Author: Desp(e)rat(e) measures

A new and stronger Europe in the making 

16.12.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

2025 will be remembered as a year of drastic change in terms of the world which we knew, all the more so in relation to the post-WW2 transatlantic alliance, which kept us away from war, and then brought us many features of a peace through trade in a globalised world. Trump 2.0 and its autocratic and nationalistic 1930s America First approach is gradually destroying the sound Western world we knew, while America is rejecting the benefits of its leadership as seen with the new US National Security Strategy. While not making America stronger, as it will keep paying for the erratic and self-harming Trump policies, the new era that Europe is abruptly faced with should not be seen as the decline of a continent which once led the world. Trump, while destroying a civilisation, is in fact giving the opportunity to Europe to be more unified and stronger by taking sound political, economic and defence directions.

The US National Security Strategy is critical of a weak Europe that relied upon the US for its defence while not focusing on being militarily independent enough, preferring to devote funding to economic and social matters. There is no doubt that Europe, before and after the EU, chose to give America the leadership of the Western world, including its own defence, even if some countries like France and the UK developed serious military forces on their own. The weight of the WW2 tragedy was deeply felt across the continent and the desire of a strong America to take the Western defence leadership, also for its many geostrategic and economic benefits, strengthened with the 1949 creation of NATO as the Cold War took off, were serious drivers. European countries did indeed follow the clear US lead on defence matters while participating as much as they could, given their relative strengths and abilities. The European approach to its own defence is now seen as unacceptable and cheap complacency by today’s America as that view also fits the America First nationalistic agenda and focus on its own Southern hemisphere. However, this unexpected change in a key 80-year policy should lead Europe to reshape its own approach to geostrategic and related priorities. 

It is now time for Europe to be in charge of its defence while keeping working with the US as part of NATO. It is likely that the Trump era will be seen as a strategic mistake, also by America at the polls, given the impact on their own society. On a personal note, and having grown up shaped by the old American values and principles we all knew while having many American friends who are like me, there is no doubt that the US will eventually come back to the sound country and Western leader it was. A strong majority of Americans will realise that the Trump adventure is self-destroying at too many levels, even if some key Trump topics, like immigration and its key link to national identity, should be better managed, also in the whole West. While we should all hope that the Americans will wake up in the mid-terms and later in 2028, it does not change the fact that Europe needs to show more resolve regarding its own future at the level of the EU – Europe today and tomorrow – in terms of decision-making and notably defence. 

The clearest show of independence for Europe will be to devote more funding to its defence, and indeed technology sectors, in focusing on the right segments and develop start-ups that will be instrumental in developing Europe’s strength and independence – again in partnership with an America which should gradually find itself again. A new balance in the US-European relationship is needed. This new focus on defence will also need to be done in real partnership among EU members and in ways that need to be fully understood by the European populations that are Europe. There will also be a need to change EU decision-making and avoid being stopped by one or a few member states that happen to have geostrategic links to the obvious threat that is represented by an aggressive Russia once again searching for its lost existence. Europe and the EU have the financial means to ensure its future (ten times Russia’s GDP) but need to redefine the proper mechanisms to achieve sound and time-efficient decisions. While improving its decision mechanisms, now should be a time on both sides of the Channel to welcome back Britain as a key member of the EU as we are simply stronger together, this regardless of the fact that working in a group, however sensible, is not always as easy as staying alone. It is time to forget the mistakes Brexit caused, often led by personal political ambitions, and are seen by many in the UK today, including increasingly in government and legislative circles. We are simply stronger together, all the more so in a divisive and unproductive Trump world.   

One of the main European challenges in the short term will be to manage the current poll rise of the hard-right populist parties, some of its leaders – but not all – of whom find Russia not the threat that it is. However, and while Europe and its key countries like Britain, France and Germany should be better off with experienced mainstream parties at their lead, it is clear that hard right populist parties’ foreign policy programmes have meaningfully evolved, as seen with Giorgia Meloni in power in Italy even if the German AfD still shows its young age and inexperience. There are indeed critical matters that should get all Europeans to want to be more united and stronger in defence.      

The road is clear and we should hope for the right focus to prevail, and soon. There is no other choice for Europe to exist and indeed build a great future for its new generations. 

Warmest regards,

Serge               

On the changing nature of the Western democratic landscape

24.11.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

While being a gifted amateur on matters of political science, all the more when they touch the essence of domestic politics in the Western democratic world, it is hard not to notice both in the US and across Europe a real shift of the political landscape. Adults living in the second half of the 20th century would find it hard to relate to political forces opposing each other today at the electoral booth, in the streets and at the dinner tables. 

The world evolves as we see with Big Tech (and now, even more so, AI), bringing drastic changes that supporters explain is akin to previous industrial revolutions. It is a fact, even if a dauting one, all the more for those who will be AI-jobless while the mega-tech billionaires will keep thriving. It would appear that our political landscape has gradually changed too over recent decades. There is no more of the usual fight between the once traditional right and left as they have actually also changed in nature and the left-right terminology no longer fully applies. Today some would argue that the divide is more between pro-democracy parties and mild autocracy ones. Others would see the divide between traditional centrist parties against hard right parties, the old social democratic left having been marginalised (like Mitterrand’s once powerful Socialist Party in France) if not taking a hard but unsuccessful version of its former self. Polarisation has also become the word of the day. And it is clear that many voters increasingly dissatisfied by traditional democratic parties in power have shifted their votes to hard right ones that have also gradually and smartly moderated their stances when closer to power, looking at the rare but so far highly practical and effective Meloni example in Italy. 

It is clear that old right-wing parties like the Republican Party in the US under Trump have had to deal with a combination of White House autocratic leadership flavour with endless executive orders and retribution lawsuits against opponents, while experiencing an unexpected and odd left-wing protectionist shift against free trade that was a key historical tenet of the Grand Old Party. It is clear that Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush would be rather perplexed when looking at their own party today, even if many elected officials may gradually refocus on their core values as Trump’s poll rating keeps going down (35% post recent elections) – and they follow their natural job preservation mantra as already seen. The Democratic Party also went more left in a country where the word did not really exist, in order to accommodate at times the cultural and societal needs of its big urban centre voters, losing some of its centrism appeal on the way and paying for it dearly nationwide. 

