8-7-24
Dear Partners in Thought,
While I did not want to rush with an Interlude earlier as news was flowing fast, I wanted to cover in depth and very honestly a very key and at times sensitive topic for France, Europe and the world: Where is France today and why? Since he became President in 2017, Macron has remade France to a great extent into a modern country for the 21st century. He reformed employment, leading to 2 million new jobs and 6 million new businesses in seven years, making France a business-friendly country. Inflation was also well-managed. Paris became a hub for tech start-ups and rivaled London as a top financial center, while business taxes were cut along with unproductive wealth taxes. Education was boosted and pensions were reformed. France grew faster than its EU peers and poverty rates were below the EU average. It is possible that those achievements were not felt by the average voter, with European parliamentary elections showing a rejection of Macron’s electoral grouping in ways that were both drastic and surprising. And to be fair, the public deficit expanded to markedly new heights making the overall French economic picture less impressive. This Interlude will try to go through the much deeper roots of these results and explain why France is where it is today while democratic governing is challenging in our times.
As the Rassemblement National (National Rally or RN), the far-right Eurosceptic party, created the huge dual surprise of finishing first with a 33% stake in the first snap election round but unexpectedly not securing an absolute or even relative majority in the second round, I still wanted to focus on the roots of its increased popularity. I wanted to focus on the RN given the future, as it may keep growing and eventually secure power in France if traditional politics kept failing, however governing is challenging. RN lost today but France did not yet win. France is now going through a chaotic period with no clear path for an obvious government. It is clear that the “republican wall” worked again, even if not ideal for voters who would like to vote “for” rather than “against” a program, while also creating governing issues for France.
The results of the European parliamentary elections in France, often the case for a protest vote, led to Macron’s unexpected and, to some, gamble of dissolving the National Assembly. His decision, leading to snap parliamentary elections, which can be controversial, was made to create a reasonable centrist wall assisted by moderate socialists and center rightists against the RN, whose deep founding roots go back to the Vichy period (some French Waffen SS having even been with Marine Le Pen’s father’s leadership of the Front National or National Front when he created the original party in 1972). Macron’s admittedly bold move was put in jeopardy when various parties on the left, some with little common policies, values or principles, unexpectedly (for many observers and indeed Macron himself) decided to use the far-right and the dissolution as a way of trying to seize power electorally by presenting the Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front or NFP), a tactical and opportunistic gathering established in four days, that could win “only” as it would oppose the RN. In doing so, these far-left and center-left parties decided to recreate the aura and forces led by Léon Blum which were opposed to the rising far-right in 1936. To some extent it was also a more drastic flashback to when the Socialists and then stronger Communists joined forces under candidate Mitterrand to defeat mainstream President Giscard in 1981 under the banner of the Common Program – an experiment that did not work out very well, not even for the French economy, and collapsed two years into Mitterrand’s mandate.
