Three key geopolitical points for the West going forward


Dear Partners in Thought,

As the world hears from a leader who thinks that one can rationalize the Ukraine invasion by stressing that it is business as usual in 2022 Europe, and that like Peter the Great it is not about conquest but returning lands to Russia, three key geopolitical points should come to the European and indeed Western minds.

  1. The Transatlantic Alliance is essential

Since the beginning of what was now the first Cold War, the stability of Europe was based on the cultural and ideological bond between the US and European countries which, through NATO, guaranteed the future of the old continent. Today, and while years went by (and the last thirty were focused on global trade), Europe was suddenly thrown back to a forgotten era where the worst can happen – all the more as the Kremlin may be even less rational in its behavior than during the Soviet days. The West and Europe are facing a Russian existential crisis at multiple levels. The current perception of decline and under-achievement experienced at the top of Russia can only be relieved by the triggering of once-forsaken tools – like the invasions of European neighbors, regardless of their justifications – so leadership and domestic order are also preserved at all costs. The only way forward for Europe and the West is to fall back to a tried-and-tested approach, embodied by the Transatlantic Alliance and NATO reflecting values that bind the two sides of the Atlantic pond – regardless of all the societal challenges we know on each side today. There is no other way to uphold what we call the Western way of life, and indeed civilization.

  1. A stronger Europe is key

While Europe needs a strong American leadership, and would hope for a more united America at home, the West (and indeed America and NATO) need a stronger Europe. This means a Europe that spends more on its defense, and a European Union that focuses on this existential feature – in a non-fragmented way, beyond trade and other key matters. The recent moves by Germany to allocate EUR 100bn in a cross-party way to its defense – in a rupture to decades of post-war challenges to deal with anything military on a grand scale – is an essential component of this change. The drive by France to have the EU focus more on defense and security, even before the Ukraine invasion, was prescient and is now required at all costs. Europe needs to think in terms of defending its very existence before factors such as inflationary pressures or costs related to energy and food shortages – even if it needs to find ways to work on new and efficient supply chains in this respect. Denmark, Finland and Sweden – all historically the opposite of defense-focused countries – have already changed their ways very rapidly. The stronger Europe – and indeed the EU – focus on defense and security (Britain may or may not rejoin the EU at some point, with polls increasingly showing the strategic mistake of leaving its “club”), the more they will naturally work closely with the US, which will welcome the change, via NATO and associated channels. Ideally (and for the West’s and America’s benefits), NATO should gradually be more of a partnership of “relative equals”.

  1. A clear and strong approach to Putin is crucial

While we hear that it would be better not to humiliate or corner a Russia (the first point relating to the revanchist consequences of Versailles 1919, though also implying the Kremlin’s defeat) that has demonstrated both a return to the ways of early 20th century Europe, and a clear strategic and military ineptitude, it is essential not to forget all the lessons of history. Accommodating dictators only works for a short time while they continue unfolding their grand strategy, all the more if they control their own country and there is no local opposition to stop them. Munich in 1938 showed the world that appeasement does not work and leads to far worse developments. While not humiliating Putin would make rational sense as President Macron said, Cartesian thinking is absent from the Kremlin’s mind – assuming it was ever there. Only determination, even at high Western financial and other costs, can ensure that Russia is stopped, and that change can happen for the benefit of all parties – including Russia in the long term. Western “war fatigue” is neither acceptable nor desirable. This avenue is not without pains and sacrifices for the West, but would ensure that Europe stays Europe. By assisting Ukraine, even if never a role model for Western values and principles, and winning the war, we would guarantee that Europe and the West (and what they stand for) will prevail in the end. There should be no other choice for a Western strategy that should not be weakened by nuclear deterrence, all the more so as Russia would also lose in that context.

Both a historically-strong America, and a newly-stronger Europe are needed in a renewed and essential transatlantic partnership that stands tough to Russia, and can fully express its common values-based identity. Lastly the West cannot let the Ukraine invasion become an example to be followed in other parts of the world, which goes beyond Europe’s remit but would have similar negative global impacts.

Warmest regards,