Conflict – The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine (David Petraeus/Andrew Roberts)

22-2-24

Dear Partners in Thought,

I would like to share with you a new book on warfare since 1945 by two well-known specialists of the subject. One is General David Petraeus, one of the leading American military commanders (and indeed thinkers) who was CIA Director under Obama (before sadly and to some unfairly having to resign due to an affair with his “All in” biographer). The other is Andrew Roberts, one of the leading British military historians also known for his famed “Napoléon” and “Churchill” biographies. I realize the topic is a tough one and some will think I relish writing on sad matters, but I thought it was an interesting one, all the more so as we are going into the third year of a war of invasion in Ukraine—an event which upended the relatively quiet and very productive post-Cold War globalization world we knew. “Conflict” is clearly a very dense book which a Book Note could not give the right credit for. To be fair, each chapter and its wars, that are described chronologically, would deserve a Book Note of its own—if not a whole book.     

Given the return of war in Europe, Russia is of course front and center of the authors’ considerations. Throughout history, Russia has always had a peculiar approach to using military forces, not necessarily to the benefit of its own soldiers. Eighty per cent of the soldiers who died fighting Nazi Germany did so on the Eastern front – these were Soviet forces, not including the millions of Soviet civilians who lost their lives as German forces went East in 1941. Russia registered five times more war dead in one year of the Ukraine invasion than in a decade in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Ukraine war is a regressive WW2-type war in terms of its warfare approach. Strategic leadership being key in modern warfare, the authors stress that the failure of Russia to win, all the more given its assumed military might, is a testimony to its inherent weakness. In a way, Russia’s military unwittingly showed Russian forces more appropriate for grand military parades of a North Korean style as seen in the May Day victory parades to celebrate the victory over Nazi Germany. Russian victories require masses of soldiers and casualties rather than sheer strategic brio—this perhaps reinforced by the inherent leadership weakness of commanders primarily chosen for their obedience. This assessment does not mean they will not win in Ukraine as time goes on, and the West gets tired or immersed into domestic political games and considerations—as vividly seen in the US.    

The authors make clear they are not writing a comprehensive history of all conflicts, while their focus is on the evolution of warfare through strategy, tactics and weapons and what happened on major battlefields. When looking at warfare, the 20th century yielded more violent deaths than at any time since the beginning of the history of the world. 1945 and the end of WW2, a victory for a nascent West that would be solidified by the rising Cold War, was a time of hope. President Truman even abolished the OSS – Office of Strategic Services -, the predecessor of the soon to be CIA, in September 1945, within one month of the victory in the Pacific theater. Europe and the US were no longer at war, even if conflicts would ignite—such as with the Indian sub-continent partition that would give rise to Pakistan and the India we know, the Palestine conflict in 1948 (there to stay as we sadly see), and the Chinese civil war leading to the creation of an independent Taiwan (another sensitive spot 75 years later). Potential war on a large, if not unseen, scale then started gradually with the US and then Russia developing a nuclear arsenal, and MAD or the Mutually Assured Destruction strategy (during the Cold War, the US and Russia undertook 1,032 and 715 nuclear and then thermonuclear tests, incidentally leading to serious medical conditions in Kazakhstan where Moscow conducted 50% of its tests). One could say that MAD worked, as the two arch-enemies did not wage war directly for nearly half a century, before the Soviet Union collapsed, and globalization became the focus of all world powers.

In “The Death of the Dream of Peace” (1945-1953) the authors start with the world digesting the biggest conflict the world ever knew with the Chinese civil war, pitching Kuomintang leader Chiang vs. Communist Party leader Mao. This civil war, that few of us know well in the West, had started as the war against Japan was also waged, creating a very confusing overall battlefield. While Chiang’s Kuomintang had initially 2.5 million men under arms vs. half a million for Mao’s party, the latter leader inspired by Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” was far more agile tactically, avoiding direct confrontation when he could. Mao was also more in command than Chiang, with soldiers devoted to him and their cause, while the Kuomintang leaders were often more focused on internal politics and not caring so much about their forces. Mao was also more flexible—even using 200,000 soldiers who had fought for Japan—while being very rash in executing 150,000 soldiers opposing Communism. Chiang, supported by the West, lost a war that he should have won if only on sheer numbers, due to strategic and tactical mistakes that were not expected, and led to a retreat to Formosa and the Taiwan situation we still live with. The Chinese civil war, and its staggering six million deaths, showed that guerilla warfare carried out by much smaller Maoist forces could prevail against a Western-backed government much more powerful on paper. Then the Korean war broke out, when North Korea invaded south of the 38th parallel Blitzkrieg style with 135,000 forces following Kim Il-sung’s decision being blessed by then Soviet Stalin (Kim Ill-sung was the father of Kim Jong Il, himself the father of Kim Jong Un, the current leader – North Korea being a family business). The Korean War, as it became known, was the first invasion of a country and, with the Chinese Civil War, the largest commitment of forces since WW2. It was also the start of surprise attacks—that we saw for decades to come with the 1967 War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Falklands War, the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 9-11—where the attacker usually gets a much stronger response than its initial offensive however dreadful (a feature we still see to this day). It was also a war that unified most the West led by the US, (Truman having already lost China) via the UN, and so many of its members against one single enemy, which would keep its aggressive style in the Korean peninsula literally for generations. One of the amazing features of that war was the egotism of MacArthur who commanded the Western/United Nations (88% American) forces and the little-known fact that he was leading from Japan.  The Korean War that started very well, ended up in a Western retreat that was only saved by General Ridgway who replaced MacArthur after his criticism of President’s Truman limited war and his many ineptitudes as a military commander. Petraeus and Roberts give us a forgotten account of one of the leading intelligence disasters post-WW2 when the Chinese were able to move massive forces into Korea undetected, and Russian fighter pilots assisted North Korea while passing for North Koreans. This war cemented the existence of the famed 38th parallel separating the two countries and led to what we still see today, with the aggressive moves and statements of Kim Jong Un.           

The book is too rich and dense to keep within the scope of a regular Book Note, so I will keep the great contents to be discovered and thoroughly appreciated. In “Wars of decolonization” (1947-1975) the authors deal with the old British and French powers in Asia and Africa and the demise of their old empires.  In “From the Sinai to Port Stanley” (1967-1982) the authors discuss the Six Day War up to the famed Falklands War, which saw Margaret Thatcher showing what Britain could do in 1982 to preserve its global power and historical reputation.

In “The Cold War Denouement” the authors deal with the most key event post-WW2, which is the end of the biggest rivalry of the 20th century leading to the end of the Soviet Union. In “The New World Disorder” (1991-1999) the authors cover a period where the rules are rewritten gradually and led by the US and by extension the West. In “The War of Afghanistan” (2001-2021) the authors do not deal with the Soviet war we all remember, but the one that started post-9-11 when US forces dislodged Al Qaeda and ended the Taliban rule for twenty years, only to let it back in two years ago—this with a reputational blow to US leadership and a disgrace for women and young girls. In “The Iraq War” the authors deal with another 9-11-related war. One that was also a continuation of the war that President George H.W. Bush did not want to end by seizing Baghdad in 1990, but his son orchestrated on the false premise Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (leading to Colin Powell losing some of his well-deserved aura as he famously made the wrong case). This war, opposed by Western countries like France, led to what became known as the Arab Spring with unimageable consequences for the Middle East. In “Vladimir Putin’s Existential War against Ukraine (2022-)” the authors focus on the return of history in Europe and a Russia going back to imperial delusion. Finally, the authors deal with the “The Wars of the Future”—conflicts that will involve expected tech features, where AI would not be absent. After the book was already published, history repeated itself putting Israel back at the forefront of Middle Eastern warfare with its global implications.

“Conflict” is a great book both in terms of history as well as tactical and strategic warfare, the latter being the focus for Petraeus and Roberts. It is not easy reading and is very detailed, one of the useful features being to remind us of many episodes of history that we might have forgotten, even if war is unexpectedly and sadly back on our menu these days. If anything, it reminds us, especially in Europe, that, while war is not desirable, it is not just a matter for history books. As the Roman author Publius Flavius Venetius Renatus used to say: Si vis pacem para bellum(if you want peace prepare for war), a quote that NATO, a reflection of the essential and hopefully enduring transatlantic alliance, would support, all the more in our Europe today.   

Warmest regards,

Serge             

The key challenges of Western liberal democracy in 2024 and ways to fix them

24-1-24

Dear Partners in Thought,

As we go into 2024 we see many articles, in leading publications and from think tanks, stressing the key challenges the world will be facing due to many issues like an increasingly politically unstable America, an ongoing Ukraine war, or a worsening Middle East. As we go into an election year in America and many liberal and not so liberal democracies globally (70, or half of the world population), it is useful to look at the drivers of liberal democratic decline in the West. While addressing this matter, it is worth noting that elections are also held in countries like Russia, but they are more formal than real, with the outcome already known and thus not a sign of democracy.

The main issues that have hurt our democratic West are a hodgepodge of features, at times inter-linked, that, put together, foster a weakened socio-political system that keeps gradually declining, while simpler autocracies and dictatorships keep thriving the world over. Some of these features are the drastic change of younger generations’ political views, the impact of “hate” social media, the decline in formal education, the excesses of capitalism, the mismanaged migration used as a populist selling point, and the lack of defense readiness on the part of most countries – all while rational discourse increasingly falls on deaf ears.       

The hodgepodge of Western democratic decline features

The young, who used to demonstrate in major cities the Western world-over in 1968, while wanting governments to adopt very radical economic and social policies, are no longer there, many having grown up conservative or far more moderate in a natural life development. However, today younger generations are often keener to adopt extreme-right policies to deal with key issues such as immigration. The extreme-right National Rally led by Marine Le Pen, now the second political party in France, and a serious contender to lead the country in 2027, enjoys the support of a large part of the younger French today.

Social media have contributed to the younger generations adopting extreme policies, as knowledge is no longer perceived to be based on classical education and schools, but laptop screens and indeed social media. While each country is different, the young generation, as they reach voting age, naturally listen more easily to populist leaders who reflect the extreme views on many a social media channel. The older generations – especially the 60+ age group – will generally tend to be the ones to uphold traditional liberal democratic values, also as they have a more vivid knowledge of the 20th century with its two World Wars and nuclear bomb-flavored Cold War.   

