politics – Desperate Measures

Getting a better grasp of Trump’s wide range of destructive policies

5.2.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

It has been hard not to write about the impact of Trump 2.0 on the world and America itself over the last 12 months. There were too many hard-to-follow policies at too many levels, usually with no clear ideology but a need for action; this, it would appear, without a proper understanding of their impact nor the need for any careful management. It is clear that the senior team around President Trump, be they White House advisers or key US Secretaries, are also far from being “The Best and the Brightest” to borrow from David Halberstam’s book on the JFK team. It was hard to follow what was happening, even if it became clear that these multiple policies were destructive at all levels and erratic in nature, though reflecting a gradually ageing, hyper-sensitive and mean leader of what was the Western or Free World.

It is hard for many of us, who liked America very much for its values and principles, to manage happily this descent into hell. It is clear that not supporting and being critical of Trump is not being anti-American as the international reactions to the likely mid-terms results, if they are not cancelled or “managed”, will show in eight months as the slide will continue. It is also true that not all of Trump’s decisions to deal with some key issues were fundamentally wrong, even if usually badly managed. A case in point would be the fight against crime also linked to illegal or uncontrolled immigration (the latter itself associated for many with a disappearing national identity), a dual matter always hard to manage by more traditional governments, also in Europe, that explains the steep rise of hard right, not very government-competent, populist parties.

I think it is useful to take a non-emotional pause to carefully review the whole picture of Trump’s policies that are destroying the world order as we knew it and America itself. Here is a list of key policies and developments (in no specific order as it goes), which, combined together over one year, offers a drastic picture one tends to miss as a whole, particularly given their never-ending deployments:

Tariffs led the world trade destruction from day one and were also used as a tool to obtain political gains, this even if the new TACO acronym stressed the unbelievable back and forth of huge tariff strikes aimed at trading partners. All while such a policy would end up being paid by many of the Trump voters at the shopping mall. And as many US brands see a steep decline in sales in Europe that is not yet widely reported.
The unusually aggressive stances with allies, like NATO members, as seen with the plan to get Greenland away from Denmark against its will, led to the gradual downfall of the Western alliance with Europe now being more responsible for its future (not a bad thing) but weakening trust among key allies while heavily damaging the West.
The drive to achieve peace at all costs (motivated by the Nobel Prize?) while not often caring for the interests of the clearly aggressed and being unbelievably too nice with the aggressor, as seen with Ukraine and Russia (even if coercing India via tariff decreases not to buy crude oil from Russia).
The unseen, so far, use of the National Guard in DC or an untrained ICE in various cities, usually run by the Democrats, with a very driven deportation agenda, the latter with no constraints and sheer violence while the Homeland Security leadership would lie without reservation as to why all was fine, like after clear murders of largely peaceful protestors in Minneapolis, with the White House forced to finally react. All while hurting the US economy by depriving it overnight of key respectable workers like in the agriculture or retail sectors, all the more in red states.
The announced firings of up to three hundred thousand federal employees (many having already left) in key departments that would result in lesser key services across the country that would hurt Americans, this without any clear financial gains to justify reaching such a bad situation in an already expensive country when dealing with health and other costs. And the attacks against the Federal Reserve’s independence, as seen with the unusual targeting of chairman Jerome Powell.
The destruction of key foundations and art centres like the renaming of the Trump Kennedy Center while finally deciding to close it down for two years, also as many artists would cancel their performances in protest, at times being sued by Trump. Similarly, the destruction of the East Wing of the White House to make a new ballroom funded by sycophantic supporters, many converted from the Big Tech world. And now a new ego-driven monument to supposedly celebrate the country’s 250^th anniversary that would be higher than the Lincoln Memorial, not to mention a statue of Christopher Columbus as “the original American hero” outside the White House, apparently to gain the good graces of Italian-American voters.
The personal family enrichment of the Trump family (USD 4bn according to the New York Times) and friends like the Witkoffs, all while Jared Kushner does deals with Saudi Arabia as he and Steven Witkoff negotiate peace in the Middle East. All of this while astutely promoting cryptocurrency at the federal level (also making Trump’s 19-year-old son Barron USD 180mn richer). And Melania receiving at least USD 28mn for her documentary funded by Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, a practical friend of the family.
The incessant attacks against top world-ranked universities like Harvard or Columbia with the former just being sued by Trump for USD 1bn in damages, probably to please his anti-elite and remote MAGA base. It is amusing that Yale went unscathed so far – not for being the cradle of the CIA, but perhaps as Mr JD and Ms UB Vance were its law school graduates. Through these attacks, often using campus antisemitism as a strange and unfounded driver, Trump is gradually destroying one of the key tenets of American leadership.
The pardons of most, if not all, of the “January 6” offenders who, supporting a then-defeated Trump, stormed the Capitol, leading to nearly 200 police injuries and contributing to the death of five police officers in 2020, as well as many financial fraudsters, some naturally including cryptocurrency founders who broke many laws in creating a new and questionable financial asset while enriching themselves without control.
The termination of American support of various international agreements (like the Paris climate change COP 15), stopping of foreign aid (like with the withdrawal from the World Health Organisation or the dismantling of USAID), the end of promoting democracy in key geographies (like with the defunding of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) or hurting international institutions that helped manage the world for 80 years like the United Nations (with the so-called Board of Peace to manage Gaza where questionable countries like Russia were also invited as members). Trump 2.0 definitely put a stop to the post-WW2 international organisation system and its many development institutions that was so sound to keep a peaceful and growing world.
The unusual high-level lawsuits from Trump against American media companies and today even financial institutions and their leaders that would have shown no respect to him. Various US newspapers of the first order were massively sued while the BBC was also on the receiving end of a USD 5bn lawsuit and Jaimie Dimon, head of J.P. Morgan (who might have also been a bit too honest in his exchanges with The Economist’s Editor-in-Chief Zanny Minton Beddoes at Davos in January) is being unexpectedly sued for another USD 5bn, Trump arguing he would always donate the money gained in any of these trials. It is clear that such an approach may result in an even more passive business establishment, which may explain the Trump drive.
A rising desire from Trump to intervene abroad, like in Venezuela, where an admittedly bad leader was captured in what was a James Bond-type operation but one that is not usually conducted by international law-respectful powers. While Trump’s MAGA base was always keen on making sure America would no longer go into “foreign wars”, it is not clear if some might not change their mind as big wins might help doing so. The Caracas operation should clearly worry Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei and Middle Eastern peace today, all the more as the US fleet is waiting for a potential green light.
One of the last strange policies of note, even if minor in relative terms, was to require foreigners visiting the US to show a five-year history of social media to ensure that no critics of America, even Europeans, would enter the new Trump Kingdom. It is amusing to think that this measure might have affected the likes of then South African Elon Musk and German Peter Thiel as they should impact many Indian natives going to make Silicon Valley stronger – but we know that the Big Tech Bros would find a way for their staff to bypass these harsh rules. Clearly, I would likely not make it to my beloved Virginia under this new rule. Until 2027 maybe.