Before I start, and as some of you may know, I should stress that I grew up in a Gaullist family. In my early twenties, I was part in 1981-1982 of the then young Sarkozy-led national youth leadership team of the RPR (Rassemblement pour la République or National Gathering for the Republic, founded by Jacques Chirac and the then Gaullist party of the day) as Socialist François Mitterrand took over France. My French political involvement stopped then as I opted for an “American Dream”-fueled personal reengineering and spent 35 of the last 40 years outside France, unwittingly becoming an admittedly easy poster child for the hot topic of “immigration.” Since 2017 and his first run at the French presidency I have supported Macron as reflecting the political center or a better balanced, non-extremist approach to politics. To some critics, Macron embodies a certain French elitism, which I always found should ideally reflect a journey leading the most able individuals to lead a country like France. While I liked the man and never found him that “arrogant” as I often heard – as if a President of the French Republic had to be low key and humble not to irritate the sensitive ones – he certainly made the mistake, not to dissolve the National Assembly, but to forget that political parties, like his own, do still matter. He never really built “En Marche” (Going Forward) and then Renaissance (Renew) as they should have been, leading to a much lower presence and impact in the domestic political scene as if only the Elysée presidential leadership mattered, this possibly reinforcing the arrogant image we know. In other words, Macron, while an effective and sound leader for our challenging times, behaved like a de Gaulle while not really having saved France like “le grand Charles”. To be fair, his tactical approach in the 2017 presidential elections had been to sell “himself” while marginalizing if not destroying both the erstwhile “parties of government” which were the Socialist and Gaullist parties (the latter by then Les Républicains). He succeeded in marginalizing both politically moderate parties which gave rise to the extremes with the NR and the far-left France Insoumise (Unbowed France) led by former Trotskyist Mélanchon, the latter which is today the core force of the NFP. Some of Les Républicains MPs (including Eric Ciotti, their quite radical, Nice-based, President) joined forces post-European elections with the NR out of sheer existential need, even if losing their political souls and roots – de facto imploding their party. If anything, Macron unwittingly created the electoral rise of the extremes even if he likely never saw the emergence of the incoherent NFP that hurt his bet for centrist Renaissance (or Ensemble, another new name for the elections) to defeat the RN like in 2022, via a republican coalition as the sole option to do so.
This snap election put the RN in a stronger position in French politics even if it did not secure a relative or absolute majority as many would have clearly expected. It is thus worth understanding how and why such an extremist party was ever on the verge of power in France. There is no doubt that Marine Le Pen, daughter of the true founder of the RN (then Front National before the name was changed in 2018), worked hard over the last decade to make her party less extreme, even if still with a far-right flavor, making it more appealing to a wider electorate. When the original party was founded, it was clearly focused on the arrival of North African workers in the 1970s (mostly Algerians post-1962 independence from France), providing a taint of racism to the program of the then Front National. We are now fifty years later. The changes led by Marine Le Pen to make the party more widely acceptable (even if national identity remains a key RN facet) did not make her party and key members any more competent to manage a country like France but the RN still stuck to a focus on securing votes rather than being a party of government. As for the left wing NFP coalition that was agreed within four days, it put together parties at times with little in common: Socialists, Communists, Ecologists and Far-Left, making for an unlikely government should they ever win an absolute majority in the legislative elections, even always a highly challenging possibility. It is clear, however, that the sudden electoral rise of the RN gave the opportunity for all the disparate left and far-left parties to get together, even if they could never work together, to show a fictitious gathering solely aimed at beating the far-right based on “very broad” republican values and principles but not on policies, especially of the economic kind.
What we saw in a key election with a very high participation (66.7% and 67.1% in the first and second rounds respectively) was the electoral rise of two largely government-incompetent, if not disparate for the NFP, political groups. The NFP, created opportunistically by leaders with irreconcilable differences, making endless promises to many voters wanting less taxes for themselves and more for the wealthy, more state subsidies, public sector wage increases, an abandonment of the retirement age reform, pension increases or the return of the wealth tax. Given its absence of serious consideration for its funding and the economic damage to follow, this opportunistic and vote-grabbing program led the French investment and business communities to almost prefer the RN, which they assumed would be more reasonable or indeed manageable should they ever win. Before the first round, polls (later confirmed) unexpectedly showed the NFP with results below those of its constituent parts during the European election, this reflecting its clear lack of internal coherence and reduced overall support. It was very hard, if not impossible, to see such an opportunistic coalition leading to any stable form of government, even if a wall against the hard-right extremism of the day – eventually a winning wall but with its centrist partners. As for the RN, which led in the polls, the economic program seemed very vague, besides less funding for the EU (though staying in it and keeping the Euro unlike in the past), even if naturally vote-grabbing, its main focus being immigration and linked security, all flavored with an anti-“remote Paris elite” message. The RN made sure to stress policies like forbidding dual nationals in sensitive top public service and government jobs, like in the defense sector (even if some RN officials also mentioned a past French-Moroccan Minister of the Education as a case in point). Another key RN mantra was to restore “order” in society, hence the uniform in schools and addressing teachers with the formal “vous” – proposals which incidentally might appeal to quite a few non-RN voters.