The lack of formal education is also becoming a feature (if not a factor) of younger voters backing extreme-right candidates or populist leaders. The US is a case in point, with the vast majority of voters with no college degrees – young or not – backing Trump who, in typical fashion, claims to love “the uneducated ones”. Interestingly the college-educated Americans nicknamed by economist Thomas Piketty “the Brahmin Left” tend to shift to liberal positions also as a reaction to Trump populism, also often reflecting their residing in large urban centers, which tend to be less conservative or indeed reactionary than rural areas.   

Capitalism is not helping today. Free markets, that underpinned Western and world growth, are out of control. There is a feeling of Wild West at play, that is also worsening feelings of social inequalities. Growing up the ladder through work, and indeed capitalism, is no longer clear to many. Leading capitalist figures such as Musk, Bezos or Zuckerberg, who are the new and even more powerful Rockefeller or Vanderbilt, while highly successful, are hardly role models (even if Bill Gates and others are around). In addition, the wealth of the top five billionaires has more than doubled since 2020, creating a further social disconnect. Recent news such as the annual salary and dividends of GBP300 m of Denise Coates, the CEO of Bet363, the UK gambling group is simply out of the world we knew. While US CEOs earned 21 times the average salary in 1965, today’s number is 344 times. The news that Taylor Swift, a clearly business-gifted singer, became a billionaire in 2023 are senseless at too many levels, all the more given the inequalities the world (including the West) knows, even if such situations are created as people, at times struggling, attend her concerts and buy her songs. Capitalism has become a system of excesses that are allowed by the legal system that is used and protected by its beneficiaries and their vast wealth, under the pretense that all benefit.

Migration is a key issue in the US today, like it was in Europe since 2015-16, and the aftermath of the Arab Spring, that also created local civil wars, prompting many to go for a better life elsewhere. Migration is used by hard right parties as a tool to grab votes in the name of national identity, while the problem today is also more acute than ever, as seen by the US-Mexican borders or on Italian shores. The problem has been compounded by a combination of moderate European governments losing much voter support through not wanting to adopt policies that would have been seen as akin to racial discrimination, while also needing cheap labor for their economy – as was the case for Merkel’s German economy nearly ten years ago, thus setting precedents that kept encouraging unwanted migration.

Apart from the US, the West and especially Europe may not be prepared today for an unwanted major war scenario. Old military powers, like France and Britain, are still very good at special operations, as often seen in the Middle East and Africa. But the talented professional soldiers on their own might not be able to counter a large-scale military aggression from a country like Russia and its allies in Europe. After 30 years of peaceful globalization, we live in times taking us back to the 20th century and its major conflicts. As a Dutch senior commander of NATO rightfully sadly stated, the populations of Europe would simply not be ready or able to fight today, even to defend their freedom and democratic system. This fact also reflects a lack of community feeling at the national level of many countries, whose populations are no longer concerned on matters of war and peace or freedom preservation, as if those themes were from another age.     

Rational discourse no longer resonates well with many voters also, when they face daily situations like those living in the Southern American borders with Mexico. Principles are hard to matter in those cases also, as time goes by and nothing happens to fix what is not livable with 35% of Republican voters (likely hard core and Trump supporters) still believe in a rising trend that the “January 6” insurrection that stormed the US Capitol was a product of the FBI, which defies any logic. Ninety-one indictments against Trump do not seem to matter to his supporters, who feel invigorated by these actual facts, as if they were proof of a conspiracy by a deep state against their good leader.  Re-elections of moderate governments look increasingly challenging, with polls showing only a one-third success rate across Western countries today (although polls do change as elections get closer and are under-way).     

It is also clear that once rising to power, or having won key elections, many populist leaders, especially in Western countries, put “water in their wine” as the French would say. The recent examples of Georgia Meloni, as Italian prime minister, is very telling, but so are the examples of Geert Wilders in Netherlands or so far Javier Milei in Argentina. The reality of power, all the more in major Western countries, dictates populist winners to throw away many of their principles, a fact that should be stressed to the younger generations and all voters. All the more so as these populist winners are made to win elections these days, but not to exercise power in the best of ways, also given their overall backgrounds.    

Some thoughts to revive the Western liberal democratic course

While possibly naïve, there are solutions which, put together, could change the self-harming decline of Western democracy, and indeed civilization. These simple, but at times tough measures, all inter-linked and part of a Western society revival program, could involve an old-fashioned return to more driven parental guidance, civic education in schools, more sensible regulation of social media, increased taxes of top corporate and individual earners, as well as new tech developments like AI, and more realistic policies on the part of Western governments on issues like migration, as well as the institution, or return, of a national military service given our challenging times and societal needs.

Some could argue that this proposed wide-ranging approach would amount to a form of “dirigisme” that would go against liberalism and its spirit of “laissez faire” (do what you want), but countries need to go back to better social frameworks through which liberalism and democracy can endure. Liberalism should not be a tool for chaos, and our times require some decisive action, both from democratic governments and societies at large in partnerships – so we can survive and keep thriving.    

Both parents (admittedly in traditional families) and schools should work together to ensure that children in their teenage years are able to deal with domestic and world issues in a rational and sensible way. Parents should be more assertive in taking care of their children, and not allow them to stay for hours locked in their rooms watching and listening to social media, whose contents are often damaging to society, or playing video games for hours at a time (on a light note, this approach will come short of dealing with “watching one’s phone while walking down the street” so as to avoid any collision but it is a sound start). Schools, starting in early grades, should develop civic duty courses focused on societal and political matters, stressing the different viewpoints attached to them. The parental-school partnership goal would be to decrease the “hate” social media mind invasion, while giving children a fairer understanding of the issues of our time, and why democracy needs to be preserved.  It is worth noting that some Western governments are already taking some steps, as seen with President Macron’s proposed policies—part of his “civic rearmament” in January to regulate children’s screen time, and also introduce compulsory school uniforms, the latter to develop some better sense of community beyond social differences. 

Regulations should be more severe as to the hate contents from social media, while being fair as to freedom of speech, the latter a challenging balance to reach and an issue especially sensitive in the US today. The point is not to favor any political agenda, but to bring some normalcy leading to more reasonable thinking, and thus approaches to key societal matters, all the more by young generations who will also grow up and lead societies in the future. Similarly, and putting aside all their clear benefits, tech and AI companies should be regulated in a suitable manner to ensure they do not end up “managing” societies directly or indirectly. The EU has already taken steps, now followed by the US, to control notably Big Tech more adequately, also given their strong financial power and massive societal clout.    

Taxation should be reviewed, ideally in a coordinated manner throughout the West, to ensure that sanity comes back and net earnings are no longer out of this world, this for corporations and individuals, and not to let a societal disconnect, however legally framed, to endure. There is a need for governments to keep supporting fair free markets while restoring societal sanity via taxation and fund the lives of those in real need, so as to preserve the social contract. Similarly, AI companies should be taxed in a way that would help fund jobs to be likely lost by so many individuals due to this key tech development that is still unclear and quite worrisome as to its real benefits for society and its well-being (it is amusing to know that both Bernie Sanders and Bill Gates suggested a tax for “job-taking robots” in the past). While the West would engage in a societally-driven tax reassessment it would take appropriate measures to ensure that countries that do not follow suit, or top earning corporates or individuals that move to low if not zero tax jurisdictions, do not benefit from any resulting economic advantage and are publicly identified – putting the start of an end to new non-exotic tax paradises as they would think of rising.   

Government policies led by liberal democratic governments should be able to address sensitive issues liberal democrats traditionally averted from managing, out of social unease, like immigration. It should not be an expression of Nazism to want one’s country to keep its national identity and manage a sensible immigration program. Nor should it be forbidden to enforce the control of one’s own borders. New approaches to these issues would deprive extremist populist parties from winning elections across the West, while forgetting about them once in power and facing its reality. Democracies need to address unwanted migration as it should be, and frontally – with care for all parties involved, notably their own citizens. It would be best to set and enforce workable policies to deal frontally with unwanted immigration, while realizing that some immigration is needed in many key economic and social sectors in the West, and avoiding drastic and last resort questionable programs of shipping back individuals to Rwanda or Albania.    

Finally, there is a dual need to restore a sense of community at the national level of most Western countries, while getting their populations better ready to defend their freedom, and indeed liberal democracy, against any aggression from autocratic powers using wars as an easier way to cement their power at home. The best way to achieve this dual objective, that is key given our newly challenging times, is to institute or re-institute a form of national military service to educate young populations in the basic art of warfare, and also to cement national communities across social classes. Until the mid-1990s, France had a one-year military service for all physically able young men to train them on military matters and give them a sense of national belonging. The end of the Cold War put an end to that process which could be restarted with EU nations also managing exchange programs, as a way to cement the EU project. And young women could also take part in this key process. From a geostrategic standpoint, European nations alone should reconsider national military services, all the more so in the context of a potential return of Donald Trump in the White House and an always-possible withdrawal from NATO (some even seeing this drastic scenario as a disguised blessing, needed to build a stronger and more independent EU or Europe).      

Those suggestions, the list of which could easily be increased, would be clearly challenging, if not impossible for some, to put in place. There is no simple solution, but a concerted and inter-linked approach, which while not being perfect, may be the only way to focus the minds and gradually reverse a trend that risks destroying a still-young historical concept we call modern liberal democracy. Holding elections is not enough today, and may lead to autocracy going forward. Doing nothing and hoping for the best only benefits ill-equipped populist-extremists without any meaningful societal gains in sight. 

Warmest regards

Serge

Why climate change and decarbonization matter

8-1-24

Dear Partners in Thought,

As we went through the challenging COP28, the latest annual episode of the global grand mass of climate change fighting, hosted by leading oil producer Dubai (creating much early controversy), I thought it would be useful to recap key features of what we know as climate change or global warming and ways to fight it. This Interlude will be thus focused on basic facts and thoughts about where we are on this key matter for human civilization and how to fight it best. While geopolitical unrest and wars we know matter, there are issues that also need our focus, this for future generations and indeed human civilization.

While I am keen on the world doing its best to alleviate the causes of global warming, it is admittedly a new field for me. I was born the year of JFK’s presidential win, a time when we were rightly focused on economic growth, while gradually adjusting to a post-WW2 Cold War that would last for another 30 years. It would also lead to a growing globalization that many of us start regretting today, given its key peaceful features. Very few of us thought about the impact of carbon dioxide in our lives, being very happy to drive great cars and enjoy flying the world over.

Here are a few key points focused on global warming and some of its contributors. I hope that all my scientific friends and experts will forgive me for excessively summarizing matters.       