While not yet a policy, we also hear that Trump would now like to change how Americans vote at the booth or from a distance as he apparently feels that too many immigrants abuse the system, which may seem odd to those who know how voting works. He would also want a national federal-controlled system of voting that would bypass some states and districts which the public is gradually discovering. This, after redistricting attempts, is the latest move Trump tried to mitigate the likely bad results of the November 2026 mid-terms. It looks so preposterous that such a sudden pre-election change would seem hard to enact – in normal times.

To be fair, Trump’s team and supporters would point to rising financial markets as seen with the Dow Jones index in 2025 even if stock markets are fuelled by short term gains, moving back and forth depending on the news of the day while AI was a major performance booster so far – until a potential crash. As for US inflation, it would seem that statistics can be used to defend any good or bad theory, while it seems to have held firm at about 2.7% while job unemployment climbed to +4.6% also due to federal jobs being cancelled. As for US GDP growth, we saw a roller coaster likely due to the impact of trade policies with a growth of 4.3%. One would need a PhD in economics to be able to assess the quality of the statistics describing the health of the US economy today, all the more given the political environment.

Even if it may seem daunting, it is hard not to feel a gradual descent into, so far, a mild autocracy In America at the federal level even if many states and their judges are fighting back case after case. It could also be the start of a new form of civil war involving blue states against red states though more likely a Trump-led federal administration against nearly all states as even many Red ones start seeing the light.

Who wins from such a descent into hell for the world and America? As stated before, a pragmatic China is a clear winner also as the likes of Europe will try to deepen ties with Beijing but also New Delhi as seen with the unforeseen EU-India trade pact. And finally, Russia to some extent, given the wedge created with Europe and as America is less directly anti-Russian, especially when it comes to its historical imperial needs in the now (and hopefully not post-Trump) White House-forgotten continent of its own roots. What Trump does not see is that Europe may also become stronger by sheer necessity and more unified (with Britain being closer to the EU or eventually re-joining it). It is hard to see how America will benefit from this range of policies, that would also limit its true sphere of influence to its own Southern hemisphere as seemingly wanted by a 1930s Trump. The only good news is that this long list of amazingly bad policies is very likely to lead American voters to stop the nightmare in November 2026 even if Trump should still have two years in the White House, even as a diminished President. The unexpected results of a state Senate election in a strong Texas red district in early February should show the way. History will tell.

Warmest regards,

Serge

Trump, the world destroyer

23.1.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

It is hard to believe that one year into Trump 2.0 we are in a situation where the future of the Western world, including America itself, and globalisation is looking very bad. Trump was always a dangerous, but very few would have predicted the insane unfolding scenario we witness on a daily basis. There are so many features of Trump’s destructive policies that affect all parties globally that they are at times hard to follow, which may be a tactical approach in itself.

Trump’s ever deal-making and at times punishing tariffs approach has hurt all parties, including the US and its very voting base in terms of affordability, all while breaking trust between trading partners. Globalisation, or peace through trade, have been affected to a degree that the White House and its advisers do not realise yet. The anti-immigration drive, with its awful deportations often involving honest people who contributed to the US economy and its tragic developments, like in Minneapolis, has now created the grounds for a quasi-civil war in the making. While Trump was going as usual back and forth with his threats, seizing control of an allied sovereign territory, like Greenland, which cooperated with America for decades, would have been the unbelievable end of NATO and the Western alliance – not to mention a potential massive conflict in the making. In the end, a framework agreement with NATO to strongly enhance Arctic security changed Trump’s approach within hours at the World Economic Forum in Davos. While all of Trump’s policies are not always bad, these are only a few key examples of a massively destructive drive of the Trump administration, with the latter being the most worrying for our world as it weakened the needed trust between key historical allies, even if a workable solution was finally found.

It is hard to believe that those voters who backed Trump in November 2024 would all rejoice at what we see today. Some still do. While Trump’s poll ratings have declined massively after one year, there are still some Americans – a clear minority – who think all is fine and we should all wear MAGA hats and sing his praises. It is today a combination of deeply disgruntled individuals who think America and the world did not treat them well at the personal level while hating Democrats who went too far on issues like diversity, that did not help them either. Many Trump voters are by-and-large uneducated or with very few degrees, often passport-less and living in marginalised and increasingly empty states, while they hate the traditional and often urban elite they also resent as having stolen their future. There are naturally some highly pragmatic educated ones who feel that their interest is to follow the supreme leader as it is best in the short-term for their career or financial interests – this including among others all the officials working directly or indirectly for the Trump administration, many elected Republican officials or Big Tech Bros and their teams and followers. The Trump support base is a strange and diverse one, all the more so today. Such a group will dwindle over time, but perhaps not before domestic and global chaos may prevail.

Even if the outline of an agreement with NATO was finally and unexpectedly found at Davos, the end of the Western military alliance linked to the threat of a military seizure of a sovereign Greenland or, as a latest Trump option, its forceful control “of a piece of ice”, would have definitely meant the end of the Western world as we have known it since WW2. A world where the US assumed a clear and highly beneficial leadership at all levels while Europeans naturally relied too much on the big American brother for its defence. The end of NATO would de facto have been a victory for Putin’s Russia, confirming the many views that Trump always liked Putin too much (as seen with peace attempts on Ukraine), as if he was working for him, willingly or not. In many ways, seizing Greenland would have been for Trump what Ukraine has been for Putin in a return or, more aptly, the acceptance of 21^st century superpower supremacy and its associated means. As Trump’s aggressive approach over weeks created deep angst and broke the trust Europeans need in the key transatlantic alliance, such a move, in spite of a last-minute likely agreement with NATO, should make China stronger and Europe closer to it as previously stressed and now agreed by many leading foreign policy experts and media. It is now clear that quite a few Republican US Senators will be gradually waking up to the fact that Trump’s moves may serve the interests of their nation’s old foes while weakening its core alliance and America itself.

It may be time to realise that Trump is losing his mind as gradually seen by his long and rambling aggressive speeches where sentences are never finished. His key speech in Davos (funnily the emblem of globalisation) stressed Trump’s wild and dangerous incoherence, all the more regarding what he really wanted to do or not with Greenland, also oblivious to his MAGA base’s key rejections. Trump is clearly no longer “there” while nobody in his team will stand up to him as they would have in his first term. His core team of Secretaries are not equipped to do their jobs – stating their names is no longer required – while too obedient to say anything, job preservation being their key driver. While a deranged individual is running the White House and the leading country in the world, there is no safeguard to put him in check, even at the US Supreme Court level with its clear obedient majority. It is as if Trump could do anything he wanted, whatever the outcome for America and the world while enriching himself and his family and friends without any societal backlash.

One would hope that many Republican elected officials in the US House of Representatives and Senate will wake up and finally focus on the interests of their country and indeed those of the world. It is not too late, but nine months before the mid-terms, when Trump could become a lame duck, is a long time, all the more if further Greenland invasion-like developments bring Western chaos and might be an easy reason to suspend elections too. Crazy scenarios for sure, but we live in Trump times where everything, especially awful developments are possible.