Unwanted immigration, regardless of any criminal feature and as it was perceived by many as altering national identity (even in a country of immigrants like the US), became a key factor in changing the Western political landscape. Fifteen years ago, the economy and “affordability” were the key issues for many voters (it still is as we see with Trump) but immigration waves, at times welcome by the likes of Angela Merkel due to the need to boost the national economy, brought many issues that gradually focused the voters’ minds and gave rise to hard-right parties, often led by good marketers, to increase their share of the vote. Today, they lead in the polls in the UK, France or even Germany (some even arguing, not crazily, that they even won in the US, historically the first democracy in the world). 

As an aside, and even if potentially seen as a far-fetched point by some (if not many), one could argue that Osama bin Laden won in the end. While 9-11 was a horrible tragedy, it led to various US military operations in the Middle East that many felt warranted but led, years later, to the Arab Spring and a total dislocation of some of the regimes and countries in the region that fostered mass immigration waves with societal impacts, like security-related ones, that we keep seeing today. (Even the UK Labour government is now dealing with a change in its refugee asylum policy.) The current upheaval in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, following the retreat of the former French colonial power and its replacement by the new Wagner Group (interestingly named Africa Corps), allowed for regional Jihadists to be on the verge of seizing control of these countries, which might lead to another wave of immigration towards Europe as the horrific civil war in Sudan and the horrific Tanzanian developments easily could – and strengthen its far-right parties. As already stated, these far-right parties, that offer easy solutions to complex issues, provide new avenues for many easily swayed voters. These voters are frustrated by the often-slow pace and absence of clear results of democratic European governments that are also culturally attached to values and principles like human rights and a natural aversion to racism, making them struggle with managing issues like mass immigration from Africa and the Middle East, illegal or not, in the 21st century.  In some ways, and while American agriculture experiences strong labour shortages, the Trump team combined the fight against unwanted immigration with that against crime but also the drug trade, this also leading to drastic geostrategic and military developments as seen in Venezuela.  

The new political landscape is linked to the fact that elections are a game today where the hard-right has shown uncanny excellence. Ideology matters less than dealing with some issues like immigration and affordability – at least in words, usually strong. The problem with hard-right parties, even if they can win elections, is that they are usually ill-equipped to manage governments efficiently while their programmes create strong, if not always violent, opposition, changing the very nature of life in some countries. An additional feature of some far-right parties, especially in Europe, is their closeness to Russia, which is today the natural enemy of democratic Western governments in the context of the Ukraine war and multiple daily disruptions led by Russian intelligence. It is clear that the rising AfD in Germany, Fico in Slovakia, Orbán in Hungary or some unexpected and unfit Babiš coalition partners in Czechia are not anti-Russian (to say the least), at times on energy grounds, even if Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France (in spite of her 2017 campaign previously funded by a Prague-based Russian bank) and clearly Meloni in power in Italy took their distance from Moscow, all the more as they know where their voters stand on the matter. 

We live in a Western world where winning elections is the end game while governing has to be done but is often mismanaged, notably by hard-right leaders, with back and forth moves à la TACO as seen with Trump in less than one year. At least, we still benefit from a democratic environment and set-up which at times can put a stop to the overreach of some of the hard-right leaders as seen in America – but for how long? It is clear that it is key for increased voter participation in elections, as long as they are free and fair, especially from the younger generations who should focus more on their own future and manage their love of social media, if not video games, in a better self-preserving way. On the same note and as Erdoğan’s opposition leader and Mayor of Istanbul, now facing “2000 years” in jail for running a criminal organisation (real democracy in Istanbul?), said, it is key to “communicate” with everybody of all ages and political inclinations to foster dialogue and better understanding of what matters. As Ekrem İmamoğlu stressed in a great way all should remember: “People-ism against populism”.      

Warmest regards,

Serge                                         

Envisaging the likely scenarios post-hard right populism collapse in the West 

10.11.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

I took a writing break these past two months as covering the ceaseless Trump developments, which many do across the pond, was becoming very toxic as an endless act of democratic despair. I decided to take up my pen again after telling some of my Financial Times writer friends what I thought the post-Trump era could bring, a topic that we see starting being covered as the tide may have turned following recent elections in the US. In doing so, I will focus on rational developments, short of revolutions while assuming democracy would still endure in our old West. This topic may not relate only to the US but also to quite a few key European countries like Britain, France and even Germany.

The Trump era is one of an abandonment of traditional values and principles that made America since 1776 and a rise of a form of – so far – mild autocracy seen with the exercise of executive powers that even a Trump-friendly US Supreme Court starts reviewing and questioning (for example with the implementation of systemic tariffs). As I covered at length and well beyond trade, the Trump administration pursued unusual policies such as deploying troops in large Democrat-led cities, attacking leading universities that paradoxically have “made America great”, mass-deporting immigrants at a time when they are needed by the US economy, all while making elitism a bad word so as to please a voting base of often non-college educated which is  usually based in rural areas and states where the current Republican Party enjoys an already excessive representation set-up. Today Trump’s support stands at 37-39% after ten months. In Europe, populist parties lead the polls in Britain, Germany and France while at times disrupting the governmental process even if elections are not “planned” in the short term – for now. However, hard-right populists can win votes in responding to voters’ disappointment with the traditional parties by offering easy solutions to complex issues – their main strength – but they usually are ill-equipped to manage governments efficiently, often leading to the demise of coalitions in the short term, as recently seen in the Netherlands after only two years.     

While hard-right populists increasingly win, as many voters are disappointed by the slow pace and perceived mismanagement of key issues – like, indeed, immigration – by liberal democracy and their traditional parties, they are often now supported by ultra-wealthy business leaders as seen with the “Big Tech Bros” in the US with Trump. While they often change their previously liberal essence to gain favour from Trump and the like, these business types help form an unusual leadership set-up that combines extremist politics and business (in the case of tech, also fostered by social media platforms those leaders helped create). The rise of the mega-billionaires under the Trump era is also a reflection of the demise of traditional capitalism, when ultra-money has become a leading value or objective of a tiny few at the expense of many, including those voters who supported the Trump rise and populist parties aspiring to gain power (see Elon Musk and the AfD in Germany, also his “market”). Money has become an excessive feature of modern society even among those who seemed to care about the “people” when realising that even Nancy Pelosi and her husband made USD 130 million in stock profit since 1988 when she was a member and then leader of the House of Representatives, a key public role.