  1. Climate change is unequivocal since 2007 with thousands of research studies clearly making the case, together with its human involvement, since the Industrial Revolution. Climate change worsened in a much warmer way as economic growth was the clear focus, also fueled by consumer demand that industries naturally responded to at a time when climate did not matter. 
  • While the climate was warmer millions of years ago (by ten degrees), global warming accelerated much faster over the last 10,000 years due to human impact and, again, the need for economic development since the mid-19th century. That development itself had a faster path in the 20th and fast-globalized (until now) 21st centuries.   
  • The concentration of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere has risen by 42% since 1850. Today and as Saudi Arabia and Russia know only too well 40bn tons of CO2 are released every year by the fossil fuel industry globally.
  • While CO2 in small doses is helpful to avoid the planet freezing, its human-produced quantities have massively contributed to global warming (even more than other natural culprits, like volcanoes). As the Earth needs to adjust its temperature by evacuating excess CO2, decarbonization has become a key strategic matter for industries well beyond profit-making.
  • CO2 also clearly stimulates the growth of plants, through what is known as “greening” which is a positive development even though it consumes more water. This has resulted in a more intensive agriculture in China and India, though without compensating for the tropical deforestation we saw in Brazil in recent years and its associated biodiversity loss. Forests also play a key role in reducing carbon dioxide as they are living direct air capture machines.  
  • Humankind is often slow moving to do the right thing, all the more when economic interests are at stake (and some countries are understandably highly dependent on oil and gas production). At COP28 the heads of the IMF, European Commission and WTO stressed the challenging “trade off of short-term financial health versus the long-term health of the planet”. As such the best way to reduce CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions would be to engage globally in “carbon pricing”, making polluters pay for what they emit under the form of tax (some revenues – the IMF estimates 20% – that would be reallocated to poor households who may suffer from the needed transition) and emissions trading schemes. Such a way forward would create an incentive to shift to cleaner energy sources, while being cost-efficiently revenue-generating for countries for public investment or other tax cutting and would fairly target those producers and consumers that are the most responsible for carbon emissions. Fifty countries have already followed that approach, but more are needed, as well as international cooperation through framework agreements, to lower trade distortions and ensure reduced competitiveness. This approach naturally has many facets at the global level beyond the scope of this short Interlude.
  • While the purpose of this Interlude is to address the reality of climate change, and what is behind global warming, while seeing what humankind could do to reduce it by focusing on CO2, the affected areas and thus battlefields are plentiful.  Climate change massively impacts glaciers, sea levels, hurricanes, the acidification of oceans, droughts, heat waves, floods, mega-fires, biodiversity and even polar bears and many other species beyond man. Global warming is a lethal game-changer that impacts the future of human civilization like no other threats before.   

Climate change deniers find it very challenging to make their case today, even if social media and the like provide them with tools to argue their point on a non-scientific, not to say crazy basis. In our strange times, many people do not need evidence, less so scientific evidence, to support themes that make little sense. This denier group, however, finds it hard to resonate among the “thinking” crowd today – even if they reach many gullible and passionate followers looking for outlets for their existential and societal anger.     

Hard right parties in Europe have seized on the perceived financial impact on living standards of fighting climate change (exacerbated by post-Covid austerity-driven public spending cuts and the energy constraints felt with the Ukraine war) to add this matter to their usual migration and national identity programs. On a side note, the latter two matters, largely and mistakenly neglected by liberal democrats as being too sensitive, opened a vote-grabbing avenue to extremists even if they all tend to practically moderate their positions once having won elections as seen with Georgia Meloni in Italy or recently Geert Wilders in the Netherlands. On the same basis, Donald Trump, now the US climate change denier supremo, clearly stated his “drill, drill, drill” support of fossil fuels (many producers being his backers) if winning the US presidency in 2024, again adding this new hard right theme to his old US-China Cold War focus, a hard to go away Putin-friendly lack of interest in Ukraine and NATO, increased protectionism and unprecedented isolationism at many levels, and his case (which, in all fairness, could be understood better if one lived there) for “more walls” at the Mexican border today.

The good news since the game-changing COP20 in Paris in 2015 is that a vast majority of countries across the various global geopolitical divides now supports global warming resolutions to decrease its increasing trend. One of the last economic sectors COP28 members focused on was food production, which was not an obvious candidate versus oil and gas producers, but shows the global warming footprint to be gradually dealt with as the key issue it is. In spite of such positive COP28 developments and the hard-negotiated final wording stressing a commitment to transition away from fossil fuels, it is clear that vested interests, often national in nature, make it hard to get tangible results as seen with the resolution to decrease coal consumption two years ago which led to no change as of today.  

While fighting for liberal democratic values, all the more as Europe and the Middle East go back to more uncertain times and a number of key elections are on the horizon, it is also our moral duty combined with vested interests to fight climate change and ensure our world keeps growing as it should even if financial and restructuring costs may be high on the way.   

Warmest regards,

Serge

When America is playing with fire

19-12-23

Dear Partners in Thought,

We live in challenging times, with major wars in Ukraine or in Gaza playing out, bringing us back to the worst periods of the 20th century, with globalization and its peaceful features also receding as seen with the increasingly conflictual relations with China. This new era – not so new if we remember the famous line that “History repeats itself” – comes at a time where the West is struggling in terms of leadership due to an America that seems to have lost its values and keeps hurting itself and the Free World it stood for and led for decades. Many columnists, including Americans, recently wondered whether the US was “irreparably off track” with all the implied global consequences.  

America is not well, as most Americans would also agree. A recent Gallup poll showed only 20% felt the country was well versus more than 50% 20 years ago, this in spite of US per capita income higher than in Western Europe or Japan, nine of the top 10 most-valuable companies in the world being American (versus four at the end of the Cold War) and a still-unrivalled defense machine. This pervasive feeling, also shared across the Western world, may be partly explained by America’s unsettling approach to its evolving role in the world. The proximity to an overly-intense presidential election is naturally not helping the situation, also given the nature and profile of the two likely contenders.

The America of Reagan that stood firmly as a leader of the West during the Cold War is no longer there, mainly due to domestic political issues that make it forget what it was and should be. No President is ever perfect, but Trump due to his personality, perhaps more than his policies, started changing the game with deep adverse effects on the country and as a result the West (this even if a Republican Congressman strangely stressed recently that one should separate personality and policies when dealing with Trump). One of the key reasons for American and Western pessimism is to be found in its domestic politics and their dynamics today, compounded with a clear worry globally that Trump could come back. 

The Republican party of Reagan has been taken over by Trump-influenced and practical hard right extremists, who do not even realize what they stand for and their deep historical disconnect with their own roots, but only wish to grab votes, often very locally. It is not even clear what Trump really believes in, as long as he can increase his polling and is strengthening his fame, this in spite of all the legal issues he is facing regarding January 6, 2021 and his own business enterprises. It is remarkable that many primary voters, even if usually more hard line than regular ones, support someone like Trump given his abysmal personal features that many of them should see as un-American. It is clear that resentment against a perceived out-of-touch “elite”, their own social standing and serious and mismanaged issues like immigration do play a role in crafting their simple views, like in Europe today. In addition, the quality of the politicians seems to have gone down over the years, as many bright individuals prefer to take the business road, as many studies show across the Western world.  As for the Democrats, it is a hollow combination of left-wing individuals many who adhere first to inclusion, diversity if not, (to use the word initially invented by right-wing extremists) “Woke” before anything else while there seems to be a very short list of individuals who could be leaders in this party, where Joe Biden is apparently in sole charge, and only the liberal California Governor Gavin Newsom could be seen as a major though differentiated figure. Democrats are simply nonexistent, while the media focus is on outlandish House Republicans like Matt Gaetz, Marjorie Taylor-Greene if not, even if no longer, George Santos or an outlandish primary candidate like Vivek Ramaswamy. Hope is fortunately not lost for the GOP, when seeing the likes of Nikki Haley, even if playing a tactically smart game with Trump believers and of course Liz Cheney, two individuals, who still offer some degree of political system redemption for their party. And there are others like Governor Chris Sununu or Senator Mitt Romney who still stand for the right values behind democracy as we knew them. These individuals may feel very lonely in their party at a time of a ludicrous “retribution” impeachment enquiry process against Joe Biden launched by the likes of Representative JD Vance, the Hillbilly Blues author and once, before being a US Senator, a fierce and then fashionable critic in 2016 of Donald Trump, whom he called an idiot.       

The lack of quality of the US political personnel, which one could argue could be seen also in in key European countries is helping the demise of America and its Western leadership. Positions taken notably by House Republicans regarding financial aid to Ukraine risk hurting America’s international standing and its position as leader of the Free World. Not backing Ukraine on the basis that national security should also be managed at home regarding immigration at the Mexican border would risk destroying the democratic West by losing its leader. If Ukraine were to lose the war through lack of US support, Russia might expand its costly imperial fantasies by invading the NATO and EU Baltic state members and even Poland, whatever the risk of a major global conflict. It is noticeable and somewhat redeeming that older GOP Senators and House Representatives, perhaps with a direct memory of the past, are more aware than younger ones, who are more in a perpetual partisan if not extreme mode, about the need to uphold the foreign policy leadership values that made America. One natural step, were Trump to be elected against all rational hopes, would be for him (also given his old liking of Putin) to make the US withdraw from NATO on the grounds of America First and a return to a 1930s isolationism that many of his short-sighted supporters would think would be good for their country (he would now need a Congress majority to do this but anything is possible). Isolationism, that would be a natural step for Trump and has already been felt through some of the tactically protectionist Biden tax policies, would in any case hurt American interests and businesses globally, and as a result the American people, even if many do not see the direct links to their own well-being today.

Getting America back on track and avoiding a global power vacuum will take hard work and require high quality individuals to save the day (or indeed century) in politics, lest a collection of autocracies win the world over. The world has changed with the nemesis of the democratic West not being one single country like the Soviet Union, but a collection of strong and not-so-strong powers with their own different tactical geopolitical interests and a common strategic opposition to America and the West, even if some trading with them in the meantime. America, through its next generation of political leaders, should refocus on its essential global leadership role and the clear benefits attached to it, this for itself, the West and indeed a more peaceful and yet again globalized world focused on trade and prosperity. 

While America needs to go back to its roots, it is also key for European countries to adopt realistic policies to preserve democracy at home while making sure voters do not support extreme right parties on the basis of simple solutions for complex issues. European democracies should also take a firm lead and defend their founding principles abroad, while building a stronger Europe, as seen with Britain and EU member states working closely together in supporting Ukraine as if they were again happily part of the same club of old. In this respect the key decision from the EU to start accession talks with Ukraine is a major step even if their voting process should be reviewed so as to avoid the impossibility of providing a key financial package to Kyiv approved by 26 member-states as one member, Hungary, vetoes it on tactical and strategic grounds as if it were de facto an ally of Moscow. 