Most neutral observers (if ever possible) focused on economic impact that would see the NFP triggering a capital flight while the RN would create a debt crisis that would not help France’s already high public deficit. Having a prime minister like Jordan Bardella, aged 28 with only a high school degree (even if with the highest marks) – not a fact often stressed as being sensitive – and zero “real” job experience apart from his political engagement at an early age, would be a drastic change for a country that was “managed” since 1945 by very educated (usually highly selective ENA graduates) and experienced individuals on all sides of the mainstream political spectrum. Such a clear and unusual leadership move naturally fit the anti-elite focus of the RN and some of its supporters. Bardella’s surprising statement a few days before the first round, that he would only go to Matignon (the Prime Minister’s office) if the RN obtained an absolute majority, made some wonder about the actual meaning of such a statement as if he might have felt, deep down, that he was unsurprisingly not equipped for the job – indeed a simple reality fact. Focusing on him, it is interesting to see the Taylor Swift impact – without, so far, the amnesia effect we now know happens at or after her concerts – that Bardella (and indeed the “Bardella mania”) can have among young voters who see themselves in him, especially if coming from poor backgrounds and likely without many degrees at hand. This picture would change slightly if looking more closely at Bardella‘s father, amusingly of Franco-Algerian descent, who was a successful entrepreneur while his son went to private Catholic schools, something the RN does not much mention, preferring the tough Seine-Saint Denis suburbs, high rise building, and Italian-emigrated single mother story on offer. With all due respect, Bardella, admittedly very engaging and well-dressed, may be the most recent and successful political case of primarily focusing on grabbing votes regardless of what comes after if winning – including policy implementation and sheer abilities. Such a tactical or indeed marketing approach is not a surprise if studying the challenging struggles of Le Pen’s party to convince voters over decades. The RN found the correct winning and even refreshing “medium” for our times so kudos are rightly deserved in terms of political acumen, this even if not fully winning today.
It is of course easy for some of us, also given our levels of education and careers, to not understand why some people would back extremist politicians who have no government experience and only offer simple solutions to complex issues in order to get votes. The far-right parties, and their politicians, are usually not government-focused as their aim was always to increase their forever minority electoral stake over the past many decades. I grew up in the 14th arrondissement of Paris where Jean-Marie Le Pen launched his first and forever losing legislative candidature in 1972. Over the years, I would have never thought Marine Le Pen could reach the second round of the presidential election in 2017 and 2022 and be on the verge of Matignon, via Bardella, in 2024. Marine le Pen, while clearly the daughter of her father (she sure can thank him for where she is today, even if she tactically expelled him from the party in 2015 as part of her reengineering drive), eventually saw that the best route to increase her party’s popularity was to make it more acceptable, less autocratic in its program and clearly distant of its fatherly roots. She certainly succeeded, even if the tools are still much election-focused like the selection of a very young and naturally untested Bardella to appeal to new, social media-inspired, generations, who incidentally do not share the memories of WW2 and her father’s party and want a “quick change” to their own fortunes, all the more if many of them have not followed traditional higher educational paths, which they may feel should matter less in these new times.