It would appear that Gen Z and many young voters are now shifting leftwards as seen during the recent US elections as well as many Hispanics and Black Americans who had supported Trump in the 2024 elections, the latter that had created an odd coalition with the disgruntled and vastly white nationalist MAGA base. It would also not be surprising for many in the MAGA base to desperately shift their disgruntled extremism from a hard-right stance to a hard-left one, all the more after they deeply suffer economically from Trump’s policies while seeing the clear rise of the mega-billionaires who also keep reducing staff and indeed their jobs as seen with Amazon. While the younger generations are shifting leftwards both in the US and Europe, also in rejection of Big Money and its impact on society, it is possible that disappointed hard-right voters keen on extremist societal approaches, could join them and help creating a new seismic political shift.    

Although it was not foreseen a few weeks ago, it is now possible that Trump could become a “lame duck” following the 2026 mid-terms if he keeps delivering his senseless policies with no sound advisory control from his top team that was clearly not selected for this role. While hard right nationalists are likely to fail while in power, it is not yet clear whether a soft version of socialism, as shown with a gifted and charismatic Mamdani even if in an admittedly differentiated New York City, or a harder-left version would prevail. It is possible that a younger and less civil Bernie Sanders might win the Presidency in 2028 if the Trump slide goes on or a more moderate and centrist Californian Gavin Newsom could prevail, also as he would fit the American political essence, as seen with the recent strong victories of the Democrats in his California as well as for the Virginia and New Jersey governorships. What is clear is that the Democrats will need to focus on issues of affordability and stay away from extreme cultural issues if they want to win in one and then three years. Europe, which is more extremist than America in nature (at least until the Trump era), may find it harder to find another centrist solution à la Macron to replace an eventually likely failing Nigel Farage or Marine Le Pen (Bardella) government if they were to happen – but future history will tell. At the same time, current and potential hard-left leaders do not seem today or in the near future likely inhabitants of Number Ten or the Elysée Palace. 

We also live in a different world, with a new and gradually changing order since 1945, which makes it crucial to think about its likely scenarios so that individuals and businesses can adjust best and keep thriving. For this there is a need to manage risks, old and new, while ensuring that rules are clear and ethics prevail from the boardroom to the family dining table.      

Warmest regards,

Serge

Understanding the key features and developments of our new world 

3.9.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

As I was taking a pause from writing on the rather toxic Trump 2.0 developments, one of my closest American friends told me I should write about the state of the world following seven months of Trump 2.0 for all parties involved. These past seven months have been hard to deal with for many, including myself, a Paris-born individual who grew up in unlimited admiration for America and sought to meet its “dream” in the 1980s to take himself away from a France he loved but found too rigid. While America was never perfect, the country projected values and principles that made one easily forget some of its less-appealing features. America led a so-called Free World where all in that group benefitted, including its leader, while the world gradually became a better place as those who suffered from the Cold War can testify. Globalisation, or “peace through trade”, became the norm while world wars were to be found in history books. The seismic change experienced today would deserve a long list of books to cover all of its features, something a short piece cannot do. However, a focus on defining and understanding the very key features and developments experienced since Trump 2.0 could be useful to foresee a new world in formation for all parties at stake, including Americans but also, given my roots, Europeans.

Trump 2.0 has rapidly become an expression of mild (so far) autocracy where an historical multitude of executive decisions have led the way for a team of “obedient first” Secretaries and White House advisers, often not competent for their roles, to manage the drive. This unusual approach quickly sounded un-American, though meeting little opposition from a business establishment fearing retaliation, while the opposition party seemed helpless – also due to the nature of its current leadership. Examples of policy mishandling over seven months have been akin to a flood, making it hard to follow the massive American downturn. The recent sackings of intelligence officials, leaving a void in challenging times, was startling, all the more so if replaced by incompetent individuals, as seems to be the norm across the Trump administration in key positions. Universities, like Harvard or Columbia, were attacked in a populist way and on strange rationales but mainly to please what is known as the MAGA base, which resents their societal disconnection and what is seen as the elite, often due to their lack of formal or advanced education. In now a classic populist move, illegal immigrants were then deported in drastic un-American ways to please Trump’s base (even if national identity preservation should be understood), while some segments of the economy like agriculture or food chains would suffer. The Supreme Court, with a Trump-leaning majority, seemed to support all these moves, while some courts and indeed courageous judges opposed the most drastic Trump administration decisions. America’s approach to foreign policy was a game-changing experience where allies were treated like foes and tariffs were used for political ends, not mentioning their likely adverse impact on US consumers. Trump 2.0 became a major change in the history of the world for all parties. 

It may be hard for the basic Trump voter to go beyond the sheer news impact of being tough to allies and foes alike or grasp the adverse effects of some policies like tariffs, all the more erratic in nature. Similarly, the sheer foreign policy impact and harm to core US interests may be hard to understand for many of them, so remote they may be from the world at large. So here are a few very key developments that should be noted and indeed explained to American voters, all the more so as they may eventually pay for many Trump 2.0 policies:

  1. Trump 2.0 and its treatment of longstanding allies (and indeed the ways used) has created a strong doubt about the Western world being able to “trust” America – as the Danes should feel after the Greenland never-ending episode. And while many Europeans were too reliant on America for their defence, thus also allowing it to cement its clear leadership, the new Trump 2.0 less-European focused approach, which is also becoming mercantile (“we will supply weapons to Kyiv from financial assistance provided by Europeans”), is worsening the spirit of a sound and highly successful post-WW2 partnership. The tariff war finally made clear that Europe was to be treated as any party would be, without any special difference. Trump’s foreign policy and its impact, well beyond a Lindbergh “America first” 1930s message, is a return to a McKinley approach of the 19th century, where isolationism and protectionism were the norms of the day. America is just another leading country.
  • One of the key developments of Trump 2.0’s foreign policy, which will be gradually felt, is the strengthening of arch-rival China, as many countries, feeling hurt by the new American approach, will seek closer trade ties with it, leading to broader foreign policy rapprochement. A hard-to-believe joint development was the harsh US focus on long-courted India and its doubling of tariffs to an incredible 50% (on the grounds that Mumbai was buying Russian oil, which many would naturally disagree with). It is clear that India will get closer to China as seen at the recent “new world order” meeting in Beijing. There seems to be no understanding of America’s own core interests in Washington, with an unquestionable support of Trump 2.0 by all branches of government. Another winner of Trump 2.0, to some extent, is Russia, this based on a strange historical personal relationship between the two leaders and Trump himself not wanting to realise early enough that he was artfully used by a strong-minded geopolitical leader who plays for time and will unlikely stop a terrible but now existential war in the heart of Europe without clear gains. 