I never thought I would ever need to write a piece like this one. On a very personal note I love America and the “Dream” it offered. My America. I am who I am as America and what it stood for reshaped me in my twenties in the 1980s as I was searching for a future. I still want to hope we can get back to those times, all the more given the needs and risks of our very challenging times. 

I wish all of us a Merry Christmas and the Happiest New Year, hoping that our world finally gets back on the right track and Reason prevails.     

Warmest regards,

Serge  

Note: I wanted to state an addendum to my mid-November Interlude that clearly supported the right of Israel to retaliate following October 7 and eradicate Hamas and its terrorist capabilities, this to defend itself. One month following my Interlude we have reached a stage where the eradication of Hamas is proving arduous, even if its capabilities are likely severed, while the death toll of civilian Gazans and the destruction of the city are horrendous even if not the IDF objective (the mistaken killing of three hostages by the IDF is sadly telling in terms of the intensity of the fights). It is now time for the Israeli leadership to realize that they may be fulfilling Hamas’s grand design of creating a global opprobrium against Israel and stop or reduce meaningfully its military operations, including its indiscriminate aerial bombings. Time should now be focused on how to structure (indeed reconstruct) and manage a future Gaza and re-focus seriously on a peaceful future for the Palestinians and Israel. While there might be some political reasons on the part of the current Israeli leadership to keep its military operations going, the standing of the country in the world and among its allies, even like the steadfast US, will decrease while antisemitism may rise as already seen on US campuses today. This natural addendum would not change the clear right and obligation for Israel, like any other country suffering the same horrific blow, to have responded as it did initially to the atrocities of October 7.          

Why supporting Israel is natural however challenging it may seem to be for some

17-11-23

Dear Partners in Thought,

While we see the tragic developments in Gaza today, some of us may feel lost as to which side to support – unless we are strong campus-like activists or of course Jews or Muslims (if not Palestinians) and “who we are” simply dictates our support.

We should, however, take a look at the facts and not the features. It is not religion, race, or history that should matter when we look at the events we saw on October 7. We were faced with unquestionable acts of horror, targeted often at babies and older people who were clearly not active representatives of their government, as if it would ever make the case easier. October 7 was a 9-11 that would have meant a terrorist attack of 45,000 dead in the US (or 10,000 dead in France or the UK). Nobody needed the horror and the way it was delivered – all the more in 2023. It is then very natural that Israel, a democracy, however challenged, in an autocratic and theocratic ocean, wants to stop once and for all Hamas, a devilish organisation if there was ever one, acting supposedly in the interest of the Palestinians in Gaza but actually against them—and indeed for Iran. While the heavy retaliation was predictable, and likely wanted by Hamas to worsen, if ever possible, the abyss they created while unsettling the full region, there is zero doubt that it was justified.

Justification is strong regardless of any short-term political agendas at the top to shift any blame for a massive intelligence failure and likely political mismanagement – that will be addressed when the war is over. Simply put yourself in the shoes of the young mother seeing her baby without a head or yourself seeing your father gone for good after you said hello that nice morning. Terrorism of that scale and abjectly-planned nature was unheard of in living modern history. There is only one way to deal with it, as Israel did even if it is challenging. War is never clean, but such a crime and those perpetrators should be dealt with. Once and for all, “whatever it takes” – but also with a careful and understandably challenging approach to limiting civilian casualties, so as not to be seen as another Hamas with bigger means, and to preserve an image of decency.

There is no question that the Palestinian people of Gaza are hostages, under another name, of Hamas and thus Iran. We can certainly feel very bad about what has happened to them but this should not make us forget they let Hamas take over Gaza and their own lives (whatever tactical preferences at the time from Jerusalem). The fact that they were powerless in shaping their own future is reflecting other issues linked to regional historical traditions, but is no excuse. They sadly pay today the price for something they could have changed if a Palestinian leadership had been more productive. In the end, while they are indeed human shields (as The Washington Post aptly cartooned before feeling strangely guilty) they sadly should not be a reason for Israel to stop destroying Hamas strongholds even if hidden within hospitals, a feature that speaks for itself even if to be perennially denied. It is clear that careful targeting and execution are needed but not to the point of avoiding measures that would let masters of horrors avoid just retribution. The eradication of Hamas, which is needed to avoid a repeat of October 7, should benefit Gazans and be the basis to create the foundations of a workable Israeli-Palestinian partnership going forward.

This new war is not about Jews against Arabs, islamophobia or antisemitism—as we often hear shouted in Western streets or American campuses as a natural development of our times. This new war is not about religion or race. It is about making sure it will never happen again. There might actually be some further steps to take to ensure peace in the Middle East that would involve going back to old fashioned direct intervention, which might also be in the best Western interests. Hamas and indeed Iran did not understand the game they started, which should potentially lead to regime change and another Middle East. There is no doubt that many in Iran would actually want this, all the more those wearing the hijab. 

In the meantime, let’s keep hoping that as many hostages make their way back to their families however daunting it may look while Israel makes sure, with our support, that there will never be another October 7. Let’s clearly ensure that this war sets the stage for a true and fair refocus on creating a genuinely viable and pawn-free future for the Gazans, this eventually leading the way to a mutually productive two-state solution. But for now, let’s be together to defend the values and ways of life that matter. Let’s remember October 7. Today and while Gazan civilian casualties should be kept to a minimum, we are all Israelis.

Warmest regards

Serge     

Twelve points on the Israel/Hamas/Gaza/ME mega-crisis 

2-11-23

Dear Partners in Thought,

While I was cautious in writing too early on the grave matter, I wanted to share with you twelve points about the Israel-Gaza-Hamas situation that we see evolving in the Middle East, bearing in mind it impacts on the whole world. 

1. Netanyahu needed some very tough retaliation (however justified given the October 7 horrors) to try shifting the blame away. A win, however challenging to get, is his only way to try surviving by year-end. 

2. The fate of the Israeli hostages remains as fragile as before in spite of the occasional liberations and worsens as thousands of civilian Gaza residents die.  

3. Iran, even if not “directly” responsible did everything for October 7 to happen, but in any case, may enjoy the Gaza retaliation to shift the hijab revolution away too, wanting again to be seen as a true Middle Eastern power again, however fragile the regime may be (and indeed is).

4. After 44 years, a regime change may happen in Iran if the latter goes too far, especially with Hezbollah. Tehran seems to know this but is still ambivalent about its next steps.  

5. As seen with demonstrations, diplomatic break-ups and even the unacceptable odd terrorist act, it is clear that Israel is hurting itself globally by making the Gaza population unduly pay for October 7 even if to rightly eradicate Hamas. The only way Gaza will ever be rebuilt is if it comes under UN supervision and Hamas is gone. 

6. “Over time” the Israeli-Saudi rapprochement may go on as MBS has changed the Saudi MO, wanting to make it a more normal but powerful world player (golf, football, away from oil) thus needing a stable Middle East. 

7. The US has played its cards very well – surprisingly. The display of diplomacy and defence was first class. The Truman, Eisenhower but also Carter, Reagan and of course Clinton eras are back. Biden will (should?) eventually benefit from this, leading him potentially to rejig his ticket as he goes. 

8. Hamas is indeed going to be erased. One wonders what went through their minds but have they any? They will always stress wanting to put the Big P point back on the map (and will never address the October 7 horrors). It is possible that the PLO will come back to what it once was.  

9. It is also clear Israel should have addressed the P question long ago and found a solution if only to avoid enabling big scale terrorists doing an unexpected October 7. It is also sad that Netanyahu got trapped in such a useless coalition of so many populists only seeking votes (lesson to be learned), while allowing settlers of the extremist kind to go way too far as the world was not looking. 

10. Putin is curiously “rather absent” from the crisis even if he gained from the (it turns out temporary) Western shift away from Ukraine also as US popular support for Kyiv was “wavering”. He is indeed trapped into naturally backing Hamas/Iran and upsetting Israel given the latter’s earlier cautious stance regarding the Ukraine war and any military equipment support for Kyiv. 

11. As shown at the UN, the world finds it hard to deal with a conundrum created by unacceptable horrors of October 7 and the onslaught on so many civilians in Gaza—the latter caused by the Israeli Defence Forces but resulting from a tragic and unforgivable plot from Hamas and de facto their Iranian backers. One can take sides for many justifiable reasons but the whole picture lacks clarity and sanity at any moral level.    

12. While globalisation retreated and protectionism rose again as a result of the American-China feud, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the new war in the Middle East bring us back to the forgotten era of the 20th century which most of us thought was long gone forever – making us think that WW3 is no longer an academic matter. 

I have limited my points to twelve but the list could be longer, including the impact on our own societies with street demonstrations favouring one specific party, terrorist attacks as seen in Belgium or France, or less lethal but divisive situations on campuses like in America. The situation we see developing today is like another chapter of a book all hoped was finished, but is never-ending—so strong are its ethnic, religious and historical roots for the world.  

Warmest regards,

Serge           

“Assad – The Triumph of Tyranny” (Con Coughlin)

22-9-23

Dear Partners in Thought,

After nineteen months of the Ukraine invasion and many pieces on the tragic subject, I decided to focus briefly on another matter carrying its share of upheaval, by writing about Bashar al-Assad. Here is a man who led an improbable life from potential Western-like leader, if only in appearance, to civil war maker and despot. Con Coughlin, a veteran war correspondent since the Beirut of the early 1980s, wrote “Assad – The Triumph of Tyranny”, an eye-opening book on a man of benign appearance behind one of the greatest and bloodiest tragedies of the 21st century. I have to admit that my knowledge of the Middle East as a child living in Paris in the 1960s and 1970s was limited to “Exodus” with Paul Newman and “Lawrence of Arabia” with Peter O’Toole until the Yom Kippur War suddenly changed that for me into a darker story – all while knowing on the surface, that the region was not a symbol of stability, since the state of Israel had been recreated also to assuage the sins of the Nazi German era. The book about Bashar al-Assad is full of many stories and provides a flood of angles reflecting the complexities of the Middle East. It also sheds some light on a man that we all saw but few knew well. As such, this Book Note will be longer than usual, so as to capture all the key events of the Bashar al-Assad saga.