Once again, it is not being anti-American to wish for Trump’s demise (some even waiting for a new Lee Harvey Oswald, all the more in the NRA-friendly and mass shooting America), which could lead to a more reasonable approach to the strategic management of the leader of the Free World. It is clear that one should hope for a gradual and stronger rise of the institutions that made America (as happily seen with so many judges across the land) to stop this massive and, so far, historically unseen drift in governance that will hurt itself and our world. One major benefit for Europe of Trump’s erratic and aggressive approach to the key transatlantic relationship is that it should make it stronger and more independent. Trump may indeed have been the unwitting unifier of Europe. We should naturally all support changes that will bring America back to its roots, values and principles while ensuring a sound leadership and partnership of our Western world.

Warmest regards,

Serge

Food for thought on the potential impacts of the Donroe doctrine

13.1.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

As much is written about the amazing post-Venezuela “James Bond” operation and the Donroe doctrine (I like to facetiously call the Duckroe doctrine), I thought it was interesting to think about what could be its impacts in terms of geostrategy, especially for Europe, as we potentially enter a new and challenging era.

Europe has relied on America for its defence for 80 years since the end of WW2 that ensured a clear Western leadership for the US, bringing it massive benefits, even if easily forgotten by the current White House. It is clear that Europe needs now to strengthen its own defence, as it will do, while working on maintaining the best possible Transatlantic alliance through NATO, even if dealing with the occasional strategic American moves from another age at least until their mid-terms in November. However, it is useful to see what could happen, also from a European standpoint, with impacts on the US, if Washington were to keep going down the globally dangerous and self-hurting path it showed in the last few months.

It is clear that America’s move against the Maduro regime, while being imperialistic in nature due to the nature of regime change, set a precedent for America (even if the Grenada and Panama operations are remembered). Putting aside the wide agreement that Maduro was a dictator also involved in very bad activities and the main oil reason for the drastic move, it is clear that such an operation puts the US in a different light as a country that upheld and promoted the vanishing international legal principles that mostly drove our world or indeed the West for decades. So, while the Donroe doctrine is clear about America “controlling” its Southern Hemisphere, at times enlarged up North, it creates serious potential conflicts, also with traditional allies like Europe. The desire to annex Greenland for security purposes could be a start of a new “America First” superpower and the end of the strongest alliance the West has ever known. In some ways, it would show that Trump and Putin are moved by the same imperialistic flavour, also not thinking about the costs to their own people, which may be a sad and unexpected reality for them too.

Europe is now waking up to a new world and will gradually strengthen itself in defence and related sectors as its populations will gradually see the dangers they could face with a return of history. Some education and sound messaging will naturally be needed so the new world, away from social media and video games, is fully understood before it is too late. History will tell. It is useful to think about the impact of an America First approach to Europe and what would happen in terms of strategic repositioning.

A key impact of Trump’s America First policy could be for Europe to focus on creating a sounder partnership with China. Even if China is not a Western style democracy, Xi is first and foremost a pragmatic leader, all the more in their relatively challenging economic times. While there are always invasion noises about Taiwan and the West should put the right pressure on Beijing, Xi has nothing to gain from pursuing an existential and historical quest that would only would bring havoc. It is also clear that protecting Taiwan could be a tool for cementing a partnership with China, the upside being more important for Beijing than rewriting history going back to 1949. Such a European move, that would be seen as extreme in nature, would only parallel the America First one if it lasted.

A second facet of Europe’s strategic repositioning would be to work with Britain on doing a sound Brexit reset as the Starmer government would like, this even if it is a complex and hard issue, also given the current political polls. It is clear that a majority of Britons see today the 2016 referendum as a mistake that was fuelled by the personal ambitions of a few politicians. The EU has never been a perfect body and will always need to adjust its rules and ways to be more efficient and fit the evolving times, but it is a sheer fact that Europeans will be stronger “together”, also if an America First era were to keep going. It is clear that a populist Trump may actually have hurt the position of Reform’s Farage via his imperialistic drives which makes a lonely Britain more at risk. On a funny note, Brussels in reset discussions with London, would want a “Farage clause” involving a pay-out provision (on both sides) to ensure that a party, that would leave a new agreement, would face – this with the 2029 parliamentary elections in mind and a potential Farage PM, even if populist parties may be weaker even across Europe by then.

A third impact of the America First Trump policies may be that the first political parties to gradually be weakened will indeed be the European populist parties as their own voters may wake up to a changing world led by a leading populist. The main strength of these parties is the hard messaging and their abilities to win votes from disgruntled individuals who are fed up with traditional democratically-minded politicians and slow-moving sound policies. The likely shocks of Trump policies at all levels, but mainly in terms of their own costs of living, might bring some old-fashioned and forgotten realism into their thinking and indeed voting.

A fourth facet of the impact of an America First could be for some countries, including those in the Trump imperial America in Central and South America, to get closer to Europe. It is clear that Mexico would be open to it while the Mercosur agreement with the EU, which took decades to be signed, but was concluded in a matter of recent weeks (even if not all EU countries, like France, were totally happy) shows an unmissable sign that countries, that may not oppose the US frontally, are reacting through astute diversification drives as seen with Latin America even if many will argue about this, all the more in Washington. Clearly Canada, which is close to the EU, has already taken that European road, with a clever PM who used to manage the UK’s central bank and was very clear with Washington about what mattered.

These are only a few examples of what could and will happen if an America First era were to last and destroy many features of the “old world” order, like globalisation or NATO. Some countries will potentially be more at risk than others, like Ukraine (that will clearly be supported by Europe if only for its own defence) while others, like Russia, would enjoy the new era allowing them to keep existing as the US would keep withdrawing from Europe. It is of course hard to understand why the Trump administration does not grasp the dangers of an America First policy, which may be linked to the mediocre executive leadership all can see today but it is a fact that requires action, all the more from the part of Europe. It is indeed sad to be where we are as America reaches its 250^th anniversary and it forgets its roots.

It should be clear that I take no pleasure in stressing these potential impacts and passing for anti-American, which I never was. This country helped me become who I am in my twenties with its values and principles that were always sound. America was never perfect (too many guns at home, a clear focus on money first, a high cost of education) but was overall a great country, which its movies with the likes of John Wayne and Gary Cooper had shaped my childhood. I would therefore wish for the Trump administration to see the light (as more and more Republican officials now do) and naturally lose the mid-terms in November, so we can gradually go back to sound Western sanity – all while Europe keeps being more autonomous and a better partner in defence.

Warmest regards,

Serge

A new and stronger Europe in the making

16.12.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

2025 will be remembered as a year of drastic change in terms of the world which we knew, all the more so in relation to the post-WW2 transatlantic alliance, which kept us away from war, and then brought us many features of a peace through trade in a globalised world. Trump 2.0 and its autocratic and nationalistic 1930s America First approach is gradually destroying the sound Western world we knew, while America is rejecting the benefits of its leadership as seen with the new US National Security Strategy. While not making America stronger, as it will keep paying for the erratic and self-harming Trump policies, the new era that Europe is abruptly faced with should not be seen as the decline of a continent which once led the world. Trump, while destroying a civilisation, is in fact giving the opportunity to Europe to be more unified and stronger by taking sound political, economic and defence directions.