The gradual disappearance of trust of Western allies in the US and the unwitting enabling of the rise of China while weakening American government efficiency are probably the two key developments the world will have to deal with in Trump 2.0 times, not to mention a never-ending war of attrition in Ukraine based on an existential quest. As a prelude of days to come, foreign tourism to the US has massively declined with Trump 2.0 with an estimated loss of USD 12.5bn for 2025, even if a transactional Trump 2.0 would argue that tariffs will more than make up for this loss, not minding the core message of this development. One can hope that mid-term elections in 2026 may change this poor course, but harm will have been done, and a sound course will be hard to restore, even if it should be pursued nonetheless.  

One of the few winners of this seismic change may be the geopolitical risk and risk intelligence consultancies as clients may grow due to the challenging times we know. As it is also a segment I feel very interested in, even if I am very demanding in terms of platform MO and overall quality, I should almost send a note of thanks to Karoline Leavitt, the young White House press secretary, but – as a good sense of humour is key in our harder times – I will not do so as I really find her too unpleasant and so representative of her boss.   

Warmest regards, 

Serge

Stressing the irrationality and damage of Trump’s tariff policies 

4.8.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

It is clear that Donald Trump enjoys unusual personal features that most people would find odd at the very least. The problem is that he was re-elected president of the leading country in the world (so far) and that his usually aggressive and bold policies, which reflect his personality, create adverse consequences for the world and America itself – all while his support base is unable to realise it yet, while his top team follows orders and focuses on their own career preservation. 

The list of odd policies triggered by Trump 2.0 is long and, in some ways, too hard to follow due to their relentless emergence. While some policy drivers have roots shared by many voters – like the issue of illegal immigration linked to the rise of crime (which we also feel or for some “experience” in Europe), the problem is that many of these policies and their management are often not suited to achieving the desired objectives and they carry questionable management ways. If choosing one key Trump policy that was driven by a perception of a deficit at the national level, that has seized the news headlines also due to their transactional back-and-forth moves, tariffs would be a good choice. In doing so, it is key to focus on simple facts dealing with impact and not to be lost on the too many policy details at hand. 

Trump focused on tariffs and hitting 92 countries at the same time as a key policy focus, while America, the world’s leading economy, needs the world as a market. The move was driven by the desire to achieve a perception of reciprocity and to avoid America being taken for granted as too easy a trading partner. While one can understand the motivations of Trump 2.0, the ways to achieve this objective have been disastrous, while their impacts at so many levels are yet to be seen and indeed felt. Today, the US average tariff rate is akin to those favoured in the mid-1930s protectionist era and the first “America First” of Charles Lindbergh. Let’s then review the poor points for all parties involved in this unusual approach to tariffs – for the whole world and America itself. 

Declaring what is akin to tariff wars has started to globally destroy the image of America as a “good country” caring for the world it always wanted to lead. It also gradually killed the post-Cold War globalisation that benefitted the world, not only economically but also ensured “peace through trade”. Being transactional, as if the world was another Trump Tower development project, with ceaselessly changing tariff rates and deadlines, while deemed to be tactically smart, showed an unreliable America, which contradicts its basic history, values and ways since WW2. 

On a pure geopolitical note, treating allies and foes alike (even if the latter may face higher rates as would China) is unseemly, while US trading partners and, all the more, key strategic allies rightfully question what an alliance means today. Mixing geopolitical objectives (some very strange too) with tariffs, the latter as a way to achieve the former, is lacking values and principles that defined America while creating a new and sub-optimal diplomatic environment for all parties involved (even if one would more than smile at the laudatory remarks made to Trump by the very gifted NATO leader Mark Rutte when they were discussing continued US support to the key Western alliance institution). In many ways, Trump’s tariff drive is another element of the destruction of US soft power shown with policies such as the termination of USAID and what it brought the developing world as well as America’s image as a caring world leader. Trump’s tariff policies, beyond their economic impacts, destroy the strength of the democratic interdependence also enjoyed by democracies in the West and elsewhere. 

It is interesting to see that some countries or federations, like the EU, seemed to have accepted too willingly a poor tariff deal at 15% in order to preserve the key relationship and model, while others are still fighting, like India, and may face higher rates (also as they are targeted for buying too much Russian oil – like de facto China in addition to the key rivalry we know). It is also fascinating that the EU faces 15% while Britain will only deal with 10%, a “divide and rule” move to weaken the UK-EU rapprochement that will take place in any case and is needed since the disastrous Brexit (also on defence, an area where Europe itself could strangely thank Trump 2.0 for becoming more in charge of its destiny as it should have been for so long). As for Switzerland with its 39% rate, it may regret its non-EU status. Tariffs are also used as a political reprisal, like with Brazil or Canada, both cases where individuals like Lula and Carney are personally targeted for reasons that have nothing to do with trade.

It is clear that the key Trump driver is the news effect and the short-term impact on its core base of supporters, MAGA or not. Many, but not all, are not equipped to understand the impact of most of Trump’s policies but thoroughly enjoy the drive that America shows under Trump 2.0. The problem is that many of these supporters, who are not well-off, will be the first to pay when shopping at Costco or Walmart, even if it will take some time to happen as many foreign suppliers may take time to raise prices so as to initially protect their market share. US car manufacturers are already starting to hurt given their need for massive steel and aluminium imports. It is possible that the unreadable stock market performance and the still viable economic environment are comforting many Americans, even if job creations and inflation rates seem to start showing poor trends. One does not need to be an Economics Nobel Prize winner to realise that tariffs will affect American consumers, many of whom will be surprised by this obvious development.  It is, of course, possible, but not likely, that some US consumers will no longer buy imported products as being too expensive. On the same note, and putting aside the needed US tech, some European consumers may forget about Amazon or drink Kofola, the Coke equivalent, in Czechia. Time will tell, as this tariff offensive looks like a show with no end but, in any case, this is a major step back for globalisation and its product and service diversity, not to mention a more peaceful global environment.    