We all remember Bashar as a nice and mild-mannered individual carrying hopes of modernity. Often with his charming wife Asma (once known by Vogue as “the rose of the desert”), they created a stylish and sympathetic couple in the early 2000s, after he took the leadership of Syria. The impactful couple, boosted by a very photogenic Asma, could have been a strategic tool for Syrian image re-engineering. Asma was a London-born Syrian, part of the refined Sunni elite (quite remote from the Assads’ rough Alawite crowds) and a JP Morgan investment banker. (On a funny side note, Asma, a very bright young lady, forewent Harvard Business School to elope with Bashar, after they had met when he was training as a compulsorily low-profile ophthalmologist in London, studying hard and quietly listening to Phil Collins and Whiney Houston in his flat). French President Jacques Chirac found him to be a nice leadership style-change for the region, and the former French League of Nations protectorate. Queen Elizabeth and the Syrian couple posed together for nice pictures stressing the normalcy of the new Syria, after the often-hard regime of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father. The future would destroy all of this genuine feel-good factor following tragic events in Lebanon post-Iraq invasion, the Arab Spring and the dreadful civil war that ensued—even if Arab states now seem to wish to reintegrate Bashar into the community of regional nations in mid-2023, and as the Middle East is also changing with Saudi Arabia working on a new regional and global role at many levels including sports. Coughlin’s book is a fascinating and often too-horrific story that deserves much reflection.   

Bashar was not destined to be a leader of Syria. He was not the eldest son or even eldest child of Hafez, and had no interest in politics. He indeed studied in London and became an ophthalmologist, something few realise today. The al-Assad family (Assad meaning “lion” and actually not the original family name in the Alawite region) was not destined to lead either, and came from a humble background. But times changed and a new version of Arab “socialism” helped the family seize power gradually from 1963 and fully in 1971. Then as often is the case with strong regimes or monarchies, Hafez’s brother thought he should lead the country instead of Hafez, but was finally exiled (although not shot, due to the intermediation of their mother). When Hafez became gradually ill and thought of succession in the 1990s, his first son, Bassel, who had the characteristics of a strong if not tough leader in the making, died at 31 in a car crash. Hafez’s daughter, Bushra, thought she could lead the country at 41 and was indeed equipped with many of the requisite features. But it was many years before “Me Too”, all the more in an Arab Muslim country, so she was discarded by her father and his senior team. Bashar then became the one left in the shop, with many arguing whether a medical doctor, probably too westernised and with a such a benign appearance, could become the successor of strongman Hafez. But then Bashar was the only Assad with the right seniority left, and when his father died in 2000, the debate was quickly and forcefully closed by him and he became the leader of Syria.    

Syria, since the advent of Hafez, was a country not led by religion and a monarchy as often seen in the Middle East, but by the socialist Baathist party—even if ten families around Hafez controlled the wealth of the country. A phenomenon often seen and lived with in what the West used to call “developing nations” the world over (see the 56-year Bongo dynasty in now coup-ridden Africa). Benign kleptocracy was at work, with all the slogans that the regime naturally worked for the people. Bashar ensured that the succession plans went well, even hiding the death of his father from his mother and family the day it happened, so he could prepare his next steps. While he was seen as a benign and even game-changing moderate when he “took over”, he had made sure he cleaned up the military and security services of dissenters. And he warned others with the wrong aspirations, like Rifaat, Hafez’s brother and perennial would be leader, that he was the one in charge.                          

The book stresses how Hafez’s Syria was not a friend of the West, and preferred to side with the Soviet Union during the Cold War on many issues, as well as post-Shah Iran. Notably when the latter, through its sponsored Hezbollah, sought to exert some control over Lebanon, a neighbour it also saw as its own. Syria’s opposition to Israel, a strong historical US ally in the region, also made the Moscow-Damascus link natural, even if so many Russians (admittedly not Soviet-supporting), emigrated to Israel. On a funny note and a regional scale prelude to how many nations today do not always side with the US or China, preferring to follow an opportunistic approach (like India liking Russian oil, but also getting closer to the West on grand strategic matters due to China), Syria backed the West in the 1990 Gulf War. It never liked its Baathist neighbour Saddam Hussein, while funding and supporting Iranian-led disruption in Lebanon and the region. In the last years of Hafez, Bashar had been in charge of the “Lebanon brief” for Damascus, and had facilitated Iran’s direct and indirect involvement in Lebanese affairs. This included supporting terrorist organisations and their leaders like then well-known Abu Nidal, not to mention Carlos “the jackal” (who liked the Damascus haven) and Islamic Jihad founder Mughniyeh, the man behind many bombings of US and French military barracks in Lebanon in the early 1980s.  When he took over the leadership of Syria in 2000, it seemed that Bashar tried initially to be a man of change (more economically than politically) and was perhaps conflicted by projecting the image of a modernised leader with a Western suited-look, while gradually following the steps of his father. More than likely helped by the not so enlightened Baathist old guard. Most observers would agree that it took one year for Bashar to adopt the old Assad style of power management, thus killing any hopes for a long Damascus Spring. Bashar clearly condemned 9-11 and provided intelligence to the CIA, to the delight of its Director George Tenet. All the while the Pentagon still saw him and Syria as part of the “Axis of Evil” and state sponsors of terrorism like Iran. Even the Blair administration tried very hard to get Syria to change its tack, going as far as for the “glamorous Bashar-Asma couple” to meet with the Queen in 2002 (apparently no trace of the visit can be found in the Buckingham Palace registry). As the 2000s unfolded, Bashar showed signs of not knowing where he wanted to stand, being very foreign affairs progressive on one-on-ones with Blair in Damascus, while attacking Israel publicly with a startled British leader at his side the same day. Or being very open with John Paul II, and then blasting Israel publicly during the same visit for having killed Jesus.  Bashar initially got closer to the Iranians in order to move away from Russia (who would come back in a decisive way during the Civil War, led by the now disgraced, Prigozhin-friendly General Surovikin) and surprisingly get better weaponry and communication systems from Tehran (on a side note, the fact that Moscow goes to Pyongyang today to get ammunitions it is lacking so much for its ill-fated Ukraine invasion, is also telling).    

The first major step in Bashar’s new direction, even if it was not clear or public at the time (nor that it was ever admitted), was the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri in 2004, when a suicide bomber threw himself and two tons of explosives (more than what was used at Oklahoma City in 1995) into the politician’s car and his convoy of bodyguards. It turned out that investigations (including from the UN) pointed to Bashar’s brother and other family members being the culprits, even if Damascus always denied the facts. The roots of the assassination (and Bashar’s gradual anti-Western stance) were to be found in Hariri wanting truer independence for Lebanon, while Bashar wanted Syria to stay in the country as it had since 1976 in a controlling mode during the civil war, and make sure Lebanon would be part of Greater Syria as it should always have been historically. Bashar’s move may have also been helped by George W. Bush’s decisions to back a truly independent Lebanon and sanction Syria in 2003 while DoD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was pushing for regime change and keeping Syria as a member of the “Axis of Evil” together with Iran. As a result, Bashar would wish to get closer to Iran and Hamas and take part in making the invasion of Iraq a failure for America, while helping to send Islamic fighters to Iraq to fight Western troops. At the same time even France, not an Iraq war supporter, was now backing the US in wanting Syria out of Lebanon, which stressed a different approach than the one taken by Chirac in 2000 when hopes were high for a new Middle East due to a perceived game-changing Bashar. In 2005, a few months after Hariri’s murder, and as Lebanon had become ungovernable, Syria and its 14,000 troops and intelligence officers left Lebanon after 29 years of “occupation” or “presence”, as Bashar could no longer manage it, and the anti-Syrian political blocks were about to win the elections; pro-Syrian politicians, like the Maronite Christian President Emile Lahoud, were to be gradually removed from office. Even allies and indeed funders like Saudi Arabia, became dismayed by Bashar’s perceived role in Harari’s assassination. Arab diplomats visiting an ally in Damascus also became concerned about Bashar’s erratic behaviour. Even his vice president, Halim Khaddam, a member of the Baathist old guard, decided to resign, while criticising the blunders of the leadership in Lebanon – and flying to Paris to avoid retribution, while becoming a voice for the opposition to Bashar, a dangerous role in itself even from afar. As he was reaching a low ebb, and questions about his political survival were raised, Bashar strengthened his ties with Iran and Hezbollah in a defensive move and further alienated the West, and even Damascus’s allies in the region. Damascus began a clearing house for Jihadi fighters traveling to Iraq, making Syria the clear enemy of the West and a dangerous, if not unstable, player for the region and its leaders. Only the very intense three-week summer 2006 fight between a Syrian ammunition and equipment-supported Hezbollah and an attacking Israel helped Assad to benefit from Hezbollah not losing (even if no side won) and him not to be the main focus of the region, while he gradually recovered from the setback of the Hariri assassination. Boosted by this rise in popularity, that he doubtless played on, he was “re-elected” for a second presidential term with 99% of the votes, in ways that were expected but without any local troubles. The end of the Iraq war would still see Western powers trying to get Bashar to stop his involvement in Iraq (which he eventually did, at least on the previously known scale) and stopping his support of Hezbollah and Hamas (which he did not, perhaps (or not) pressed by the old Baathist guard, his intelligence agencies, and the key strategic link to Iran). Syria was trying to play a leading regional and international role in hosting the Arab League Summit in 2008, while Sarkozy invited Bashar to the 2008 Bastille Day parade, a feat seen with Macron inviting Modi for the same key French celebration in 2023, also driven by clear foreign policy goals. While he still was strongly opposed to Israel also in very practical ways, Bashar wanted to get Syria supporting the never ending Arab-Israeli peace talks as if living in a parallel world of a country.

At the personal level a benign-looking and seemingly happily-married Bashar was also known as a party goer, heavy drinker and womaniser, even having had a regular German mistress according to clear evidence from Western intelligence. His personal life, like his political stances, appeared very conflicted, all the more given the projected image of a glamorous couple with three young children. His family affairs were not too happy either, with his decision to exile his Hariri-friendly brother in law (once shot by one of his brothers in a brawl), head of military intelligence, and putting aside his sister, once a “could have been” leader of Syria, who had remained too vocal in her aspirations. It nevertheless looked like a big public relations campaign was underway when American Vogue focused on Asma in February 2011 with its “Rose of the Desert” issue, and Damascus was trying hard to manage conflictual geostrategic positions while getting more accepted in the Western world.