The US National Security Strategy is critical of a weak Europe that relied upon the US for its defence while not focusing on being militarily independent enough, preferring to devote funding to economic and social matters. There is no doubt that Europe, before and after the EU, chose to give America the leadership of the Western world, including its own defence, even if some countries like France and the UK developed serious military forces on their own. The weight of the WW2 tragedy was deeply felt across the continent and the desire of a strong America to take the Western defence leadership, also for its many geostrategic and economic benefits, strengthened with the 1949 creation of NATO as the Cold War took off, were serious drivers. European countries did indeed follow the clear US lead on defence matters while participating as much as they could, given their relative strengths and abilities. The European approach to its own defence is now seen as unacceptable and cheap complacency by today’s America as that view also fits the America First nationalistic agenda and focus on its own Southern hemisphere. However, this unexpected change in a key 80-year policy should lead Europe to reshape its own approach to geostrategic and related priorities.

It is now time for Europe to be in charge of its defence while keeping working with the US as part of NATO. It is likely that the Trump era will be seen as a strategic mistake, also by America at the polls, given the impact on their own society. On a personal note, and having grown up shaped by the old American values and principles we all knew while having many American friends who are like me, there is no doubt that the US will eventually come back to the sound country and Western leader it was. A strong majority of Americans will realise that the Trump adventure is self-destroying at too many levels, even if some key Trump topics, like immigration and its key link to national identity, should be better managed, also in the whole West. While we should all hope that the Americans will wake up in the mid-terms and later in 2028, it does not change the fact that Europe needs to show more resolve regarding its own future at the level of the EU – Europe today and tomorrow – in terms of decision-making and notably defence.

The clearest show of independence for Europe will be to devote more funding to its defence, and indeed technology sectors, in focusing on the right segments and develop start-ups that will be instrumental in developing Europe’s strength and independence – again in partnership with an America which should gradually find itself again. A new balance in the US-European relationship is needed. This new focus on defence will also need to be done in real partnership among EU members and in ways that need to be fully understood by the European populations that are Europe. There will also be a need to change EU decision-making and avoid being stopped by one or a few member states that happen to have geostrategic links to the obvious threat that is represented by an aggressive Russia once again searching for its lost existence. Europe and the EU have the financial means to ensure its future (ten times Russia’s GDP) but need to redefine the proper mechanisms to achieve sound and time-efficient decisions. While improving its decision mechanisms, now should be a time on both sides of the Channel to welcome back Britain as a key member of the EU as we are simply stronger together, this regardless of the fact that working in a group, however sensible, is not always as easy as staying alone. It is time to forget the mistakes Brexit caused, often led by personal political ambitions, and are seen by many in the UK today, including increasingly in government and legislative circles. We are simply stronger together, all the more so in a divisive and unproductive Trump world.

One of the main European challenges in the short term will be to manage the current poll rise of the hard-right populist parties, some of its leaders – but not all – of whom find Russia not the threat that it is. However, and while Europe and its key countries like Britain, France and Germany should be better off with experienced mainstream parties at their lead, it is clear that hard right populist parties’ foreign policy programmes have meaningfully evolved, as seen with Giorgia Meloni in power in Italy even if the German AfD still shows its young age and inexperience. There are indeed critical matters that should get all Europeans to want to be more united and stronger in defence.

The road is clear and we should hope for the right focus to prevail, and soon. There is no other choice for Europe to exist and indeed build a great future for its new generations.

Warmest regards,

Serge

On the changing nature of the Western democratic landscape

24.11.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

While being a gifted amateur on matters of political science, all the more when they touch the essence of domestic politics in the Western democratic world, it is hard not to notice both in the US and across Europe a real shift of the political landscape. Adults living in the second half of the 20^th century would find it hard to relate to political forces opposing each other today at the electoral booth, in the streets and at the dinner tables.

The world evolves as we see with Big Tech (and now, even more so, AI), bringing drastic changes that supporters explain is akin to previous industrial revolutions. It is a fact, even if a dauting one, all the more for those who will be AI-jobless while the mega-tech billionaires will keep thriving. It would appear that our political landscape has gradually changed too over recent decades. There is no more of the usual fight between the once traditional right and left as they have actually also changed in nature and the left-right terminology no longer fully applies. Today some would argue that the divide is more between pro-democracy parties and mild autocracy ones. Others would see the divide between traditional centrist parties against hard right parties, the old social democratic left having been marginalised (like Mitterrand’s once powerful Socialist Party in France) if not taking a hard but unsuccessful version of its former self. Polarisation has also become the word of the day. And it is clear that many voters increasingly dissatisfied by traditional democratic parties in power have shifted their votes to hard right ones that have also gradually and smartly moderated their stances when closer to power, looking at the rare but so far highly practical and effective Meloni example in Italy.

It is clear that old right-wing parties like the Republican Party in the US under Trump have had to deal with a combination of White House autocratic leadership flavour with endless executive orders and retribution lawsuits against opponents, while experiencing an unexpected and odd left-wing protectionist shift against free trade that was a key historical tenet of the Grand Old Party. It is clear that Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush would be rather perplexed when looking at their own party today, even if many elected officials may gradually refocus on their core values as Trump’s poll rating keeps going down (35% post recent elections) – and they follow their natural job preservation mantra as already seen. The Democratic Party also went more left in a country where the word did not really exist, in order to accommodate at times the cultural and societal needs of its big urban centre voters, losing some of its centrism appeal on the way and paying for it dearly nationwide.

Unwanted immigration, regardless of any criminal feature and as it was perceived by many as altering national identity (even in a country of immigrants like the US), became a key factor in changing the Western political landscape. Fifteen years ago, the economy and “affordability” were the key issues for many voters (it still is as we see with Trump) but immigration waves, at times welcome by the likes of Angela Merkel due to the need to boost the national economy, brought many issues that gradually focused the voters’ minds and gave rise to hard-right parties, often led by good marketers, to increase their share of the vote. Today, they lead in the polls in the UK, France or even Germany (some even arguing, not crazily, that they even won in the US, historically the first democracy in the world).

As an aside, and even if potentially seen as a far-fetched point by some (if not many), one could argue that Osama bin Laden won in the end. While 9-11 was a horrible tragedy, it led to various US military operations in the Middle East that many felt warranted but led, years later, to the Arab Spring and a total dislocation of some of the regimes and countries in the region that fostered mass immigration waves with societal impacts, like security-related ones, that we keep seeing today. (Even the UK Labour government is now dealing with a change in its refugee asylum policy.) The current upheaval in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, following the retreat of the former French colonial power and its replacement by the new Wagner Group (interestingly named Africa Corps), allowed for regional Jihadists to be on the verge of seizing control of these countries, which might lead to another wave of immigration towards Europe as the horrific civil war in Sudan and the horrific Tanzanian developments easily could – and strengthen its far-right parties. As already stated, these far-right parties, that offer easy solutions to complex issues, provide new avenues for many easily swayed voters. These voters are frustrated by the often-slow pace and absence of clear results of democratic European governments that are also culturally attached to values and principles like human rights and a natural aversion to racism, making them struggle with managing issues like mass immigration from Africa and the Middle East, illegal or not, in the 21^st century. In some ways, and while American agriculture experiences strong labour shortages, the Trump team combined the fight against unwanted immigration with that against crime but also the drug trade, this also leading to drastic geostrategic and military developments as seen in Venezuela.

