china – Desperate Measures

The Triangle of Power (Alexander Stubb)

17.2.26

Dear Partners in Thought,

I thought I would keep my focus on Book Notes dealing with the nature of our new geopolitical times, so would like to cover a new book by Alexander Stubb: The Triangle of Power – Rebalancing the New World Order. Mark Carney, recently known as a driven leader of what the West should be, following his exchanges with Donald Trump and his memorable Davos speech, has been very keen on Stubb’s “values-based realism” shown in his book.

Alexander Stubb is the Finnish President and one of the best leaders Europe can enjoy today in relation to leading his country and adjusting to our new geopolitical times. He draws on decades of experience in diplomacy with political, finance and academic positions that give him an unparalleled view of the world and the history of its order and disorder. His acumen also reflects the long frontier he shares with Russia, now as the leader of a recent NATO member. His book dealing with the current changes in our world order has been very well received by many foreign policy experts of all types like Jess Stoltenberg, Niall Ferguson, Timothy Garton Ash, Fiona Hill, Fareed Zakaria or Gideon Rachman.

His long introduction section covers the key features of international affairs as we have known them since the end of WW2 with the uncontested American-led post-Cold War era through rules-based cooperative multilateralism fostered by a unified West. This world order was gradually followed by multipolarity defined as “an oligopoly of powers” and now the emergence of three global power groups in the West, East and South, hence the Triangle. It is clear that the driver of the book was Trump 2.0 and its dislocation of the world order we knew to go back to a 19^th century approach of world power rivalry, also with defined controlled geographies. The end of the world order we knew, initially confirmed by Secretary of State Rubio arriving at the Munich Security conference this past weekend, was already felt by most European NATO allies with the Trump threats of invading Greenland so the US could “protect” it and benefit from its critical minerals. To be fair, Rubio, unlike Vance at the last Munich conference in February 2025, did not stress European decay while promoting needed far right populism, but stressed the need for a stronger Europe so the NATO alliance could work to its best. To the happy surprise of many attendees, Rubio also gave the audience, likely unwittingly, a back and forth feeling à la Trump’s TACO with tariffs, in stressing his “we belong together” US position to European “friends” and allies of decades. Sadly, his following meetings with Fico in Bratislava and Orban in Budapest clarified matters.

Stubb meticulously covers the various periods the world went through since the end of WW2, with the ascent of the liberal world order following the Cold War and what became globalisation – or also peace through trade. He admits that multilateral cooperation is now gradually forgotten for multipolar rivalry and conflict, the Ukraine war being a clear and new example in Europe. Global norms that international organisations, led by the United Nations, set up are also eroding. He stresses that the need to search for a new global framework is made urgent as we live through a hinge moment of history, like in 1918, 1945 or 1989. A globalised world led by a UN spirit and clear rules agreed by most if not all countries in the world (whether they liked them or not) to contain self-interest is now indeed replaced by the three major power groups described in detail in distinct and very rich chapters, each covering politics, economics, technology and geopolitics and could be a book in itself.

The three mega-world players are the still-leading and democratic Global West (in a potential phase of self-destruction with Trump policies), the autocratic Global East (combining an existentially-driven Russia and a pragmatic China not always on the same page, along with the challenging Iran, North Korea and a number of African and central American countries driven by regime preservation or old alliances) and the once-forgotten and at times controlled, if not colonised, Global South (led by India, Brazil or South Africa and even Saudi Arabia). The Global West and East are often engaged in a fierce competition led by bilateral deals and alliances while the Global South represents the once often-forgotten developing world, which will also be the great arbiter and determine whether the future tilts toward cooperation or fragmentation. The coming years will decide what the new order will be for the rest of the century, which also requires democratic and especially mid-sized European powers – hence the EU – to help reform institutions and give a new life to multilateralism.