At the same time, the Obama administration—in a hopeful gambit—was trying to adopt a more pragmatic approach to Bashar and Syria than his predecessor. And then the Arab Spring erupted following a street vendor setting fire to himself in Tunis in December 2011, as he could no longer stand police harassment. Protests and riots started all over the Arab world, across monarchies and secular countries. Leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya would fall, at times paying the ultimate price, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan weathered the storm. Syria’s descent into chaos started with misbehaving children suffering very seriously at the hands of the local police led by Bashar’s cousin Najib in Deraa, which led to mass protests all across the country in a local replica of the Arab Spring. Bashar, who blamed the Muslim Brotherhood, seemed initially hesitant in how to deal with the unrest, likely due to the new image he was trying to project, but went for usual and tested force (while keeping for himself USD 200m that Saudi Arabia had just given to help him mend fences in Deraa through the funding of community projects). His youngest brother, Maher, also known for his heavy drinking and womanizing, was put in charge of the repressions of the protests. The first international victim of the repressions was the Vogue article that disappeared from the magazine’s website. While what was left of the Syrian opposition hoped that protests might have led Bashar to start implementing his old Damascus Spring reforms, he went to the Syrian Parliament to denounce a conspiracy to destabilise the Syrian government, stressing under the standing ovation of state-appointed delegates that Syria would not be Iraq.        

The Syrian civil war, which we all remember unfolding, was deemed by Con Coughlin to be worst war he experienced in forty years of reporting since Beirut in the early eighties. It started with the Arab Spring protests that mutated into a war at home. The difference with other Arab Spring war-like developments, like in Libya, was that chemical weapons were used to defend the regime, likely since December 2012 in Homs, this without clear evidence in spite of suspicions from the international communities and various NGOs. Of historical note, Syria in the 1980s had the third largest chemical weapons stockpile in the world after the US and the Soviet Union. Iran had then contributed in the Bashar years to Syria’s ability to keep using such weapons.  In August 2013 various parts of Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus, were massively attacked by chemical weapons which, while the strike was always officially denied by the regime, reflected Bashar’s determination to defeat the rebel forces and his gambling drive in extreme circumstances. The attack was launched as a UN inspection team was in the Damascus Four Seasons hotel to investigate such matters under challenging terms and conditions, so as to seed the fact that they could only be the result of rebel actions even if Ghouta itself, under siege for six months, was an opposition stronghold. Chemical weapons had been Obama’s red line which if crossed would lead to US military intervention of an Iraq war nature ten years before. However, Obama did not want to experience an Iraq 2.0 in Syria, nor follow the Franco-British approach that overthrew Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, even if he made clear in December 2011 that Bashar should step aside for the sake of the Syrian people. The UN officially designated the conflict in Syria as a civil war in June 2012, while Obama would forget his chemical weapons red line – at a personal political cost, even if many at home did not want another far away war – while sanctioning Bashar and his brother Maher and funding pro-Western rebel groups. Chemical weapons were one terrible feature of the overtly new Bashar Syrian management style – intelligence was another.

By 2011, the Mukahbarat, the leading domestic intelligence agency and all other security organisations comprising up to 70,000 agents became coordinated under the CCMC or Central Crisis Management Cell that had been created in March of that year, days after the initial Deraa uprising. Most security officials were Alawites as they could be trusted to preserve the Assad regime, and controlled one third of the USD 9bn annual defence budget. At this time, there was one intelligence officer for every 240 Syrian nationals. At some point the regime also turned to irregular militias or “shabiha”, usually from poor Alawite extraction and in the drug trade or racket business, to control the unrest through industrial murder, rape and torture. This very powerful security and repression apparatus was completed by the Baathist Party, set up to control the country, while its local leaders were known to enrich themselves, as seen in many developing countries the world over, via endemic corruption (and knowing that 30% of Syrians were living below the poverty line while 11% were below subsistence levels while the leadership was seen at the opening of the new Opera House in Damascus to cater to the needs of the ruling elite). Bashar would not get involved in details of the repression, but was aware of them and giving a clear freedom of action to his security services to act as they saw fit irrespective of the horrors that would ensue, like with barrel bombs and the targeting of hospitals.      

The West was not the only party asking for Syrian reform, as Turkey and Saudi Arabia started to request it, fearing a meltdown of Syria. This prompted Bashar to speak about reforms of many institutions, including the constitution, but keeping the repression which only fostered the civil war. The repression involved death, torture and rape of men, women and children by the Syrian security services to break the opposition, which it only strengthened. Bashar kept arguing that Jihadists and foreign powers wanting to topple his government were responsible for the unrest, insisting it was not another wave of the Arab Spring. He went as far as freeing many Jihadists, only to point to them later, and not the actual secular opposition, as the enemy in order to justify, if not rationalise, the hard repression. At some point, this new turn became more real than Damascus wanted, as Jihadist fighters left Iraq to fight in Syria in an internationalisation of the local conflict. And then these fighters became funded by Turkey, Qatar and even Saudi Arabia as Jabhat al-Nusra, a local al-Qaeda franchise, was created and al-Qaeda chief al-Zawahiri declared a jihad against the regime, leading to Islamist fighters from the whole region including Libyans and Chechens to come to Syria. The internationalisation of the conflict came at a point when a US-Russia initiative would eventually make Damascus agree to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal. Obama, using Putin’s initiative as likely excuse, would step away from a direct US involvement to remove Bashar, even if many US foreign policy pundits stressed the opposite (as would Britain, as the Commons did not back PM Cameron who would have joined Obama). The US non-involvement made Russia and Iran de facto the only foreign powers involved, this on the side of Bashar in dealing with Sunni Islamist fighters in what was an unexpected salvation. The civil war – and war it had become – saw Damascus losing gradually against the secular and Islamist opposition forces, this prompting Iran and especially Russia now to take a step Obama had not been able to take – direct intervention on the side of Damascus – all the more given the American void and the rise of a new Sunni Islamist group known as Daesh. Russia had been an ally of Syria since the Soviet days, and was the main provider of military equipment to Damascus, also enjoying two bases in Syria. Putin, however, did not seem to be keen on getting involved directly in the conflict, seeing Syria as a side show even if Russia kept vetoing UN resolutions against Syria and was badly in need of an influence-booster globally, but also in the Middle East.   

At some point, the war involved up to 150,000 opposition fighters, 80% coming from 100 countries on the secular and mostly Jihadist side, while the Syrian forces, initially 200,000 strong were down to 50,000 (always comprising Sunni conscripts led by Alawite commanders) due to casualties and increasingly mass desertions. It was estimated that 1,000 opposition groups were fighting the Assad regime, some very small and local. The Assad regime was losing and was about to go away. By 2015, there was an assumption that the Assad regime could not survive while the West, that wanted Bashar out, was concerned about who would replace him, a Jihadist takeover not being seen as a viable option in what was increasingly viewed as a lose-lose game. In what could be seen as a bad joke given the Prigozhin story years later, Belarus was deemed to be a viable relocation option for Bashar and his family. While the tide was not good for Bashar, his mother Anisa would have reprimanded him, stressing that if his father and older brother had been around, this defeatist scenario would never have happened. All while Asma would seem to live in another parallel world, focused on design and artistic projects, and trying to defend her husband with her lady friends part of the leading families ruling the Middle East.    

Iran had been the reason why Bashar could cling to power as the war was not going his way. Iran’s conservative Islam was at odds with a secular Baathist ideology (even if only power really mattered), but it took a wider view of the conflict and its opposition to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region. Iran was not enough for Syria to prevail, which drove Qds Forces Commander Soleimani (who would meet his death in January 2020 with a US drone strike in Baghdad) to convince Russia’s Putin to get involved to stop the debacle that might also hurt Russian interests and see them lose two bases in which they had heavily invested. A Russian-Iranian cooperation pact was signed in July 2015. Putin’s masterstroke was to go to the UN after ten years of absence and announce Russia would be ready to lead the fight against international terrorists in Syria, very much stressing Daesh at the main target (on a quasi-funny note, there had been some 2,400 Russians identified as Daesh members but to be fair the terrorist organisation also included British Jihadists known as “The Beatles” due to their strong Liverpudlian accents).

When the first Russian bombings started, the targets turned out to be US-backed rebel forces. While Russia wanted to support a vital strategic ally, even if Putin held the Syrian leader in low esteem, its key motivation was also to challenge the West in what few saw as a proxy war. All of this only a few months before Russia went into Crimea, thus helping to refocus Western minds about what Russia really was about, and which Putin stressed again following his February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It should be stated that the US national security apparatus was not all enamoured by Obama’s cautious approach, since the red line had been crossed and nothing happened, even if his approach was also motivated by the instability seen in Iraq again with Daesh – the likes of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and new CIA David Petraeus wanted some direct intervention on the side of the “secular” opposition. But the problem was that Syrian anti-aircraft defences were Russian-made, and also operated, which the new direct Russian officially anti-terror groups involvement was making impossible to consider lest WW3 was possibly an option.    

As Coughlin aptly notes, Russian military’s preferred tactic is to apply brute force to achieve its objectives, irrespective of destruction and misery it may cause (including on its own). 4,000 artillery shells were fired per day at the city of Grozny during the Chechen war. Georgia in 2008 had also been a case of military ineptitude, which would be found again 15 years later in Ukraine. As Russia was increasingly looking at a direct intervention, the Libyan conflict, that had seen a mainly Franco-British operation successfully ejecting Gaddafi, was reviewed by Moscow as it essentially involved support to local militias that carried out the operations, a model William Hague had stressed as “the paradigm for future military interventions to remove rogue regimes”. Russia was very wary of committing ground forces, preferring to follow the Libyan business model, which led to the Gerasimov Doctrine of hybrid warfare. Thus Crimea became the test in 2014, when “little green men” did the initial job, allowing Putin to deny anything until Russia was effectively in control of the peninsula. Crimea, and the lack of Western response, doubtless bolstered Russia’s confidence in going into Syria in the Autumn of 2015, even if 3,000 miles away. Russia would lead a massive air campaign against both the secular and Daesh forces led by now well known if removed General Sergei Surovikin, assisted by the Wagner mercenary group which built its reputation in Syria before venturing into Africa. In a novel development, Russia and its leading officers were also financially rewarded for their support of Bashar in a model adopted later by Wagner Group’s Prigozhin and his various mines in the African Sahel.