The new political landscape is linked to the fact that elections are a game today where the hard-right has shown uncanny excellence. Ideology matters less than dealing with some issues like immigration and affordability – at least in words, usually strong. The problem with hard-right parties, even if they can win elections, is that they are usually ill-equipped to manage governments efficiently while their programmes create strong, if not always violent, opposition, changing the very nature of life in some countries. An additional feature of some far-right parties, especially in Europe, is their closeness to Russia, which is today the natural enemy of democratic Western governments in the context of the Ukraine war and multiple daily disruptions led by Russian intelligence. It is clear that the rising AfD in Germany, Fico in Slovakia, Orbán in Hungary or some unexpected and unfit Babiš coalition partners in Czechia are not anti-Russian (to say the least), at times on energy grounds, even if Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France (in spite of her 2017 campaign previously funded by a Prague-based Russian bank) and clearly Meloni in power in Italy took their distance from Moscow, all the more as they know where their voters stand on the matter.

We live in a Western world where winning elections is the end game while governing has to be done but is often mismanaged, notably by hard-right leaders, with back and forth moves à la TACO as seen with Trump in less than one year. At least, we still benefit from a democratic environment and set-up which at times can put a stop to the overreach of some of the hard-right leaders as seen in America – but for how long? It is clear that it is key for increased voter participation in elections, as long as they are free and fair, especially from the younger generations who should focus more on their own future and manage their love of social media, if not video games, in a better self-preserving way. On the same note and as Erdoğan’s opposition leader and Mayor of Istanbul, now facing “2000 years” in jail for running a criminal organisation (real democracy in Istanbul?), said, it is key to “communicate” with everybody of all ages and political inclinations to foster dialogue and better understanding of what matters. As Ekrem İmamoğlu stressed in a great way all should remember: “People-ism against populism”.

Warmest regards,

Serge

Envisaging the likely scenarios post-hard right populism collapse in the West

10.11.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

I took a writing break these past two months as covering the ceaseless Trump developments, which many do across the pond, was becoming very toxic as an endless act of democratic despair. I decided to take up my pen again after telling some of my Financial Times writer friends what I thought the post-Trump era could bring, a topic that we see starting being covered as the tide may have turned following recent elections in the US. In doing so, I will focus on rational developments, short of revolutions while assuming democracy would still endure in our old West. This topic may not relate only to the US but also to quite a few key European countries like Britain, France and even Germany.

The Trump era is one of an abandonment of traditional values and principles that made America since 1776 and a rise of a form of – so far – mild autocracy seen with the exercise of executive powers that even a Trump-friendly US Supreme Court starts reviewing and questioning (for example with the implementation of systemic tariffs). As I covered at length and well beyond trade, the Trump administration pursued unusual policies such as deploying troops in large Democrat-led cities, attacking leading universities that paradoxically have “made America great”, mass-deporting immigrants at a time when they are needed by the US economy, all while making elitism a bad word so as to please a voting base of often non-college educated which is usually based in rural areas and states where the current Republican Party enjoys an already excessive representation set-up. Today Trump’s support stands at 37-39% after ten months. In Europe, populist parties lead the polls in Britain, Germany and France while at times disrupting the governmental process even if elections are not “planned” in the short term – for now. However, hard-right populists can win votes in responding to voters’ disappointment with the traditional parties by offering easy solutions to complex issues – their main strength – but they usually are ill-equipped to manage governments efficiently, often leading to the demise of coalitions in the short term, as recently seen in the Netherlands after only two years.

While hard-right populists increasingly win, as many voters are disappointed by the slow pace and perceived mismanagement of key issues – like, indeed, immigration – by liberal democracy and their traditional parties, they are often now supported by ultra-wealthy business leaders as seen with the “Big Tech Bros” in the US with Trump. While they often change their previously liberal essence to gain favour from Trump and the like, these business types help form an unusual leadership set-up that combines extremist politics and business (in the case of tech, also fostered by social media platforms those leaders helped create). The rise of the mega-billionaires under the Trump era is also a reflection of the demise of traditional capitalism, when ultra-money has become a leading value or objective of a tiny few at the expense of many, including those voters who supported the Trump rise and populist parties aspiring to gain power (see Elon Musk and the AfD in Germany, also his “market”). Money has become an excessive feature of modern society even among those who seemed to care about the “people” when realising that even Nancy Pelosi and her husband made USD 130 million in stock profit since 1988 when she was a member and then leader of the House of Representatives, a key public role.

It would appear that Gen Z and many young voters are now shifting leftwards as seen during the recent US elections as well as many Hispanics and Black Americans who had supported Trump in the 2024 elections, the latter that had created an odd coalition with the disgruntled and vastly white nationalist MAGA base. It would also not be surprising for many in the MAGA base to desperately shift their disgruntled extremism from a hard-right stance to a hard-left one, all the more after they deeply suffer economically from Trump’s policies while seeing the clear rise of the mega-billionaires who also keep reducing staff and indeed their jobs as seen with Amazon. While the younger generations are shifting leftwards both in the US and Europe, also in rejection of Big Money and its impact on society, it is possible that disappointed hard-right voters keen on extremist societal approaches, could join them and help creating a new seismic political shift.

Although it was not foreseen a few weeks ago, it is now possible that Trump could become a “lame duck” following the 2026 mid-terms if he keeps delivering his senseless policies with no sound advisory control from his top team that was clearly not selected for this role. While hard right nationalists are likely to fail while in power, it is not yet clear whether a soft version of socialism, as shown with a gifted and charismatic Mamdani even if in an admittedly differentiated New York City, or a harder-left version would prevail. It is possible that a younger and less civil Bernie Sanders might win the Presidency in 2028 if the Trump slide goes on or a more moderate and centrist Californian Gavin Newsom could prevail, also as he would fit the American political essence, as seen with the recent strong victories of the Democrats in his California as well as for the Virginia and New Jersey governorships. What is clear is that the Democrats will need to focus on issues of affordability and stay away from extreme cultural issues if they want to win in one and then three years. Europe, which is more extremist than America in nature (at least until the Trump era), may find it harder to find another centrist solution à la Macron to replace an eventually likely failing Nigel Farage or Marine Le Pen (Bardella) government if they were to happen – but future history will tell. At the same time, current and potential hard-left leaders do not seem today or in the near future likely inhabitants of Number Ten or the Elysée Palace.

We also live in a different world, with a new and gradually changing order since 1945, which makes it crucial to think about its likely scenarios so that individuals and businesses can adjust best and keep thriving. For this there is a need to manage risks, old and new, while ensuring that rules are clear and ethics prevail from the boardroom to the family dining table.