Trump 2.0’s tariffs are hurting the world and America itself at too many economic and diplomatic levels to a point that US rivals, if not formal enemies, like China may benefit. As stated, it is possible that many countries, while not leaving America as a market, will decide to refocus their trade on other markets, notably in a rising Asia or even Latin America – Brazil likely being a welcoming partner these days. And these new trading developments may also lead to diplomatic and eventually military developments in due course, all the more if Trump 2.0 persists with its ill-fated strategic approaches. It looks like the White House needs to enhance its longer term thinking or, maybe, simply start to think rationally. 

Warmest regards,

Serge

What is Russia and where is it going today?

23.7.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

Given the Russian developments we experienced over the last three decades and the clear peak represented by the old and almost forgotten style invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, I thought it would make sense to understand better what Russia really is today.

Russia’s economy is one of war today, with its key strengths based on oil and gas resources only liked by China and India. It is hard to see where Russia’s real strengths are today. Its inflation rate at 10% (deemed to be well understated) and central bank policy rate of 20% would nearly kill any government in the Western world. It is indeed a war economy with 7% of its GDP spent on defence, a figure that would make Trump happy if Russia were part of NATO. Its population is also shrinking, and its birth rate rapidly decreasing.

Many ultra-conservatives, as well as plenty of those from the MAGA base, who see themselves as true Christians, see Putin as the leader of Christendom in a world void of values and principles that the Russian leader would keep embodying. Russia is being seen by many extremist Christians as the real frontline against an ever-terroristic Islam, a secular and rising China and all that represents Woke and perceived extremist diversity today. For many of its few Western admirers, Russia is simply the Europe of the 1950s.

Russia today is another form of Soviet Union, impelled by an historical imperial need and drive that also gives Putin a reason to exist. It is far more corrupt than the Soviet Union, even if the world got used to an oligarchic model which, even if not right, is accepted for what is Russia. Russia today is not driven by ideology, even if for practical purposes, as was the case in the Soviet era, but by a need to count as the superpower it has no longer been since the late 1980s.

Russia is not like any other country today, being close to marginalised states like Iran or North Korea (as seen with a recent pact passed between the Kremlin and Kim Jong Un). Russia is also the sole state that has recognised Afghanistan, and indeed the women-erasing Taliban, a move that would incidentally make Leonid Brezhnev and his immediate successors also turn in their graves. Russia is not liked by many African states today, barring those who recently left the old French orbit and are helped by the Wagner successor mercenary platform. Russia needs to be “pragmatic” as few countries would willingly side with it today.

Russia’s strategic strengths are not many, as seen in its inability to defeat Ukraine after nearly three and a half years while losing one million soldiers. Only one area where it is shining is in opaque and intelligence-driven disinformation and wild acts of destabilisation across the West, even if some, like Trump, would disagree since the US presidential elections of 2016.

One of Russia’s rare strengths, linked to its autocratic style and a population largely muzzled or in any case historically and understandably silent (but for one million of its citizens, usually well-qualified professionals, who left due to the last war, creating serious shortcomings for its economy) is that it plays, even if unduly, a very long-term card strategically, like in Ukraine, thinking that the West will get tired as all democracies do.

Many populist leaders across Europe, including in its central and eastern parts for historical reasons, are liking Putin, who is indeed seen and promoted as defending key civilisational values and principles, key features also used to artfully grab votes. Andrej Babiš, the Czech EU scandal-ridden billionaire, who may return as Premier in Prague later this year, is keen on stressing he works first for Czech citizens and their social needs (which voter would not want to hear this?) making it clear that the new NATO 5% of GDP on defence is not warranted, all while he is known to be “soft” on Putin, even if not of Slovakia’s Fico or Hungary’s Orban kind. Babis was just turning 13 when the Russians invaded Prague in 1968 and, as a Prague resident, I wish I could take him by the hand to show him the Red Army tank left near my house for the sake of memory.

The AfD in Germany, very strong in the former Prussia or Eastern Germany, is quite keen on Putin and very understanding of his Ukrainian adventure. To be fair, other softer populist leaders, like Giorgia Meloni in Italy or Marine Le Pen in France (even if she was funded by a Russian bank in the 2010s) or her junior, Jordan Bardella, are not known to be pro-Russian, as it would still be a bridge too far in their own countries. As for Britain, while Farage is a true populist and does not seem to suffer yet from the Brexit debacle he co-led, it could never be a Putin aficionado based on history, values and principles. As for Central Europe, Poland is clearly a leader in getting Europe ready to oppose Russia in new attempts to recreate a new Soviet Union or Empire starting by absorbing the NATO Baltic state members.

Russia is facing a real problem, as it has no viable way to what Putin would see as clear victory, be it in Ukraine or in making Russia the power it once was – notwithstanding that it still oddly commands a seat at the UN Security Council, even if Trump made sure the world order was in any case changing. The world gradually witnessed a downfall of an internationalist post-Cold War Russia since the invasion of part of Georgia in August 2008. Who remembers Putin, a former lieutenant of liberal St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, singing “Blueberry Hills” with Hollywood stars at an event benefitting children with cancer? While no excuse, it is likely that Putin grew impatient with Russia’s progress and the perceived Western post-Cold War condescendence combined with his country’s gradual subservience to Western interests – be they political or economic – this even if Muscovites always enjoyed eating at McDonald’s.

Russia is positioning itself on a road where it cannot come back unless it enjoys a total but de facto impossible victory at all levels. This situation may prompt the Kremlin to go too far, eventually leading to a state of world war that would be devastating for all parties involved and indeed the whole world. However, the only way to avoid such a bad, but not impossible, scenario, is for the West to rearm and for Europe to understand what matters for its own survival. In the face of a Russia that Trump may seem to understand better of late, it is key that the new America also gets that the real threat to world peace is not China but Russia and its closest allies and that Europe would be the epicentre of World War 3 and not Taiwan, even if the latter should not be neglected nor the wrong signs given to an opportunistic Beijing.