One has to be fair, as the RN voters and supporters are by and large not “neo-Nazis” or even far-right extremists as we defined it (some historically and ideologically are of course). Many are primarily upset by the immigration slide they felt in their country for decades and the gradual lack of national identity, while a French approach to Woke takes place and the “small ethnic white” is no longer associated with the homeland, also due to globalization, in spite of its history and what was France. Immigration and national identity are the key natural drivers of RN supporters (along with associated security), which are deemed more important and easier to understand than sheer economic matters, even if the RN is still weak in its proposals on this latter key front that could hurt the country very seriously. Contrary to what James Carville famously said in the US elections of 1992, this time “it’s the economy, stupid” does not apply even if it should. Cost of living anxiety is naturally always a French electoral issue as if reflecting the perennial French state of unhappiness about their own social conditions. The RN supporters, however, deeply feel more that “it is about who we are”. Immigration is another name for national identity which is cautiously handled as it can be taken as racism in this context if too carelessly used. It is a very challenging approach, all the more as we know that this national identity drive is directed against core Islamists but also French Muslim nationals (and to some extent, though not as much, black Africans even if the composition of the French football team has had a healthy impact on this sad angle). Many of these immigrants came to France generations ago in the 1970s as France needed to build its roads and bridges, then leading President Giscard to set up the ‘family gathering” program to make it more livable for them. This strategic move led to the development of large non-ethnic French populations usually living in the suburbs of Paris and Lyons if not “taking over” cities like Marseilles in the south of France, closer to Algeria. Today the Muslim population of France (citizens and non-citizens) is the largest one in Europe (some would add akin to its Jewish population, but on a different scale). A side issue has also been the much higher birth rate among these new French at a time when the natives’ own went markedly down over past decades, creating a real issue in France even if following a European if not Western trend. It is clear that the French colonial history explains the strong Arab component of the French population (again, many of them fully-fledged citizens) in many suburbs of these large cities and that integration could never be smooth – even if with hindsight more government focus should have been applied. And then ghettoization clearly took place as the native French did not want “mixity”, this helped by the limited financial resources of these legal immigrants and their families who could not afford key city centers (all these issues often gradually creating “zones of non-law” in the banlieues where the police often do not even enter these days, even if the vast majority of French nationals of Arab and African origin residing in these parts are law-abiding citizens). One of the RN boosters may have been the memories of the suburban riots of the late summer 2023 where thefts and destruction were focused on the very areas where the non-native local population or at times its third French-born generation lived (average age of the culprits: 17 showing the urgent policy needs to deal with the issues at hand). Politically, it is also interesting to see that many of these new French today vote for the far-left France Insoumise party (when not also activists), which is also the leading member of the NFP making it more understanding on immigration issues – and de facto one of its weak points (with higher taxation) for many voters who wonder who they should support today. One of the appealing features of the RN program to its voters is to prevent children born in France from foreign parents from securing the citizenship (a standard practice in the US even today), a feature also linked to the much higher birth rate among non-natives. It should be stressed that, unlike in the US, illegal immigration is not the key issue (even if RN voters would disagree), France not having a serious border or “wall” problem like in the US and not dealing with “unwanted boats” like in Southern Italy. Unlike for Germany, France did not deal with a massive influx of refugees from Syria in the mid-2010s, which Chancellor Merkel largely welcomed out of key needs for workers to develop the German economy (similarly Ukraine did not provide a strong influx of refugees of the type seen in Poland). Liberal democratic and “centrist” governments, especially in Europe, have been notoriously weak in tackling issues like immigration, especially from Africa, so as to ensure that an always challenging integration was well-managed and indeed lived well by their native nationals, usually fearing being too easily accused of sheer racism – and they are paying the price after 50 years of benign neglect. To be fair, many RN voters do not live in the “non-French” suburbs they decry nor do they suffer directly from any aspects of what is an unsuccessful integration, but they see the news (social media not helping either) while the RN exploits them, working efficiently on their desire for “change” in many areas to steer voters away from traditional political parties that ruled France for decades. And it is fair to also realize, quite aside from the hot immigration issue, that a lot of rural French areas feel lost and disenfranchised today, this driving some local voters against a historically centralized France and global Paris elite at a time when large cities keep growing. Change at all levels is therefore the key driver for many French voters, however desperate and gambling in nature it may be. Change was also the more understanding driver in the last British elections after 14 years of Tory “leadership” and a chaotic Brexit experience. Change is also found as a top driver for voters even if governments have an acceptable track record as seen across Western democracies and a cause for concern for Joe Biden when facing an erratic and populist Trump in November, all the more adding to his age and debating performance issues.