Stubb, who gives us a detailed course on the development of multilateral institutions and their historical benefits via discipline and not idealism (order requiring structure), is still very committed to its system, especially the United Nations. Recognising the weaknesses of such a system today (like the World Bank and IMF led by the West) and the veto-bound old-fashioned UN Security Council with its five permanent members selected in another age (even if many will like it), he quotes Winston Churchill’s famous line about democracy that “the UN was the worst form of governance, save all the others”. He feels that dismantling multilateralism will lead to chaos but it could be improved in its set-up, to ensure that the key Global South feels part of the decision-making and guarantees a sounder world order.

Stubb sees rule-based globalisation after the Cold War as a resounding success with its quadrupling of GDP, six-fold trade expansion and a billion people away from starvation, even if inequality and power asymmetry hurt its clear success, as seen today with the rise of mega-billionaires and one per cent controlling half of the world’s wealth. 9/11 made security more important than freedom and affordability, while the global financial crisis of 2008 did not help, also at a time when Russia changed its approach to world affairs with its invasion of Georgia, and China became more assertive as a rising superpower. Today, Stubb sees our era as one where we do not know where we are, not helped by the blurring of war and peace and forgotten invasions like in Ukraine, all the more so in (so far) peaceful Europe. He sees the various features of our increasingly broken world, such as energy, technology, currency and information, also used as a form of coercion in international affairs.

Stubb sees multilateralism as projecting and guaranteeing order, while self-interested multipolarity creates disorder and eventually conflict while pushing aside the small and medium-sized countries which had a say in the era of multilateralism. As such, he would like a more engaged Global South and a better-balanced Security Council. One of the main challenges facing multilateralism is distrust from many citizens living in democracies regarding their institutions that leads to an appealing extremist populism that also rejects international cooperation that is deemed as serving the interests of the elites and attacks national sovereignty. He believes that key features like dignity, dialogue and institutional reform should restore the legitimacy of international cooperation in an era of strong disinformation, economic insecurity and identity politics. Stubb addresses in different chapters the three dynamics of power as “competition” that may lead, if unhealthy, to “conflict” (also notably with hybrid warfare when not conventional) while it should promote “cooperation” on key issues like climate change, trade and security – in a rules-based world order suitably reshaped so all three groups feel heard.

“Values-based realism”, that Stubb promotes, is a compromise between naive idealism and cynical realpolitik. It is “a set of universal values based on freedom, fundamental rights and international rules that reflect the world’s global diversity, culture and history”. Stubb sees it as a tool to keep liberal values alive while engaging with those who do not share them. As such, he thinks middle-power diplomacy (reflecting Europe) should show leadership by example while also being principled without being preachy, pragmatic without being amoral and clearly led by dignity – all while avoiding moral lecturing. Stubb believes that free and democratic societies are the basis for national success while regional cooperation should be strengthened, reflecting his strong EU adherence. Lastly, Stubb, as he told the UN general Assembly in 2024, would want to expand the UN Security Council with five additional permanent members to welcome Latin America, African and Asian nations while eliminating single-state veto power and – key – suspending the voting rights of any Security Council member that violates the UN charter. Such an approach would have the benefits of the Global South adhering more easily to principles often shaped by the Global West, while the latter could point to China real-world evidence of the benefits that Western-fashioned liberal markets, capitalism and free trade brought to Beijing and its ample workforce. Russia, lost in its past, is clearly a challenging party to deal with but relationships could be restored or actually created once the Ukraine war stops, its responsibility admitted and international rules and order committed to – clearly still a rather hard if not unreachable objective today.

On a lighter note, and thinking about Stubb’s cultural background, we should realise that the Finns are the happiest people on earth according to the World Happiness Report. Perhaps we should all take Stubb’s recipe to deal with our drastically changing times: “Stay calm. Be a Finn. Take an ice bath, visit a sauna and reflect”. All without forgetting our values and principles and facing the world as it is but addressing its issues in the right and sensible way. On the same light note, Stubb is silent about the Trump-led Board of Peace with a logo that amusingly only shows the Western hemisphere unlike that of the UN with its full globe.