Warmest regards,

Serge

Understanding the key features and developments of our new world

3.9.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

As I was taking a pause from writing on the rather toxic Trump 2.0 developments, one of my closest American friends told me I should write about the state of the world following seven months of Trump 2.0 for all parties involved. These past seven months have been hard to deal with for many, including myself, a Paris-born individual who grew up in unlimited admiration for America and sought to meet its “dream” in the 1980s to take himself away from a France he loved but found too rigid. While America was never perfect, the country projected values and principles that made one easily forget some of its less-appealing features. America led a so-called Free World where all in that group benefitted, including its leader, while the world gradually became a better place as those who suffered from the Cold War can testify. Globalisation, or “peace through trade”, became the norm while world wars were to be found in history books. The seismic change experienced today would deserve a long list of books to cover all of its features, something a short piece cannot do. However, a focus on defining and understanding the very key features and developments experienced since Trump 2.0 could be useful to foresee a new world in formation for all parties at stake, including Americans but also, given my roots, Europeans.

Trump 2.0 has rapidly become an expression of mild (so far) autocracy where an historical multitude of executive decisions have led the way for a team of “obedient first” Secretaries and White House advisers, often not competent for their roles, to manage the drive. This unusual approach quickly sounded un-American, though meeting little opposition from a business establishment fearing retaliation, while the opposition party seemed helpless – also due to the nature of its current leadership. Examples of policy mishandling over seven months have been akin to a flood, making it hard to follow the massive American downturn. The recent sackings of intelligence officials, leaving a void in challenging times, was startling, all the more so if replaced by incompetent individuals, as seems to be the norm across the Trump administration in key positions. Universities, like Harvard or Columbia, were attacked in a populist way and on strange rationales but mainly to please what is known as the MAGA base, which resents their societal disconnection and what is seen as the elite, often due to their lack of formal or advanced education. In now a classic populist move, illegal immigrants were then deported in drastic un-American ways to please Trump’s base (even if national identity preservation should be understood), while some segments of the economy like agriculture or food chains would suffer. The Supreme Court, with a Trump-leaning majority, seemed to support all these moves, while some courts and indeed courageous judges opposed the most drastic Trump administration decisions. America’s approach to foreign policy was a game-changing experience where allies were treated like foes and tariffs were used for political ends, not mentioning their likely adverse impact on US consumers. Trump 2.0 became a major change in the history of the world for all parties.

It may be hard for the basic Trump voter to go beyond the sheer news impact of being tough to allies and foes alike or grasp the adverse effects of some policies like tariffs, all the more erratic in nature. Similarly, the sheer foreign policy impact and harm to core US interests may be hard to understand for many of them, so remote they may be from the world at large. So here are a few very key developments that should be noted and indeed explained to American voters, all the more so as they may eventually pay for many Trump 2.0 policies:

Trump 2.0 and its treatment of longstanding allies (and indeed the ways used) has created a strong doubt about the Western world being able to “trust” America – as the Danes should feel after the Greenland never-ending episode. And while many Europeans were too reliant on America for their defence, thus also allowing it to cement its clear leadership, the new Trump 2.0 less-European focused approach, which is also becoming mercantile (“we will supply weapons to Kyiv from financial assistance provided by Europeans”), is worsening the spirit of a sound and highly successful post-WW2 partnership. The tariff war finally made clear that Europe was to be treated as any party would be, without any special difference. Trump’s foreign policy and its impact, well beyond a Lindbergh “America first” 1930s message, is a return to a McKinley approach of the 19^th century, where isolationism and protectionism were the norms of the day. America is just another leading country.

One of the key developments of Trump 2.0’s foreign policy, which will be gradually felt, is the strengthening of arch-rival China, as many countries, feeling hurt by the new American approach, will seek closer trade ties with it, leading to broader foreign policy rapprochement. A hard-to-believe joint development was the harsh US focus on long-courted India and its doubling of tariffs to an incredible 50% (on the grounds that Mumbai was buying Russian oil, which many would naturally disagree with). It is clear that India will get closer to China as seen at the recent “new world order” meeting in Beijing. There seems to be no understanding of America’s own core interests in Washington, with an unquestionable support of Trump 2.0 by all branches of government. Another winner of Trump 2.0, to some extent, is Russia, this based on a strange historical personal relationship between the two leaders and Trump himself not wanting to realise early enough that he was artfully used by a strong-minded geopolitical leader who plays for time and will unlikely stop a terrible but now existential war in the heart of Europe without clear gains.

The gradual disappearance of trust of Western allies in the US and the unwitting enabling of the rise of China while weakening American government efficiency are probably the two key developments the world will have to deal with in Trump 2.0 times, not to mention a never-ending war of attrition in Ukraine based on an existential quest. As a prelude of days to come, foreign tourism to the US has massively declined with Trump 2.0 with an estimated loss of USD 12.5bn for 2025, even if a transactional Trump 2.0 would argue that tariffs will more than make up for this loss, not minding the core message of this development. One can hope that mid-term elections in 2026 may change this poor course, but harm will have been done, and a sound course will be hard to restore, even if it should be pursued nonetheless.

One of the few winners of this seismic change may be the geopolitical risk and risk intelligence consultancies as clients may grow due to the challenging times we know. As it is also a segment I feel very interested in, even if I am very demanding in terms of platform MO and overall quality, I should almost send a note of thanks to Karoline Leavitt, the young White House press secretary, but – as a good sense of humour is key in our harder times – I will not do so as I really find her too unpleasant and so representative of her boss.

Warmest regards,

Serge

Stressing the irrationality and damage of Trump’s tariff policies

4.8.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

It is clear that Donald Trump enjoys unusual personal features that most people would find odd at the very least. The problem is that he was re-elected president of the leading country in the world (so far) and that his usually aggressive and bold policies, which reflect his personality, create adverse consequences for the world and America itself – all while his support base is unable to realise it yet, while his top team follows orders and focuses on their own career preservation.

The list of odd policies triggered by Trump 2.0 is long and, in some ways, too hard to follow due to their relentless emergence. While some policy drivers have roots shared by many voters – like the issue of illegal immigration linked to the rise of crime (which we also feel or for some “experience” in Europe), the problem is that many of these policies and their management are often not suited to achieving the desired objectives and they carry questionable management ways. If choosing one key Trump policy that was driven by a perception of a deficit at the national level, that has seized the news headlines also due to their transactional back-and-forth moves, tariffs would be a good choice. In doing so, it is key to focus on simple facts dealing with impact and not to be lost on the too many policy details at hand.

Trump focused on tariffs and hitting 92 countries at the same time as a key policy focus, while America, the world’s leading economy, needs the world as a market. The move was driven by the desire to achieve a perception of reciprocity and to avoid America being taken for granted as too easy a trading partner. While one can understand the motivations of Trump 2.0, the ways to achieve this objective have been disastrous, while their impacts at so many levels are yet to be seen and indeed felt. Today, the US average tariff rate is akin to those favoured in the mid-1930s protectionist era and the first “America First” of Charles Lindbergh. Let’s then review the poor points for all parties involved in this unusual approach to tariffs – for the whole world and America itself.

Declaring what is akin to tariff wars has started to globally destroy the image of America as a “good country” caring for the world it always wanted to lead. It also gradually killed the post-Cold War globalisation that benefitted the world, not only economically but also ensured “peace through trade”. Being transactional, as if the world was another Trump Tower development project, with ceaselessly changing tariff rates and deadlines, while deemed to be tactically smart, showed an unreliable America, which contradicts its basic history, values and ways since WW2.