While being ready for the worst, it would also be best for the West and the world to try influencing change in Russia so it comes back to what we all hoped it would be in the early 1990s, where a new world started, also helped by a nascent globalisation and peace through trade. Vladimir Putin will not lead Russia forever, and many forces within the country could make change happen – this for the benefit of all Russians and the world at large. Russians would also deserve for once to enjoy the benefits of true democracy and a peaceful home, while Europe would benefit from a strong and mutually beneficial partnership. It is a case where “trying harder” is a key modus operandi, all the more so today.

With warmest regards,

Serge

Understanding why the centre is failing 

14.7.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

As we live in a new world marked by the resumed and unpredictable Trump era and the rise of populism and its autocratic style across the West, I thought it was interesting to understand why the political centre is failing today. 

Today the so-called centre comprises centre-left and centre-right political parties and governments that used to be simply seen as left and right since the end of WW2 when extremist parties, notably of the hard-right populist type, were by and large non-existent. The difference with the past is that populist parties that would have been put aside by any electorate in the second half of the 20th century have risen to levels where today they are potentially in positions to win general elections and run key countries in Europe. It could be argued that the hijacking of the Republican party by a populist Trump, even if he did not have a hard-right party to support him in the US election, is akin to a drastic change of the political landscape that led to populism and an autocratic style in power (this shown by executive decisions and little supervision from a politically captured US Supreme Court). 

No doubt, liberal democracy can be seen as too complex and slow-moving for many, all the more so if coalitions are in power (as seen in France today – as the only way to keep the hard right out). Centrist parties are also not known to be decisive when in power, creating a combination of features that result in slow motion and little if any solutions to problems societies face today (as seen by many British voters with the Labour government after one year in Britain).  The priorities of centrist governments may not be seen as aligned with many voters’ concerns due to a lack of desired and at times needed change combined with the complexity of governing.

Beyond the eternal key voter concerns linked to the cost of living, two issues have invaded the minds of many voters across the West, prompting electoral wins like that of Trump in November 2024. The major one is linked to immigration, legal or illegal, even if many economies depend on it while most voters fixated on it would never take up the jobs that need this workforce. The problem is also linked to national identity, a sensitive topic that can have flavours of racism, but is felt vividly by many across the West, this especially following the aftermath of the Arab Spring and implosions of a few countries in the Middle East that triggered mass-immigration. The second issue for many voters who followed populist parties, was excessive diversity that seemed to decrease the prospects of many voters to reach what they saw as their natural roles in society, especially among white males – again, as seen in the US. 

Populist parties have exploited these two sensitive issues for electoral gains as they saw them as an easier way to deal with voter resentment in order to increase their positions and eventually win power. As previously stated, the problem is that, while such an approach can help populists win votes, it does not change the fact that most, if not all, populist leaders are ill-equipped to manage governments, all the more so in our intricate times. The French have always enjoyed graduates of top graduate schools to eventually manage their country (especially ENA or Ecole Nationale d’Administration since 1945) while the would-be hard-right populist presidential candidate in 2027, Jordan Bardella, a very nice and appealing young man of 29, is only a high school graduate. Populists focus on the message (borrowing much from the show business world to make it more appealing) and the resentment, also playing on an anti-elite feeling often with candidates who seem culturally and socially closer to their electorates. There is little doubt that populists are good salesmen as seen with an ever-present Nigel Farage and his new post-Brexit Reform UK or with Alice Weidel for the AfD in Germany (with Prussia or eastern Germany being a new and for some historically natural home for the party). The focus of populist parties is clearly on easy-to-understand harsh policies that should respond quickly and drastically to the resentment of many voters who feel societally lost and forgotten by what they see as the established elite of our times. 

One of the key tools, at times not planned but certainly exploited by the populists, has been the rise of social media with its influencers and the sad fact that younger generations do not read as much as older ones when they read at all (also explaining the demise of traditional newspapers and magazines and the rise of subscription prices many of us witness). People do not “think” as they did when they ever do and, as such, are more prone to being influenced, all the more by easy solutions to complex issues, also where their management is not the core focus of the primarily attractive message. The perceived inability of getting things done by traditional politicians and parties and radical game-changing options are the core and increasingly well-received message of populists, enhanced by new and constant social media, to gain power today.    

The centre is seen as reflecting a broken society where nothing voters want can happen efficiently, due to the slow and sub-efficient process often attached to democratic institutions. Voters who vote for populist candidates and parties want quick policy results, often not realising that such regimes they want will likely one day stop asking for their votes. It is actually possible today, however, that many voters – hopefully a minority – would not miss democracy and their voting rights if they saw their key wishes being implemented, though populist management efficiency is not likely to be there in the first place. However, with time, lasting autocracy and its likely features like official and natural corruption, would likely be resented even by those who brought it to power.   

Managing government in Western democracies will always be a complex enterprise mixing short- and long-term issues, often delicate in nature and taking time to get results seen by electorates.  The system is not broken, but is facing a new social media era combined with a breed of politicians across the West primarily focused on winning elections at all costs and not thinking about what it means to be in power in a democratic context. Easy populism and government efficiency are de facto antinomic, all the more in a true democratic context. Managing government may be increasingly seen as inefficient and boring but only reflects a very involved process and set of steps that are today needed to keep democracy alive and indeed working. It is the work of centrist parties and politicians to get this message across, also using the new media tools of our times. 

Warmest regards,

Serge                          

The multiple conundrum of the Israeli-Iranian conflict 

20/6/25

Dear Partners in Thought,

While not being an expert on Middle Eastern affairs and having stayed gradually away from the atrocities seen in Gaza as not being able to cope, I was asked to give my take on the current descent to hell between Israel and Iran. To do so, I chose to give a take on one hand from a European observer and, on the other, to cover the multiple issues facing Trump 2.0 and its core MAGA base, top officials and influencers. The best word to describe this dual and inter-connected topic is conundrum to remain polite and civilised in our new times.

Having grown up remembering the Shah and his wife Farah (I looked like their son when in my early twenties) and not being so aware of Iranian politics, I thought they presented rather well on their official pictures. But not all was going very well in the Pahlavi Kingdom and we had in the Paris suburbs the leader of the opposition, a cleric named Khomeini, whom President Giscard had allowed to stay while not waging an outright war against his regime. Then the Shah fell, and Khomeini became the Supreme Leader in 1979 – 46 years ago. It is clear that the then-new Iran was not always liked in the region, leading to a war with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the early 1980s, while the new theocratic regime became very hard on its own people, especially women who ended up with no rights. Demonstrations, when suppressed, led to numerous executions in a trend that lasted until today. It is clear that Iran became an international pariah that a few enemies of the west like North Korea and now Russia stayed close to but with some distance (while other powers like China needed oil). Looking at a war with Israel, no European country supports Iran today while many are worried about its rising nuclear capabilities given their clear military focus. Regime change would certainly be welcome (also by the Iranian people) but the way to reach it appears too dangerous for all parties and potentially leading to a messy regional destabilisation including in the thriving part of the Gulf. 

