence of what is democracy – which in any case they may no longer understand nor value. Trump won in November 2024 on three key drivers that many voters supported. Beyond the obvious one of ensuring prices would stay low at the shopping centre (definitely not what is happening), the two other populist drivers were illegal immigration and the so-called “woke”. Illegal immigration as a political topic can be tainted with racism but also reflects cultural identity and making sure migrants are not criminals, something that residents of borders like in Texas, can be forgiven to want. “Woke,” which can also be known as DEI (diversity, equality and inclusion) which, while projecting sound values in essence, can also be too extreme in its promotion, especially within schools and companies, where “excellence” may not always have been seen of late as the key admission, recruitment or advancement driver. Once again, the problem is with “too much” immigration, in particular of the illegal kind, and too much “woke”, all the more in the face of those who behave according to traditional and tested values like excellence or common sense. Understanding these key points is key to ensuring sound immigration and diversity, while traditional parties and governments have often missed the point, appearing to live in what they saw as new times as a result, and hoping to gain votes in other segments of the voting population. In many ways, populists often win because traditional parties and mainstream governments miss what matters to the general population of voters, many of whom will try new and often wild avenues. Trump 2.0 is a case in point even if, in this unusual case, the harm to America and the world is found at all levels of domestic and foreign policies, going well beyond the three focus drivers of its unwittingly self-harmed voters. The hugely negative impact of Trump tariffs is only one very vivid example of what ill-thought-out populist policies can achieve in no time in the globalised world today.  

Populist parties or movements, often led by people who can today expertly sell and win an election, are too often (if not always) poorly equipped to govern in the ways most voters would expect, based on past experience with traditional parties. Even if these movements have successfully seized issues that have created resentment among disenfranchised voters, the end result can be chaotic. Trump 2.0 is again a vivid example of this inability to manage a government sensibly, both domestically and internationally, with all the chaos that can follow that their own voters may also pay for (all the more when adults are no longer in the room as they were in Trump 1.0). It is clear that the way to exclude easy populist salespeople from running governments in the future is to let them show their inabilities once in power, but the key problem is that they can then also create autocracies with no future elections in sight (will there really be US mid-terms in 2026?) or create wars and conflicts to change the electorate’s focus on what is not working (what about a war with China to make my voters forget the damages?) Having said this, it is also the duty of traditional parties to keep ensuring their programmes fit the needs of voters and their leadership teams are strong to soundly convince them, and then run governments efficiently and deal with issues that matter.   

The rise of populism can be repelled but only through focusing on ways to do so at many levels and not simply wishing for the best. Society and governing will never be ideal, and many issues will always remain, but preserving true democracy as we know it, for those countries that still enjoy it, is key. Populism and disgruntlement will never die but can be managed to avoid or minimize substantial harm to all parties, including populist voters who often are the first to feel the pain. If anything, the Trump 2.0 experiment, which will be harder to defend by its makers, is a case in point even if the cost of being right is too high.

One of the key decisions which traditional governments still in power should take, and working along democratic values and principles (like in most of the EU and hopefully later in the US in a post-Trump world if any) is to focus on “educating” their electorate by making them understand what is behind democracy, government and their electoral process. In addition, governments should explain what they do at the economic, social and foreign policy levels, this in concise information letters or via internet to all citizens. Education is key to changing the minds as to how democracy works, its benefits and key features. While not perfect, it would be a sound start. 

Going more deeply, a stronger focus on mandatory public education through expanded funding would also help children and young adults to think more carefully about the benefits of Western democracies while preparing them better for a happy and productive life, hopefully gradually away from phones and other screens. In many ways, especially for Europe, strengthening education and defence should be the two joint pillars of dealing efficiently with our new world and its threats. 

As to the impact on the younger generations of social media, abusive video games and not reading books or mainstream newspapers, it’s up to all of us – at a family level – to try to make children understand the benefits of sound thinking devoid of easy manipulations and avoid the hours spent in self-imposed jail-like bedroom isolation. It is the duty of our new times.       

Warmest regards,

Serge