On a pure geopolitical note, treating allies and foes alike (even if the latter may face higher rates as would China) is unseemly, while US trading partners and, all the more, key strategic allies rightfully question what an alliance means today. Mixing geopolitical objectives (some very strange too) with tariffs, the latter as a way to achieve the former, is lacking values and principles that defined America while creating a new and sub-optimal diplomatic environment for all parties involved (even if one would more than smile at the laudatory remarks made to Trump by the very gifted NATO leader Mark Rutte when they were discussing continued US support to the key Western alliance institution). In many ways, Trump’s tariff drive is another element of the destruction of US soft power shown with policies such as the termination of USAID and what it brought the developing world as well as America’s image as a caring world leader. Trump’s tariff policies, beyond their economic impacts, destroy the strength of the democratic interdependence also enjoyed by democracies in the West and elsewhere.

It is interesting to see that some countries or federations, like the EU, seemed to have accepted too willingly a poor tariff deal at 15% in order to preserve the key relationship and model, while others are still fighting, like India, and may face higher rates (also as they are targeted for buying too much Russian oil – like de facto China in addition to the key rivalry we know). It is also fascinating that the EU faces 15% while Britain will only deal with 10%, a “divide and rule” move to weaken the UK-EU rapprochement that will take place in any case and is needed since the disastrous Brexit (also on defence, an area where Europe itself could strangely thank Trump 2.0 for becoming more in charge of its destiny as it should have been for so long). As for Switzerland with its 39% rate, it may regret its non-EU status. Tariffs are also used as a political reprisal, like with Brazil or Canada, both cases where individuals like Lula and Carney are personally targeted for reasons that have nothing to do with trade.

It is clear that the key Trump driver is the news effect and the short-term impact on its core base of supporters, MAGA or not. Many, but not all, are not equipped to understand the impact of most of Trump’s policies but thoroughly enjoy the drive that America shows under Trump 2.0. The problem is that many of these supporters, who are not well-off, will be the first to pay when shopping at Costco or Walmart, even if it will take some time to happen as many foreign suppliers may take time to raise prices so as to initially protect their market share. US car manufacturers are already starting to hurt given their need for massive steel and aluminium imports. It is possible that the unreadable stock market performance and the still viable economic environment are comforting many Americans, even if job creations and inflation rates seem to start showing poor trends. One does not need to be an Economics Nobel Prize winner to realise that tariffs will affect American consumers, many of whom will be surprised by this obvious development. It is, of course, possible, but not likely, that some US consumers will no longer buy imported products as being too expensive. On the same note, and putting aside the needed US tech, some European consumers may forget about Amazon or drink Kofola, the Coke equivalent, in Czechia. Time will tell, as this tariff offensive looks like a show with no end but, in any case, this is a major step back for globalisation and its product and service diversity, not to mention a more peaceful global environment.

Trump 2.0’s tariffs are hurting the world and America itself at too many economic and diplomatic levels to a point that US rivals, if not formal enemies, like China may benefit. As stated, it is possible that many countries, while not leaving America as a market, will decide to refocus their trade on other markets, notably in a rising Asia or even Latin America – Brazil likely being a welcoming partner these days. And these new trading developments may also lead to diplomatic and eventually military developments in due course, all the more if Trump 2.0 persists with its ill-fated strategic approaches. It looks like the White House needs to enhance its longer term thinking or, maybe, simply start to think rationally.

Warmest regards,

Serge

What is Russia and where is it going today?

23.7.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

Given the Russian developments we experienced over the last three decades and the clear peak represented by the old and almost forgotten style invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, I thought it would make sense to understand better what Russia really is today.

Russia’s economy is one of war today, with its key strengths based on oil and gas resources only liked by China and India. It is hard to see where Russia’s real strengths are today. Its inflation rate at 10% (deemed to be well understated) and central bank policy rate of 20% would nearly kill any government in the Western world. It is indeed a war economy with 7% of its GDP spent on defence, a figure that would make Trump happy if Russia were part of NATO. Its population is also shrinking, and its birth rate rapidly decreasing.

Many ultra-conservatives, as well as plenty of those from the MAGA base, who see themselves as true Christians, see Putin as the leader of Christendom in a world void of values and principles that the Russian leader would keep embodying. Russia is being seen by many extremist Christians as the real frontline against an ever-terroristic Islam, a secular and rising China and all that represents Woke and perceived extremist diversity today. For many of its few Western admirers, Russia is simply the Europe of the 1950s.

Russia today is another form of Soviet Union, impelled by an historical imperial need and drive that also gives Putin a reason to exist. It is far more corrupt than the Soviet Union, even if the world got used to an oligarchic model which, even if not right, is accepted for what is Russia. Russia today is not driven by ideology, even if for practical purposes, as was the case in the Soviet era, but by a need to count as the superpower it has no longer been since the late 1980s.

Russia is not like any other country today, being close to marginalised states like Iran or North Korea (as seen with a recent pact passed between the Kremlin and Kim Jong Un). Russia is also the sole state that has recognised Afghanistan, and indeed the women-erasing Taliban, a move that would incidentally make Leonid Brezhnev and his immediate successors also turn in their graves. Russia is not liked by many African states today, barring those who recently left the old French orbit and are helped by the Wagner successor mercenary platform. Russia needs to be “pragmatic” as few countries would willingly side with it today.

Russia’s strategic strengths are not many, as seen in its inability to defeat Ukraine after nearly three and a half years while losing one million soldiers. Only one area where it is shining is in opaque and intelligence-driven disinformation and wild acts of destabilisation across the West, even if some, like Trump, would disagree since the US presidential elections of 2016.

One of Russia’s rare strengths, linked to its autocratic style and a population largely muzzled or in any case historically and understandably silent (but for one million of its citizens, usually well-qualified professionals, who left due to the last war, creating serious shortcomings for its economy) is that it plays, even if unduly, a very long-term card strategically, like in Ukraine, thinking that the West will get tired as all democracies do.

Many populist leaders across Europe, including in its central and eastern parts for historical reasons, are liking Putin, who is indeed seen and promoted as defending key civilisational values and principles, key features also used to artfully grab votes. Andrej Babiš, the Czech EU scandal-ridden billionaire, who may return as Premier in Prague later this year, is keen on stressing he works first for Czech citizens and their social needs (which voter would not want to hear this?) making it clear that the new NATO 5% of GDP on defence is not warranted, all while he is known to be “soft” on Putin, even if not of Slovakia’s Fico or Hungary’s Orban kind. Babis was just turning 13 when the Russians invaded Prague in 1968 and, as a Prague resident, I wish I could take him by the hand to show him the Red Army tank left near my house for the sake of memory.