It is a fact that younger generations of voters – many of whom support the RN – do not experience the repulsion felt by older voters regarding the name of Le Pen and its family past (the largest age group of non-RN voters is the 70+ year one, likely as memories of WW2 and Jean-Marie Le Pen stuck more easily). Newer generations comprising young voters do not share the same memories, direct or indirect, of WW2 and its aftermath. It is also fair to say that many RN candidates and now Députés are young, many of them women, very presentable, nice and engaging as seen in the various French TV interviews during the election. In a positive drive, even if politically-motivated, RN elected officials have also been known to bring back old school local politics by getting closer to their residents like in Hénin-Beaumont or Perpignan that were the first large cities to go the RN way. In many ways they provide a clear image break with the historical hard far-right personalities known to an older public but also those seen in recent years. To be fair and true to tradition, a few RN candidates were also unexpectedly found to be legally ineligible, not wanting to debate their opponents, having posted racist and homophobic comments on social media while one lady candidate having to withdraw due to an old Facebook photo of her wearing a Nazi officer cap or another one, nevertheless finishing first, not having been seen on official electoral posters if that were ever possible – this also showing a real internal vetting weakness even if preparation time was scarce. The main problem with RN supporters is that they forget or do not want to see that RN leaders (or even local candidates) are not skilled or experienced to govern and usually poorly trained to deal with the intricacies of economic issues and the implications of politically-motivated policies. It was no surprise to see Bardella, clearly focused on the RN’s economic program pre-first round, to manage the concerns of many, showing reasonableness – read readiness to forget some drastic proposals – flavored with reassuringly old-style political messaging. It is also a fact nobody dwells upon the fact that the French, compared with other nations, are by and large not known to be experts on how the economy works – or not. It is even possible that the simple and easy “the rich will pay” also speaks to the nation’s colorful and engaging Bastille Day roots (even if the RN is not as economically radical voter-focused as the far left given its historical constituency and main natural focus). On the fun side, polls showed one week before the first round that a majority of voters (assumingly RN ones) trusted Marine Le Pen most on the economy – “trust” being the right word as there is no evidence of her knowledge in that field. Time will tell but it was clear that the RN leadership was already backtracking on much of their bold economic program, which today is vastly unfunded, this even if RN voters do not mind and are ready to see what happens, truly hoping for the best and indeed wanting “change”, however still drastic after seven years of Macronism and indeed decades of traditional parties in power. One strange, but expected feature as it is quite French in nature, was the total lack of interest on the part of RN voters in foreign policy issues at a time when geopolitics are back on the front scene of all governments with clear impacts on daily lives of citizens, Ukraine being a case in point. The prospect of WW3 and how to manage or avoid it in a productive way for France and Europe was not a top issue at all, also maybe as the war in Ukraine has been around for quite a long time by now. On the reassuring side and constitutionally, it should be stressed that French foreign and defense policies would still be the remit of the President in the extreme case of a “cohabitation” even if Marine Le Pen would disagree on the latter and budgetary features would be overseen by the government.
On a side key note, and while foreign policy was not a core electoral issue, it is clear that the massive “October 7” Hamas terrorist attack on Israel deepened an RN “detoxification” effort witnessed over the last decade. Marine Le Pen, while breaking with her father’s party roots, decided to focus on Islamism as the enemy while stressing that her party was not anti-Semitic and now indeed a strong supporter of Israel. This gradual shift led many Jewish voters, including leading personalities, like the renowned 88-year old Nazi hunter Serge Klarsfeld, to declare, to the surprise of many, their support for the RN in these elections. Today nearly 20% of French Jewish voters would vote for the RN, this reinforced by the far-left France Insoumise’s pro-Palestinian positions and keffiyeh-wearing members seen at many protest marches. These reinforced RN changes are also happening as a form of Gaza war anti-Semitism has been on the rise in some quarters in France, home to the largest Jewish population in Europe, this more likely creating confrontations of various types allowing the RN to focus on anti-Islamism (Israeli officials even congratulated the RN for their now very official stance). On a not unexpected note, the renunciation of an always unofficial party anti-Semitism by Marine Le Pen might not have been followed by the core grassroots who still find issues with both local Jewish and Muslim Arab communities, a feature that must make her 96-year old father, convicted for anti-Semitic remarks and hate speech, smile and the topic of family discussions, assuming father and daughter are still on speaking terms (in terms of hate speech, French readers may remember the awful “Monsieur Durafour-crématoire” play on words referring to Nazi concentration camp ovens when addressing a government minister in 1988).