“The Triangle of Power” is definitely a rare book that could be multiplied in many more given all the topics it covers, going back to the roots of a world order we knew and is now endangered. It is a must-read to understand the issues we are facing today and what could be done to ensure an organised and peaceful world, hopefully also dealing with the governing features that are necessary. We should hope that a cooperation-driven Global West happily endures, all the more so given its freedom and democratic essence, even if it will never be perfect in its management, as no system could ever be.

Warmest regards,

Serge

Understanding the key features and developments of our new world

3.9.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

As I was taking a pause from writing on the rather toxic Trump 2.0 developments, one of my closest American friends told me I should write about the state of the world following seven months of Trump 2.0 for all parties involved. These past seven months have been hard to deal with for many, including myself, a Paris-born individual who grew up in unlimited admiration for America and sought to meet its “dream” in the 1980s to take himself away from a France he loved but found too rigid. While America was never perfect, the country projected values and principles that made one easily forget some of its less-appealing features. America led a so-called Free World where all in that group benefitted, including its leader, while the world gradually became a better place as those who suffered from the Cold War can testify. Globalisation, or “peace through trade”, became the norm while world wars were to be found in history books. The seismic change experienced today would deserve a long list of books to cover all of its features, something a short piece cannot do. However, a focus on defining and understanding the very key features and developments experienced since Trump 2.0 could be useful to foresee a new world in formation for all parties at stake, including Americans but also, given my roots, Europeans.

Trump 2.0 has rapidly become an expression of mild (so far) autocracy where an historical multitude of executive decisions have led the way for a team of “obedient first” Secretaries and White House advisers, often not competent for their roles, to manage the drive. This unusual approach quickly sounded un-American, though meeting little opposition from a business establishment fearing retaliation, while the opposition party seemed helpless – also due to the nature of its current leadership. Examples of policy mishandling over seven months have been akin to a flood, making it hard to follow the massive American downturn. The recent sackings of intelligence officials, leaving a void in challenging times, was startling, all the more so if replaced by incompetent individuals, as seems to be the norm across the Trump administration in key positions. Universities, like Harvard or Columbia, were attacked in a populist way and on strange rationales but mainly to please what is known as the MAGA base, which resents their societal disconnection and what is seen as the elite, often due to their lack of formal or advanced education. In now a classic populist move, illegal immigrants were then deported in drastic un-American ways to please Trump’s base (even if national identity preservation should be understood), while some segments of the economy like agriculture or food chains would suffer. The Supreme Court, with a Trump-leaning majority, seemed to support all these moves, while some courts and indeed courageous judges opposed the most drastic Trump administration decisions. America’s approach to foreign policy was a game-changing experience where allies were treated like foes and tariffs were used for political ends, not mentioning their likely adverse impact on US consumers. Trump 2.0 became a major change in the history of the world for all parties.

It may be hard for the basic Trump voter to go beyond the sheer news impact of being tough to allies and foes alike or grasp the adverse effects of some policies like tariffs, all the more erratic in nature. Similarly, the sheer foreign policy impact and harm to core US interests may be hard to understand for many of them, so remote they may be from the world at large. So here are a few very key developments that should be noted and indeed explained to American voters, all the more so as they may eventually pay for many Trump 2.0 policies:

Trump 2.0 and its treatment of longstanding allies (and indeed the ways used) has created a strong doubt about the Western world being able to “trust” America – as the Danes should feel after the Greenland never-ending episode. And while many Europeans were too reliant on America for their defence, thus also allowing it to cement its clear leadership, the new Trump 2.0 less-European focused approach, which is also becoming mercantile (“we will supply weapons to Kyiv from financial assistance provided by Europeans”), is worsening the spirit of a sound and highly successful post-WW2 partnership. The tariff war finally made clear that Europe was to be treated as any party would be, without any special difference. Trump’s foreign policy and its impact, well beyond a Lindbergh “America first” 1930s message, is a return to a McKinley approach of the 19^th century, where isolationism and protectionism were the norms of the day. America is just another leading country.