While Russia was effectively a war gamechanger, and as Bashar was nominally in charge of Syria, he was no longer leading the war (even if he never was in practical terms and as Iran’s Qds Commander Soleimani had done it before). Russia decided every aspect of the war, making him likely feel he could be replaced if unhappy. Bashar maintained the appearance of being in control of the war for internal purposes, and kept to his state of denial about any atrocity committed in the name of his regime, even during BBC and CBS interviews in the midst of the onslaught. He increasingly stressed to the West that it was better for them that he kept leading Syria than Daesh as the nature of the war had changed its key dynamics. He even kept stressing that diplomacy was the best option, even inviting a French delegation to review what sensible settlement of the war could be achieved. The war was a complex military and foreign policy matter as allies were not liking each other, and foes were also not clear. Turkey supported both the secular opposition and Islamist terror groups, while the latter like Daesh would attack the former alongside Russia which it also fought against. The war had taken a turn in becoming an extension of the now old “war on terror” more than one focused on the current Syrian regime. The West wanted regime change in Damascus but did not want to be helping Daesh. This situation helped Russia (and Iran) take the lead out of a lack of clear Western commitment (based on rational reasons), which eventually led to Bashar staying in power against all odds when Racca, the Syrian capital of Daesh, was taken in October 2017 marking the real end of a conflict that would go on in various small locations for months to come. Bashar’s main challenge to his rule had been destroyed, and he thought he had won, even if in a pyrrhic mode, actually not making much mention of Russian and Iranian assistance.  Perhaps the only real winners in this conflict were Russia and Iran.  But did the Kremlin use that experience in the best of ways when looking at what came next?         

The Syrian tragedy deserves many studies, on too many awful topics, as there are so many questions left. The philosopher in each of us could ask whether “Bashar created the tragedy” or “the tragedy created Bashar” but it is far beyond the point today. How can Syria come back in the world of nations – even if the old-fashioned Western term may seem obsolete? (The same could be asked about Russia of course.) How can half a million dead be forgotten? How can 13 million displaced Syrians, nearly 60% of its 2012 population, many having unwittingly created immigration and refugee havoc in Europe since the mid-2010s, be humanly but also realistically dealt with? (the UN officially stated in August that there were 40 million asylum seekers in the world today, Syrians likely taking first place.) Will Assad be ever forgiven, even on tactical grounds, for what we know, this even as he shows some caution in dealing with the Druze these days? Will his re-joining the Arab community, as seen with the “practical” welcoming back from the Arab League in mid-2023 after 12 years of being shunned, be a sign of things to come? How will Israel, Qatar or even Egypt and Jordan react, not to mention the investment community? There are many questions around Assad, but the region seems to be also on another path with a different Israel, led by a Netanyahu captive of his never seen before coalition. Or, come to that, a Saudi Arabia and an Iran finally being on talking terms, thanks to a more foreign policy assertive Beijing, primarily focused on its world leadership rise and its features, all the more at a time of serious economic and demographic problems at home. It is clear that Saudi Arabia, now a BRICS member (with the UAE and fragile Egypt), and the Gulf states, redefining their economic and existential roots, are taking a more proactive leadership role in the region that would go beyond leading world golf and football for one, and luxury havens for the others. A visionary Saudi MBS stated a few years ago that the Middle East was the new Europe, even if the dream proved to be hard on the economic and political front recently, as seen with protests in Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the deepening civil war in Sudan. 

One of the major Syrian issues we can see today for the region (and thus the world) is the Damascus regime having become a major exporter of drugs, its slow path in taking back refugees, and the Iranian-backed militias running around the country. While the UAE was a leading promoter of Syrian rehabilitation, other countries like anti-Bashar Qatar or US-following Kuwait were not keen, while Egypt and Jordan had strong question marks. Saudi Arabia changed its mood in the context of its own leadership rationale, lesser tensions with nemesis Iran and wanting the region more stable, taking the February 2023 earthquake as an opportunity to also change its tune and restart a dialogue with Bashar.

These developments have been indirectly a victory for both the Russian-Iran team and war as a viable option given that it secured Bashar’s regime. Russia also hopes that the Arab League’s rehabilitation will allow it to keep its gains while not focusing as much on Syria going forward, given its other main focus. While the US has reduced its military presence in the Middle East since Obama, the West seems to keep sanctioning Syria, but is too busy today with Ukraine to really care about a regional rehabilitation or trying to stop it. As for Syria itself, Bashar who stands “for Arab identity against Western hegemony” (his speech in Riyadh last May) does not seem apologetic for anything, and would even seek apologies from those in the region who opposed him, while likely using the drug trade as leverage in discussions with its neighbours and their deep concerns about its impact on their own countries. All in all, Bashar has not changed and has benefitted from a complex, and at times strange, geopolitical chessboard to keep ruling Syria, even if at times in vacillating ways. And today some Western analysts see Syria potentially as the last and odd addition to the new anti-Western axis in the making, though not yet very firm, comprising Russia/Belarus, China, North Korea and Iran.         

Coughlin’s book is very useful to remember Bashar’s journey and better understand the many features that led to the Syrian tragedy, even if it is full of facts and at times going back and forth with events, making the chronology harder to grasp, especially in the last twelve years. A thorough reading is required, all the more for those not being Middle East old hands, as events, especially during the civil war were plentiful. The story of Bashar and his family could have been one crafted by Shakespeare, and reminds us that freedom and democracy are rare features in today’s world, and that they are worth actively defending and strengthening, unless we all end up becoming residents of Ghouta.    

Warmest regards,

Serge

Better understanding “Russia’s war” (Jade McGlynn) 

17-8-23

Dear Partners in Thought,

After eighteen months of the staggering (and failed) Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is worth trying to understand what drove it – and what supports it. Many recall the surprising statement from Foreign Minister Lavrov that led to massive audience laughter at a conference in India that Russia launched its “special military operation” as NATO was about to invade Russia. In July 2022, Putin, who had already written a big pre-war philosophical piece on the existential nature of Russia and its unity with Ukraine in mid-2021, made a speech at the Duma stressing that “the war was unleashed by the collective West, which organised and supported the unconstitutional coup in Ukraine in 2014 and justified genocide against the people of Donbass”. Hence the strange use of neo-Nazi appellation to describe the Ukrainian leadership (all the more knowing the religious roots of the Ukrainian president). Putin made it clear, probably to find some hard to find justification and a way to decrease the lack of results on the ground, that the West was the instigator and the culprit of the invasion of Ukraine. This invasion became no less than “the start of the breakdown of the US-style world order” also responsible for so many Russian and indeed world problems. This was “the transition from liberal-globalist American egocentrism to a truly multi-polar world based not on self-serving rules made up by someone for their own needs, behind which there is nothing but striving for hegemony, and not on hypocritical double standards but on international law and the genuine sovereignty of nations and civilisations, on their will to live with their historical destiny, with their own values and traditions.”  

The invasion of Ukraine had taken on a very practical existential role for Russia so as to make the move very noble, in a drive for Gaullian grandeur-restoration, all the more in what was portrayed as an increasingly value-less world without moral compass. All of this while Ukrainian civilian infrastructure was massively hit, civilians themselves were butchered like in Bucha (even if Russia would later argue this was staged by Ukraine) and a massive number of children were deported to Russia to welcoming new parents, in what would become a clear war crime against humanity. All these official statements would easily project a world upside down that only the boldest science fiction movies and books, like Orwell’s 1984, could have shown before. While many were ready for a Kremlin going to any length to achieve its goals, one of the key questions would then become: How could the Russian people buy this type of story-telling? As they seemed to do.          

Russia displays many, largely noble, explanations for this invasion that do not resonate well in the mostly Cartesian (even if declining for the Kremlin and many Russians) West. Notwithstanding the plausible argument that the West is in fact much stronger at many key levels today. Two major features to review are the war, led by a values-based Russia against the degenerative West via Ukraine that needs to be saved, and the feelings of a strong majority of Russians that Putin is right, and the war is just or that they are not opposed to it also in a form of apathy and refusal to see things for what they are. Jade McGlynn just wrote “Russia’s War” (and not just “Putin’s War”) to explain the two key points and its related ones from a Russian perspective. McGlynn is a young King’s College War Studies scholar with much actual exposure to Putin’s Russia, and her needed book is enlightening, even if some Russian critics may point to some unlikely support from MI6 or the dark corridors of Langley. This is a very detailed book that goes into many features around those two key points, making it for an arduous and possibly repetitive read at times, all the more given the challenging times we know.     

No leader in the West launching an invasion of a neighbour (admittedly all the more in the heart of old Europe) would enjoy an 80% approval rating – but Putin does. While the reliability of poll ratings in Russia can be discussed, a leader like Putin rarely goes down below 60%. On a key note, even the younger generations (18-24, 25-39 groups) support Putin (although slightly less so than the older ones). This can be explained by a majority of Russians wanting (if not needing) a strong leader—this mainly as the result of the shock linked to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the terrible 1990s that created societal disorder. A consequence of which was the ascension of a kleptocratic system that Putin eventually controlled and used to serve his (and his nascent co-leadership’s) needs in a strange and inflexible virtuous model. Many Russians— especially of the younger and skilled generations with post-cold war global aspirations—left Russia in 2022, some simply to avoid conscription. Yet a vast majority is not keen to go against the war and the authorities (especially in non-major urban areas as expected but clearly not only). This is helped by a unique propaganda machine, operating in a welcoming target population territory, and a highly repressive system that guarantees long-term jail if the word “war” is even publicly mentioned. (On a side note, it would appear that the Kremlin would actually prefer passivity to the actual support of its population). 

The Russian liberals who do not like Putin are actually rather condescending when it comes to Ukraine, as seen with the likes of Navalny’s and other groups. As a result, Russians do not oppose the war and are rather apathetic, some even blaming the West for the Western sanctions that deprived them of products they came to like since the 1990s (not the main objective of such sanctions for sure). Some analysts draw bold comparisons with the attitude of most Parisians during the German “occupation”, as they generally preferred to go on with their daily lives as if nothing had really happened (forgetting the many actions of the “resistance” back then, and de facto implying that Russians were actually “occupied” by their own in the Putin era). Even religion is playing a role in supporting the “special military operation” in Ukraine, notably with the well-known and politically-engaged Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill, who is naturally close to the Kremlin. To what would be his forebear’s spiritual dismay, the grandson of atheist Soviet leader Molotov, who is a member of the Kremlin-captive Duma, stressed multiple times the “holy” nature of the war. 