Israel is the child of the Holocaust, even if that region was populated by Jews since the early 20th century. Europeans naturally supported Israel in all of its conflicts since the Six Day war, as it was part of the western camp in an often-hostile region, but also as there was a feeling of moral obligation and at times, for some, Holocaust-based guilt. German premier Merz clearly and, for many, unsurprisingly supported Israel’s attacks on Iran in the strongest way, also given the goal of avoiding potential nuclear annihilation. There was no question for Europeans and the west at large that Israel was always the “good guy” in the region. The horrible October 2023 Hamas attack created universal western uproar, justifying a strong response that I also felt was justified. However, the situation degraded quickly, not making the Netanyahu government and leadership liked like Moshe Dayan was. It is clear that Iran created an unstable region by backing a dangerous Hamas that kept the Gaza people prisoners, while Lebanon was also seriously affected by an aggressive, if slightly more stable, Hezbollah (and then the Houthis of late in Yemen did not help). It is hard to understand rationally why Israel keeps destroying Gaza after nearly 21 months while depriving Gazans of basic and humanitarian-delivered food by killing so many people, including from aid organisations. It is sadly clear that Netanyahu is not keen on losing power and facing the courts on his multiple legal cases. The official mantra of stopping Tehran acquiring nuclear capabilities, even if rational, gets weaker as the crisis unfolds, even if one has to be impressed by the legendary skills of Mossad when eliminating the military elite of an enemy. It is also clear that Israel’s actions have lowered European support, that initially was strong, also leading from multiple condemnations from many key EU states. We are now faced with a conflict where Europeans do not know with whom to side, while developments involving a desperate Iranian regime could lead to very bad outcomes not seen since WW2, even with the Ukrainian return of history.  

While Europeans do not know where to stand and what to say on this conflict, Trump 2.0 keeps to its transactional ways. This time with very clear demands for an unconditional surrender of Iran that could only lead to a rebuke based on national pride, all the more as there was an ongoing US-Iranian treaty negotiation that Bibi rashly interrupted, having his own tactical reasons. Statements from Trump that the US “may or may not intervene” is of course textbook Trump 2.0 as during the back-and-forth tariff policies or the never-ending postponements of the TikTok ban. President Trump is leading the show but his MAGA elite officials, influencers and most of his base are not keen on foreign intervention as clearly – if not vociferously – stated by the likes of Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon. They all believe in “America First – and only”. The new “Lindbergh” JD Vance is not keen on this foreign adventure either while even the top national security and intelligence team is opposed to it. Tulsi Gabbard, the Putin-friendly National Head of Intelligence, who is not fond of her own intelligence teams, and Kristi Noem, the dog killer and loser of her Gucci bag and 3,000 dollars while visiting jail inmates, are also opposed to other “lost wars” (on a funny note, Gabbard called the Iranian Supreme Leader “Khomeini” in a March statement to the House Intelligence Committee, stressing (if it were needed) the quality of the top US executive team). In true Trump fashion, Gabbard was not invited to a Camp David meeting dealing with Iran this month. It is also funny to see Marjorie Taylor Greene, the odd MAGA hat- and t-shirt wearing US House Representative, going against the man that helped make her as she opposes an old interventionist America. The only senior Republican proponents of intervention seem to be the older US Senators like Lindsey Graham or Mitch McConnell or a colourful Ted Cruz who stick to old GOP foreign policy principles but do not reflect the majority of Trump supporters, even beyond the core MAGA base. However, it seems that, even with a two-week diplomatic window to reach a deal, there will likely be a US intervention to go after the “Fordow bunker” where the Iranian uranium his enriched and hidden. It is interesting to see how an old conflict and indeed now key US political conundrum could derail Trump 2.0’s core MAGA leadership and base at a time of an already 38% national approval rating in five months, even if three and half years will be a long time, while the mid-terms should hopefully bring the world some needed joy and America some hope. 

Warmest regards,

Serge           

The sad slide of America and its impact on the world 

17/6/25

Dear Partners in Thought,

Within nearly five months of Trump 2.0, we saw a deluge of executive orders often aggressively and erratically dealing with a wide number of issues at all levels, but going nowhere positively, while gradually destroying the core tissue of America and the world we knew.   

Trump 2.0 is not simply a political phase of public mismanagement or excessive policy making. It is the end of an era for America and the world. These unforeseen times – and indeed one man – have unleashed, however unwittingly, amazing developments such as the actual and attempted wide-scale assassinations of Democratic state representatives and their families in Minnesota as if all was now fair game for extremists. America is now sliding into autocracy, with the US ordering state national guards and even US Marines to deal with mostly pacific anti-deportation demonstrations, thus creating more violence as a result. The US executive style has now reached unseen lows, with descriptions of California Governor Newsome as “Newscum”, and the same for Fed Chairman Jerome Powell. And in the midst of such rapid democratic weakening, almost unnoticed substantial self-enrichment appears to be a new and acceptable presidential attribute. While what matters in Trump 2.0 is mainly the news impact and, it appears, Russian-style military parades, all these events slowly but surely throw America back to the late 1850s when a civil war was looming.    

Trump 2.0 and its quasi-1930s Lindbergh protectionism have also empowered many foreign leaders to adopt aggressive moves against their enemies, knowing that President Trump will not mind or will be too weak to react, thus making the world more dangerous and even nuclear confrontations more possible. We know that history is repeating itself and that many of us have no memories of WW2 or even the Cold War as more than 50 per cent of Americans today were not born in 1985. The degree of passivity about Trump 2.0 of many in America is still surprising, notably within the business community, though we see that this is likely changing as enough is indeed enough. 