One of the key developments of Trump 2.0’s foreign policy, which will be gradually felt, is the strengthening of arch-rival China, as many countries, feeling hurt by the new American approach, will seek closer trade ties with it, leading to broader foreign policy rapprochement. A hard-to-believe joint development was the harsh US focus on long-courted India and its doubling of tariffs to an incredible 50% (on the grounds that Mumbai was buying Russian oil, which many would naturally disagree with). It is clear that India will get closer to China as seen at the recent “new world order” meeting in Beijing. There seems to be no understanding of America’s own core interests in Washington, with an unquestionable support of Trump 2.0 by all branches of government. Another winner of Trump 2.0, to some extent, is Russia, this based on a strange historical personal relationship between the two leaders and Trump himself not wanting to realise early enough that he was artfully used by a strong-minded geopolitical leader who plays for time and will unlikely stop a terrible but now existential war in the heart of Europe without clear gains.

The gradual disappearance of trust of Western allies in the US and the unwitting enabling of the rise of China while weakening American government efficiency are probably the two key developments the world will have to deal with in Trump 2.0 times, not to mention a never-ending war of attrition in Ukraine based on an existential quest. As a prelude of days to come, foreign tourism to the US has massively declined with Trump 2.0 with an estimated loss of USD 12.5bn for 2025, even if a transactional Trump 2.0 would argue that tariffs will more than make up for this loss, not minding the core message of this development. One can hope that mid-term elections in 2026 may change this poor course, but harm will have been done, and a sound course will be hard to restore, even if it should be pursued nonetheless.

One of the few winners of this seismic change may be the geopolitical risk and risk intelligence consultancies as clients may grow due to the challenging times we know. As it is also a segment I feel very interested in, even if I am very demanding in terms of platform MO and overall quality, I should almost send a note of thanks to Karoline Leavitt, the young White House press secretary, but – as a good sense of humour is key in our harder times – I will not do so as I really find her too unpleasant and so representative of her boss.

Warmest regards,

Serge

Stressing the irrationality and damage of Trump’s tariff policies

4.8.25

Dear Partners in Thought,

It is clear that Donald Trump enjoys unusual personal features that most people would find odd at the very least. The problem is that he was re-elected president of the leading country in the world (so far) and that his usually aggressive and bold policies, which reflect his personality, create adverse consequences for the world and America itself – all while his support base is unable to realise it yet, while his top team follows orders and focuses on their own career preservation.

The list of odd policies triggered by Trump 2.0 is long and, in some ways, too hard to follow due to their relentless emergence. While some policy drivers have roots shared by many voters – like the issue of illegal immigration linked to the rise of crime (which we also feel or for some “experience” in Europe), the problem is that many of these policies and their management are often not suited to achieving the desired objectives and they carry questionable management ways. If choosing one key Trump policy that was driven by a perception of a deficit at the national level, that has seized the news headlines also due to their transactional back-and-forth moves, tariffs would be a good choice. In doing so, it is key to focus on simple facts dealing with impact and not to be lost on the too many policy details at hand.

Trump focused on tariffs and hitting 92 countries at the same time as a key policy focus, while America, the world’s leading economy, needs the world as a market. The move was driven by the desire to achieve a perception of reciprocity and to avoid America being taken for granted as too easy a trading partner. While one can understand the motivations of Trump 2.0, the ways to achieve this objective have been disastrous, while their impacts at so many levels are yet to be seen and indeed felt. Today, the US average tariff rate is akin to those favoured in the mid-1930s protectionist era and the first “America First” of Charles Lindbergh. Let’s then review the poor points for all parties involved in this unusual approach to tariffs – for the whole world and America itself.