The AfD in Germany, very strong in the former Prussia or Eastern Germany, is quite keen on Putin and very understanding of his Ukrainian adventure. To be fair, other softer populist leaders, like Giorgia Meloni in Italy or Marine Le Pen in France (even if she was funded by a Russian bank in the 2010s) or her junior, Jordan Bardella, are not known to be pro-Russian, as it would still be a bridge too far in their own countries. As for Britain, while Farage is a true populist and does not seem to suffer yet from the Brexit debacle he co-led, it could never be a Putin aficionado based on history, values and principles. As for Central Europe, Poland is clearly a leader in getting Europe ready to oppose Russia in new attempts to recreate a new Soviet Union or Empire starting by absorbing the NATO Baltic state members.

Russia is facing a real problem, as it has no viable way to what Putin would see as clear victory, be it in Ukraine or in making Russia the power it once was – notwithstanding that it still oddly commands a seat at the UN Security Council, even if Trump made sure the world order was in any case changing. The world gradually witnessed a downfall of an internationalist post-Cold War Russia since the invasion of part of Georgia in August 2008. Who remembers Putin, a former lieutenant of liberal St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, singing “Blueberry Hills” with Hollywood stars at an event benefitting children with cancer? While no excuse, it is likely that Putin grew impatient with Russia’s progress and the perceived Western post-Cold War condescendence combined with his country’s gradual subservience to Western interests – be they political or economic – this even if Muscovites always enjoyed eating at McDonald’s.

Russia is positioning itself on a road where it cannot come back unless it enjoys a total but de facto impossible victory at all levels. This situation may prompt the Kremlin to go too far, eventually leading to a state of world war that would be devastating for all parties involved and indeed the whole world. However, the only way to avoid such a bad, but not impossible, scenario, is for the West to rearm and for Europe to understand what matters for its own survival. In the face of a Russia that Trump may seem to understand better of late, it is key that the new America also gets that the real threat to world peace is not China but Russia and its closest allies and that Europe would be the epicentre of World War 3 and not Taiwan, even if the latter should not be neglected nor the wrong signs given to an opportunistic Beijing.

While being ready for the worst, it would also be best for the West and the world to try influencing change in Russia so it comes back to what we all hoped it would be in the early 1990s, where a new world started, also helped by a nascent globalisation and peace through trade. Vladimir Putin will not lead Russia forever, and many forces within the country could make change happen – this for the benefit of all Russians and the world at large. Russians would also deserve for once to enjoy the benefits of true democracy and a peaceful home, while Europe would benefit from a strong and mutually beneficial partnership. It is a case where “trying harder” is a key modus operandi, all the more so today.

With warmest regards,

Serge

Understanding why the centre is failing

14.7.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

As we live in a new world marked by the resumed and unpredictable Trump era and the rise of populism and its autocratic style across the West, I thought it was interesting to understand why the political centre is failing today.

Today the so-called centre comprises centre-left and centre-right political parties and governments that used to be simply seen as left and right since the end of WW2 when extremist parties, notably of the hard-right populist type, were by and large non-existent. The difference with the past is that populist parties that would have been put aside by any electorate in the second half of the 20^th century have risen to levels where today they are potentially in positions to win general elections and run key countries in Europe. It could be argued that the hijacking of the Republican party by a populist Trump, even if he did not have a hard-right party to support him in the US election, is akin to a drastic change of the political landscape that led to populism and an autocratic style in power (this shown by executive decisions and little supervision from a politically captured US Supreme Court).

No doubt, liberal democracy can be seen as too complex and slow-moving for many, all the more so if coalitions are in power (as seen in France today – as the only way to keep the hard right out). Centrist parties are also not known to be decisive when in power, creating a combination of features that result in slow motion and little if any solutions to problems societies face today (as seen by many British voters with the Labour government after one year in Britain). The priorities of centrist governments may not be seen as aligned with many voters’ concerns due to a lack of desired and at times needed change combined with the complexity of governing.

Beyond the eternal key voter concerns linked to the cost of living, two issues have invaded the minds of many voters across the West, prompting electoral wins like that of Trump in November 2024. The major one is linked to immigration, legal or illegal, even if many economies depend on it while most voters fixated on it would never take up the jobs that need this workforce. The problem is also linked to national identity, a sensitive topic that can have flavours of racism, but is felt vividly by many across the West, this especially following the aftermath of the Arab Spring and implosions of a few countries in the Middle East that triggered mass-immigration. The second issue for many voters who followed populist parties, was excessive diversity that seemed to decrease the prospects of many voters to reach what they saw as their natural roles in society, especially among white males – again, as seen in the US.

Populist parties have exploited these two sensitive issues for electoral gains as they saw them as an easier way to deal with voter resentment in order to increase their positions and eventually win power. As previously stated, the problem is that, while such an approach can help populists win votes, it does not change the fact that most, if not all, populist leaders are ill-equipped to manage governments, all the more so in our intricate times. The French have always enjoyed graduates of top graduate schools to eventually manage their country (especially ENA or Ecole Nationale d’Administration since 1945) while the would-be hard-right populist presidential candidate in 2027, Jordan Bardella, a very nice and appealing young man of 29, is only a high school graduate. Populists focus on the message (borrowing much from the show business world to make it more appealing) and the resentment, also playing on an anti-elite feeling often with candidates who seem culturally and socially closer to their electorates. There is little doubt that populists are good salesmen as seen with an ever-present Nigel Farage and his new post-Brexit Reform UK or with Alice Weidel for the AfD in Germany (with Prussia or eastern Germany being a new and for some historically natural home for the party). The focus of populist parties is clearly on easy-to-understand harsh policies that should respond quickly and drastically to the resentment of many voters who feel societally lost and forgotten by what they see as the established elite of our times.

One of the key tools, at times not planned but certainly exploited by the populists, has been the rise of social media with its influencers and the sad fact that younger generations do not read as much as older ones when they read at all (also explaining the demise of traditional newspapers and magazines and the rise of subscription prices many of us witness). People do not “think” as they did when they ever do and, as such, are more prone to being influenced, all the more by easy solutions to complex issues, also where their management is not the core focus of the primarily attractive message. The perceived inability of getting things done by traditional politicians and parties and radical game-changing options are the core and increasingly well-received message of populists, enhanced by new and constant social media, to gain power today.

The centre is seen as reflecting a broken society where nothing voters want can happen efficiently, due to the slow and sub-efficient process often attached to democratic institutions. Voters who vote for populist candidates and parties want quick policy results, often not realising that such regimes they want will likely one day stop asking for their votes. It is actually possible today, however, that many voters – hopefully a minority – would not miss democracy and their voting rights if they saw their key wishes being implemented, though populist management efficiency is not likely to be there in the first place. However, with time, lasting autocracy and its likely features like official and natural corruption, would likely be resented even by those who brought it to power.

Managing government in Western democracies will always be a complex enterprise mixing short- and long-term issues, often delicate in nature and taking time to get results seen by electorates. The system is not broken, but is facing a new social media era combined with a breed of politicians across the West primarily focused on winning elections at all costs and not thinking about what it means to be in power in a democratic context. Easy populism and government efficiency are de facto antinomic, all the more in a true democratic context. Managing government may be increasingly seen as inefficient and boring but only reflects a very involved process and set of steps that are today needed to keep democracy alive and indeed working. It is the work of centrist parties and politicians to get this message across, also using the new media tools of our times.

Warmest regards,

Serge