The MAGA base, often but not always poorly (if at all) educated and living in often empty areas, naturally wants a king (hence the fair point with the No King demonstrations) as they look for quick executive decisions implemented without the often-slow pace and intricate process of liberal democratic governments. Populists the world over play on this colourful electoral selling of quick and simple change and anti-elite feeling, often taking advantage of the fact that democracies are slow-moving. In the case of America, the excesses of diversity or woke drives and substantial illegal immigration – two areas that are not “black and white” in essence as the US economy would agree on the latter – sent Trump back to the White House where he could be even more himself this time, mostly surrounded by obedient servants.

As belonging to an early Gaullist family, having worn a “Giscard at the top” tee-shirt on the Champs Elysées at age 14, and having been a member of the national youth team of Chirac’s neo-Gaullist RPR party under the helm of a then-young Sarkozy, I am no raving leftie. I am for law and order – though in their fair versions, unlike what we see across the pond today. I know what matters and the value of fairness and professionalism in politics, something which is missing in the American executive today, all while their voters will be the first ones to pay for the misdeeds we keep witnessing. It is hard to believe that one man, who is treating his country and the world as if it were an episode of The Apprentice, is behind all the chaos we see and we may pay for. Trump 2.0 will be a treasure for political writers for generations to come, assuming we still have a going world.  

As a French-born transatlantic European who enjoyed his visits at Yorktown, I feel we need to assist the Trump opposition while both traditional parties remake themselves as they badly need. We need the strong America we knew with its Western leadership, soft and real power, all based on values and principles that strengthened democracy globally. 

One thing is sure for the geopolitical risk thinker I am: America may have become a risk for many, including itself. Trump may also have unwittingly served the interests of some of the many rivals or competitors he naturally dislikes under the misguided and self-harming banner of his America First. 

Warmest regards,

Serge

About Trump’s unwitting impacts on world affairs and a great damage to America 

29.5.25

Dear Partners in Thought,  

Four months into Trump 2.0 one would be excused for taking a break in writing about the developments seen to date or even following the news given their level of toxicity. Trump 2.0 has changed America and the world we knew, all the more (but not only) in the West, in no time. Following the recent show biz-flavoured populist politician recipe of offering simple and hard solutions to complex issues to largely disgruntled or feeling-left-out core voters, Trump secured a second term that was an even stronger departure from his first one with the emphasis on quick action and obedience first through “doers” who would never have been seen in any presidential team in the past. In doing so, Trump destroyed both the reputation and standing of America in the world while weakening his own country and even his own voters at many levels in no time. 

The list of unbelievable negative impacts is as long as the number of executive decisions taken in no time – a huge record in US presidential history – and would need a long book to cover them. I feel sad to have been right early on about many of these decisions and their impact at the economic, social and diplomatic levels for America, its traditional allies and the world. Today I would like to cover two developments that stress the clear weaknesses of Trump’s erratic and negative grasp of international affairs while stressing the one unbelievable case of hurting America’s core interests at their very heart. 

Trump lost it when attacking Canada and wanting to make it a 51st state, this along with wanting to seize – or even invade – Greenland while renaming the Gulf of Mexico (incidentally attacking later the Associated Press on the matter) or being overly friendly with an imperialistic Putin (even if, like with tariffs, he goes back and forth on his legendary love for the new tsar). By following this ill-fated route, Trump created an impact that was very bad in terms of America’s standing while quickly clarifying how bad his new administration could be. In some ways, while many see him as a Russian agent for many reasons, he unwittingly behaved as a liberal democracy one by ensuring the victory that was not so clear pre-Trump 2.0 of the candidacies or the parties of Mark Carney in Canada, Anthony Albanese in Australia, Nicusor Dan in Romania and even Edi Rama in Albania – all liberal democrats of various flavours and for sure not populist leaders – this at a time when their victories were far from assured. Trump made them win as a reaction to his own world-changing policies. In some ways, Trump can also be seen as a European agent as his nasty tirades made European leaders wake up (Germany and Merz being a case in point) as to the necessity of strengthening their own defence and not just relying on the American big brother, even if it made sense at many levels for all parties in a different time. It is clear that elections, and indeed history, are often shaped by near-term events and feelings. It is not certain that Marine Le Pen, if able to run, or her ill-equipped junior Jordan Bardella could not win in France in 2027 or that Nigel Farage could not eventually win in Britain due to the tiredness of traditional parties and their electorates. And finally, Trump unwittingly set the path for a closer economic rapprochement between Europe and China, the latter that needs globalisation to exist. The problem with Trump and his team is that the focus is on the “moment” or the news of the very day as if we were all playing a role in his Apprentice TV show. Trump is not focused on the long term – he does not care as he will not be there. In some ways his “policies”, while disturbing the world order and weakening America, may have helped strengthen Europe while reshaping a different but potentially viable world, this being said with an emphasis on searching for an optimistic outcome post-nightmare and Faulknerian “sound and fury”. 

The latest disaster that reflects an easy move to please his disgruntled and anti-elite MAGA base is to attack Harvard, the oldest university in America, founded in 1636, and a beacon of excellence at all levels. Suppressing all the funding of Harvard on very dubious grounds attacks scientific research at the highest level and what was American excellence for generations, as all the Kennedys, including RFK Jr, would agree. Suppressing foreign student attendance, including the 7,000 who study there, is simply crazy in nature and against the very interest of America. More than one million foreign nationals study in American colleges and universities every year with an amazing impact on the finances of America then and later in the workplace, not to mention its diplomatic and geostrategic status, whether they stay in the US or go back to their own countries (43.8 per cent of the Fortune 500 companies were created by immigrants as Elon Musk could testify). I went to America for the first time to attend a semester at Harvard in 1981 to improve my English. I went back to Harvard in 1982 for another semester to study US foreign policy and international economics. I went back in 2008 for a special programme at Harvard Business School in my field of private equity and venture capital. While the academic experience was always great, being there and mixing with such a talented international crowd of students was what made Harvard such a pillar of US comparative advantage. And this unique experience helped make me early on who I became personally and professionally. It is an invaluable asset for America, which only someone like Donald Trump – with a rather opaque personal history at Wharton – cannot see. 

On a final and humorous note (the latter we always need in dire times), there is one segment that will certainly benefit from Trump’s erratic policies and style. There is no doubt that geopolitical risk and risk intelligence firms will benefit from Trump 2.0 given its main impact on world affairs: uncertainty. At least I should be productively busy. 

Warmest regards,

Serge