In one of the ongoing features strengthening the Kremlin’s Orwellian propaganda approach, Russian history is officially rewritten in ways the country has known under Stalin with the main objective of creating a new Russian identity. The focus is permanent and on school textbooks, television shows, films, festivals, military history tours and even historical re-enactment clubs and student discussion societies while murals and even statues are added, especially in the last ten years, to the existential and patriotic display. The Christian roots of Russia, the defeat of Napoleon and the Great Patriotic War are much stressed alongside Peter and Catherine the Great while the lost Gorbachev and anarchic Yeltsin eras are quasi-demonised, the latter responding to the natural sorrows of many Russians. Ukraine, which was initially to be saved, is now often depicted as the ultra-nationalist state where no dissent can exist and opposition is banned while anything Russian is deemed to be hostile.  The Russian population is flooded day in day out with messages that underpin an existential Russian and indeed imperialistic rebirth, this without any easy access to alternative views, most if not all Western or opposition conduits being banned as deemed propaganda-flavoured.        

Jade McGlynn often refers to Dmitri Trenin, a former senior officer in Soviet and Russian military intelligence, who led the Carnegie Moscow Center, the key local post of the well-known think tank since the mid-1990s (on a personal note he even gave an internship to my older daughter). While a very fine, highly intellectual man, and de facto one of the most sensible Washington-Moscow “conduits”, he decided to leave the Carnegie Endowment a few months into the invasion as he felt deeply supportive of it. Trenin, a former member of the “Westerniser realist camp”, who knows the West better than most Russians, made statements about the need to defend Russian culture also against what the West represents today “with its civilisation of consumption, its gender innovations and so on”.  To him, clearly winning in Ukraine and “inflicting damage to the Western enemy” is about survival for Russia – not simply a return to imperial history as Putin likes. I was exchanging with him at the beginning of the conflict but did not foresee such a drastic position and rupture (which I took initially as a proof that he was de facto a prisoner of the system and had too much family in Russia as he does). While Trenin’s statements are very strong, it is also clear the state of affairs across the West (and especially in the US with its great and quasi un-American political divide, wild mass shootings and exacerbated forms of capitalism), does not help in rejecting the Kremlin scenario. Nor does this scenario not fall on deaf ears, with many Russians looking at the world and grieving post-Cold War shocks. 

It is also true that Russia was not treated with the most care by Western powers in the early to mid-1990s, as they wanted to ensure it would quickly become part of a nascent globalised, and increasingly rootless, world—even if wanting to improve the material conditions of many along the way. On a side but key note, McGlynn stresses that the main enemy of old Russia is often seen today as Britain, due to its ancient imperial history (and the odd fact that it founded America) far more than the US, in spite of its massive aid to Ukraine to date, or Western Europe—this perhaps also linked to Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak’s fierce support of Kyiv. While the invasion is now seen in Moscow as a war of liberation, Russia would also seem to endure it in order to get rid of Anglo-Saxon influence across Europe. To some in the Russian leadership, the Ukraine “special military operation” is not simply about Ukraine but also much more about Europe, of which Russia sees itself as a key part, and its very soul. 

It is hard not to try to understand, admittedly to some difficult extent, the Russians who do not want to face the horrors of the war and prefer to find some noble or practical rationale for it or stay away from the topic. Many of us would follow that sad path in their very shoes, and given their too often tragic history. Until late 2021 I wanted myself to ensure that we anchored Russia not only to the West but to the world through globalisation that would ensure a lesser focus on military solutions and would nicely “trap” nations over time into working together, as they would have too much to lose otherwise (a recipe applicable to China today that seems to need it more than Beijing may have initially thought). It is also our duty to explain to Russians that the course taken by the Kremlin goes against the interests of all parties, and at the same time makes them supportive of mass murders and war crimes. This is true, even if the latter are still well managed by the Kremlin’s propaganda machine and totally dismissed as fake news or hard to accept by most of the general population. 

Jade McGlynn’s book reveals a Russia most of us did not know, and which needs to gradually change over time, but will also unlikely support a coup in the Kremlin. The sanctions-rooted 40% decline in value of the rouble in 2023, and the likely associated inflation surge and economic crisis to follow (not ideal when funding a large-scale war) may hurt Russians and (some Western analysts hope) make them question the cost of the war, given the roots of such developments. However, it may largely remain a private or dinner table matter, given the known dynamics. As often seen in history, a coup would more likely come from the current weakened leadership (the odd Wagner insurrection, if there was one, being an erratic example, even if it showed inherent autocratic weaknesses) but is no guarantee for a better scenario for a Ukraine war that will otherwise last long—possibly with Western population support gradually waning as seen today in the US and that could be lethally dealt with in a “Trump 2024”. Hence the need for a strengthened Western resolve and speedy delivery of what is needed to win or reach the negotiation table (also making sure Kyiv is not adopting unmanageable positions like regarding the future of Crimea).  

On a very personal note that may resonate with many in the West, I would like to stress that we should not see all Russians as evil, even if one supports Ukraine and/or is naturally opposed to outdated imperialistic moves, especially in old Europe. Many Russians left their country as they could not stand the invasion, or did not want to be part of it for many personal reasons. Many Russians lived outside Russia before the invasion and even liked a Putin style, following the shambolic state of their country in the 1990s. Russians should never be rejected for being Russian, even if they ought to be sensibly and respectfully engaged on the matter of the Ukraine tragedy and its many ramifications at all societal and world levels. At some point, we will rebuild Ukraine (as many development financial institutions seem to be ready to go for in a well-planned but premature way) but we will also need to help re-building and re-shaping Russia – with the Russians and for us all.   

Warmest regards, 

Serge

The democratic West needs to evolve if it is to survive

2-8-23

Dear Partners in Thought,

While the West has shown remarkable unity to date in supporting a country invaded, for unacceptable and largely forgotten imperialistic reasons, by another in the heart of an otherwise rather peaceful Europe since WW2, it is also experiencing issues that may undermine its very future.   

I have wanted to cover a sensitive topic for some time: the need for the West to evolve in its approach to what is democracy today, so it keeps thriving in a much-needed new wave.

Rather than producing a long note I would rather draw your attention to eight key points to enable further thinking, and hopefully a change in Western patterns.

  • Western liberal democracy needs not to be “weak”, as if moderates needed to be by definition, and in contrast to political extremists. 
  • National identity that defined “who we are” and sensible immigration control matter, and should not be the topic owned and exploited by extremist parties of the hard right.
  • Law and order matter, and there is no excuse for the looting and destruction of nearly EUR 1bn in less than a week by disgruntled individuals—whatever their roots and “easy” excuses—like recently seen in the suburbs of Paris and other French cities.    
  • Reclaiming ownership of key values that defined the West should make extremist parties (with vote-grabbing easy answers to complex issues and few public management capabilities) less politically relevant.
  • A stronger and more secure West at home will be more impactful in its dealings globally, especially concerning rising nations with aspiring world leadership like China.  
  • A stronger West should combine an America at peace with itself and a Europe more autonomous at all levels, including defence, so as to strengthen the key partnership.
  • While Western style democracy can work in the West and should be offered to the world, the West should realise that many countries are not able to follow that path due to many factors, at times combined, such as their historical roots, corrupt leadership, theocratic approach or even sheer size.
  • While focusing on the challenges of our times like climate change, Western democracy should also ensure it controls and indeed regulates better the excesses found in both capitalism and indeed “tech”, big or small, and its adverse developments into unsettling social media, cryptocurrency and now AI, so as to ensure more societal equity and soundness at all levels.    

These eight features, some of which may be contentious, point to a certain direction that should help the West reposition and strengthen itself in the 21st century, and still offer what we see as workable liberal democracy, this in absolute and relative terms. Geopolitical risk management starts at home.

Warmest regards

Serge

Thirteen not always so fun geopolitical facts of our challenging times

5-7-23

Dear Partners in Thought,

As we enter the summer holiday season, I thought I would give you a shorter and more concise Interlude, focused on some of the key recent geopolitical developments of our times—indeed not always “fun facts”. I stopped at thirteen, given the special ring to it, but the list could be extended, contested and changing week after week. Will the recent events in Jenin lead to major regional disruption in the Middle East and thus qualify? Should AI, in spite of the many concerns it brings (together with clear benefits), ever be seen as a geopolitical tool or development?         

  1. The Ukraine invasion united the West against Russia more than ever expected, on old-fashioned principles of territorial sovereignty, though focused on its European heart.
  1. The Ukraine invasion showed Russia failing in the pursuit of illusory imperial ambitions, while suffering unheard of political disruptions, showing deep internal weaknesses, and reverting to old ways of domestic control and erratic nuclear tactics.
  1. The Ukraine invasion propelled oil production-cutting Saudi Arabia as a major world player in many areas (not only golf) thanks to the impact of Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas fueling its leading world GDP growth in 2022.
  1. The Ukraine invasion showed a newly-named Global South wanting to be non-aligned to either the West or Russia, while each of its major components pursued its own domestic agenda, and still pragmatically dealing with both (and also China in our times of simmering tensions) on what primarily matters to them.
  1. China, gradually lost between a thirst for global leadership and socio-economic viability, became a world peacemaker with its involvement in getting Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume diplomatic relations, or wanting to play a role in the never-ending Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
  1. While declining, the US still leads the world for now but is suffering from self-inflicted wounds such as mass-shootings and social media-fueled existential expressions of extremism, with Donald Trump being a clear example of deepening societal failure. 
  1. The old European powers like France or Britain are no longer the European powers they once were, with the EU being their key existential leadership option (sadly for the latter) and the building of European defense being key, even if NATO keeps going.  
  1. While Germany is slowly changing its attitude to defense matters and its traditional focus on the economy due to Ukraine, it is still wavering in its approach to China, given the importance of this market to its automakers and other industries.
  1. While Europe is united on Ukraine, Taiwan is usually not seen in the same light as in Washington (but for the Baltic states given the proximity of their own mainland China or Czechia to reverse past politics) and its focus will be on not creating unneeded tensions often driven by domestic US politics.
  1. Covid, which had, and still has, many unforeseen impacts on society worldwide, did not help diplomacy when it might have been needed, due to sheer distancing and remote communication amongst world leaders.
  1. While democracy, where it still exists, is challenged by its illiberal versions and vote-grabbing populism (with its easy answers to complex issues), the EU should stop with its unanimity voting system, and adopt a super-majority in its decision-making. 
  1. Globalization is receding, following decades-old corporate investments lost in Russia and the US-China on-and-off warming cold war, and protectionist measures often hidden behind green policies and supply chain de-risking, even if more of a slogan—given the scale and complexity of, and reliance upon, China’s manufacturing make-up.   
  1.  AI became an unpredictable existential threat at the “wrong” geopolitical time for the world, while venture capital went further in its gambling “spray and pray” investment approach as previously seen with the crypto and metaverse labels.  

Warmest regards,

Serge