The second and final electoral round involved tactical policies of withdrawals agreed between the so-called “republican” parties or indeed election groupings (mainly NFP and Ensemble, Macron’s election grouping) to beat the RN candidate. This approach was at times not uniform as while all NFP candidates, including far-left ones, would step down if having come in the third position in the first round, some Ensemble candidates decided not to withdraw to assist a far-left candidate even part of the NFP, as deemed un-republican, even to beat the RN. And Les Républicains, keeping to their unusual approach, decided not to back officially any other party candidate (de facto meaning not supporting a competing far-left candidate against RN so not following the proposed anti-RN “Republican pact” for the final round but also eventually having their own voters casting their ballots for the RN candidate against the NFP – if indeed wanted by them on a case by case basis). As the second round unfolded, we saw the RN surprisingly missing its expected target while the NFP coalition was securing a relative majority in Parliament, albeit a very small one. It is clearly a major shock and a serious management challenge for the RN as everybody, including them, believed they would finish first (and not third), even if they naturally stress how happy they are about their real but small progress in terms of députés. The Macron group, while finishing second in the election, is still the first “real” or certainly coherent parliamentary group in the National Assembly given the coalition nature of the left to far-left NFP that comprised four major parties and smaller gatherings for these elections. As no party secured an absolute majority of 289 seats, none will not be able to automatically govern France directly for the duration of Macron’s term until 2027 in what is known in French political folklore as “cohabitation”, like the Mitterrand-Chirac duet in 1986 between the President and the winning opposition.
Things are now unfolding as to how France will be governed, the only certainty being that the country will not enjoy a stable or clear path with a fractured National Assembly providing no clear government, at least as of today. It is possible that a RN-inspired government, would have been far more moderate than many rightly feared, while following the current and previously unexpected Georgia Meloni model in Italy. While Marine Le Pen had started toning down some of RN’s economic proposals before the first voting round, Bardella clearly stated that a RN government would not change French foreign policy directions, including in relation to Ukraine (this in spite of past pro-Russian feelings among the RN leadership and its financing history as seen during the 2017 presidential election). The economic impact of the RN in sole power would have been very strong in terms of public deficits, which are a key French issue these days, also for the EU, even under the deficit-spending Macron leadership. The likely path following a relative majority, whatever its eventual nature, now results from a “hung parliament” (one might wish if being caustic) leading to a caretaker-likely technocratic kind of government à la Mario Draghi, but highly constrained in what it can achieve (without the very Gaullist censure motion known as “Article 49.3” allowing the circumvention of the National Assembly) by the sheer weight of the RN at the legislative Palais Bourbon.