Declaring what is akin to tariff wars has started to globally destroy the image of America as a “good country” caring for the world it always wanted to lead. It also gradually killed the post-Cold War globalisation that benefitted the world, not only economically but also ensured “peace through trade”. Being transactional, as if the world was another Trump Tower development project, with ceaselessly changing tariff rates and deadlines, while deemed to be tactically smart, showed an unreliable America, which contradicts its basic history, values and ways since WW2.

On a pure geopolitical note, treating allies and foes alike (even if the latter may face higher rates as would China) is unseemly, while US trading partners and, all the more, key strategic allies rightfully question what an alliance means today. Mixing geopolitical objectives (some very strange too) with tariffs, the latter as a way to achieve the former, is lacking values and principles that defined America while creating a new and sub-optimal diplomatic environment for all parties involved (even if one would more than smile at the laudatory remarks made to Trump by the very gifted NATO leader Mark Rutte when they were discussing continued US support to the key Western alliance institution). In many ways, Trump’s tariff drive is another element of the destruction of US soft power shown with policies such as the termination of USAID and what it brought the developing world as well as America’s image as a caring world leader. Trump’s tariff policies, beyond their economic impacts, destroy the strength of the democratic interdependence also enjoyed by democracies in the West and elsewhere.

It is interesting to see that some countries or federations, like the EU, seemed to have accepted too willingly a poor tariff deal at 15% in order to preserve the key relationship and model, while others are still fighting, like India, and may face higher rates (also as they are targeted for buying too much Russian oil – like de facto China in addition to the key rivalry we know). It is also fascinating that the EU faces 15% while Britain will only deal with 10%, a “divide and rule” move to weaken the UK-EU rapprochement that will take place in any case and is needed since the disastrous Brexit (also on defence, an area where Europe itself could strangely thank Trump 2.0 for becoming more in charge of its destiny as it should have been for so long). As for Switzerland with its 39% rate, it may regret its non-EU status. Tariffs are also used as a political reprisal, like with Brazil or Canada, both cases where individuals like Lula and Carney are personally targeted for reasons that have nothing to do with trade.

It is clear that the key Trump driver is the news effect and the short-term impact on its core base of supporters, MAGA or not. Many, but not all, are not equipped to understand the impact of most of Trump’s policies but thoroughly enjoy the drive that America shows under Trump 2.0. The problem is that many of these supporters, who are not well-off, will be the first to pay when shopping at Costco or Walmart, even if it will take some time to happen as many foreign suppliers may take time to raise prices so as to initially protect their market share. US car manufacturers are already starting to hurt given their need for massive steel and aluminium imports. It is possible that the unreadable stock market performance and the still viable economic environment are comforting many Americans, even if job creations and inflation rates seem to start showing poor trends. One does not need to be an Economics Nobel Prize winner to realise that tariffs will affect American consumers, many of whom will be surprised by this obvious development. It is, of course, possible, but not likely, that some US consumers will no longer buy imported products as being too expensive. On the same note, and putting aside the needed US tech, some European consumers may forget about Amazon or drink Kofola, the Coke equivalent, in Czechia. Time will tell, as this tariff offensive looks like a show with no end but, in any case, this is a major step back for globalisation and its product and service diversity, not to mention a more peaceful global environment.

Trump 2.0’s tariffs are hurting the world and America itself at too many economic and diplomatic levels to a point that US rivals, if not formal enemies, like China may benefit. As stated, it is possible that many countries, while not leaving America as a market, will decide to refocus their trade on other markets, notably in a rising Asia or even Latin America – Brazil likely being a welcoming partner these days. And these new trading developments may also lead to diplomatic and eventually military developments in due course, all the more if Trump 2.0 persists with its ill-fated strategic approaches. It looks like the White House needs to enhance its longer term thinking or, maybe, simply start to think rationally.

Warmest regards,

Serge