Assuming that France is not going to be totally frozen in its governance, it is clear that Macron will need to work with a coalition, whether it is a wanted one or not. It is unlikely, if not impossible, that Macron and the incoherent NFP could work together, whatever the latter’s results even if still implying a very small relative majority in a fractured parliament – given its far-left component even if its other more moderate parts still might be open to it. It is clearly unlikely that all members of NFP could work together as the NFP of today in any government. It would also be more possible that a partnership between Macron with the Socialists, Ecologists and some non-RN Républicains could work out. Looking at potential scenarios pre-final election results, a governance driven by some sort of “understanding” with a practical RN could have been an option, had they secured a relative majority – though a distant one if something better for Macron could have been achieved – even if many on both sides would not have been be very happy about this outcome. As mentioned by French political scientists, the competence factor, which is a key issue for the RN, could have been dealt with thanks to experienced “opportunists” (maybe from the center right Les Républicains for those now working with Le Pen) self-servingly interested in an unexpected comeback and top ministerial front roles to rationalize the moderation of the RN and save the day in terms of government and policy management. This most-needed input would have gone with a reversal from the RN (as already seen, pragmatism being naturally their key driver electorally) on the most controversial economic policies formerly on offer like the retirement age reform, while funding would be a major driver in what stays from their program, all the more given the existing public deficit. This dual practical shift and arrangement would have to be managed without losing the RN’s soul and most importantly its voting base so it is very likely that immigration and security policies would have stayed and would have had to be adopted by the new government under the three remaining years of the Macron presidency. One unknown factor given France’s well-known experienced and highly trained top civil servants, traditionally an apolitical corps, is whether they would have been amenable to working alongside such an unusual scheme with and for, even if indirectly, a far-right populist parliamentary leadership with little credibility in terms of sound government experience.
Time will tell, but Europe and the world need a stable French government, all the more as we go more deeply into the third year of the war in Ukraine while the electorally ignored geopolitical issues and key relation with the EU (that also looks at the high French public deficit) will strongly come back to the fore sooner rather than later. In addition to the likely economic backlash of an RN (or NFP) economic program, if ever fully implemented, would have been the damages done in terms of potential reductions of net EU funding or Brussels’ reactions to excessive Single Market rule-breaking subsidies to French agriculture and businesses. Such bold French moves could also have led to similar stances from member states where the far-right is also increasingly active and ultimately the weakening of the EU. Another RN-led immigration-related management issue would have been the possible infringements of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such French electoral developments could have also possibly created a crisis of the Euro given the large size of the French economy together with highly negative French stock exchange reactions as seen in a telling post-first round preview. And it is not clear, in spite of reassuring words from the RN, whether one of the indirect winners of these elections would not have sat in Moscow. While his civil war comments may have been overstated, there is no doubt that Macron was counting on the next three years to show the French, in a worst-case scenario, how unequipped an RN-led or -inspired government would have been, leading to a defeat of Le Pen in the 2027 presidential election (and twenty years or more back in opposition). Although we should also realize that one historically key problem with far-right parties and leaders is that when they win elections – even if not really the case constitutionally in a potential best RN case scenario – it is often the last time you have one. Assuming new legislative elections were still on the cards as a way to provide France with a more coherent leadership, the earliest one that could be called constitutionally by the President, would be in late June 2025 after twelve months of potential democratic chaos. Obviously, and while it may take some time to get to a sound governmental way forward, we should all hope for historical homegrown Cartesian Reason to prevail – the sooner, the better.
On a final note, it is useful to note that “vote-grabbing via easy solutions to solve complex issues” (admittedly one of my blog tenets since 2018) as offered by far-right populists is a current trend in our democratic world globally. While these “solutions” would often fail, also as government and management competence are not key features of populists, they reflect two things: i) the need for “change” and trying what was not tried before, even if at times unfounded and out of despair or exasperation and ii) the fact that governing in a democratic context is challenging today as voters want quick results, and are tired of what they see happening or actually not with traditional governments, at times for good reasons. Lastly, it is indeed possible that Macron’s early worst-case scenario feeling, that three years of the RN at or nearly at the top of France would flesh out its shortcomings, is right but it is also risky. As stated but it needs stressing, governing democracies is very challenging today and often electorally loss-making as we see everywhere hence why autocrats (also in essence), once in power, do away with (real) elections and indeed democracy. Having said that, even an illiberal Iran surprised us in the right way with its latest election results. Time will tell for France as the plot is unfolding so let’s keep hoping – and working – for the best. It certainly could have been worse for France as most polls consistently showed, making pollsters the real unexpected losers of this snap French election.
Warmest regards,
Serge
Desperate Measures 
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