22-2-24
Dear Partners in Thought,
I would like to share with you a new book on warfare since 1945 by two well-known specialists of the subject. One is General David Petraeus, one of the leading American military commanders (and indeed thinkers) who was CIA Director under Obama (before sadly and to some unfairly having to resign due to an affair with his “All in” biographer). The other is Andrew Roberts, one of the leading British military historians also known for his famed “Napoléon” and “Churchill” biographies. I realize the topic is a tough one and some will think I relish writing on sad matters, but I thought it was an interesting one, all the more so as we are going into the third year of a war of invasion in Ukraine—an event which upended the relatively quiet and very productive post-Cold War globalization world we knew. “Conflict” is clearly a very dense book which a Book Note could not give the right credit for. To be fair, each chapter and its wars, that are described chronologically, would deserve a Book Note of its own—if not a whole book.
Given the return of war in Europe, Russia is of course front and center of the authors’ considerations. Throughout history, Russia has always had a peculiar approach to using military forces, not necessarily to the benefit of its own soldiers. Eighty per cent of the soldiers who died fighting Nazi Germany did so on the Eastern front – these were Soviet forces, not including the millions of Soviet civilians who lost their lives as German forces went East in 1941. Russia registered five times more war dead in one year of the Ukraine invasion than in a decade in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Ukraine war is a regressive WW2-type war in terms of its warfare approach. Strategic leadership being key in modern warfare, the authors stress that the failure of Russia to win, all the more given its assumed military might, is a testimony to its inherent weakness. In a way, Russia’s military unwittingly showed Russian forces more appropriate for grand military parades of a North Korean style as seen in the May Day victory parades to celebrate the victory over Nazi Germany. Russian victories require masses of soldiers and casualties rather than sheer strategic brio—this perhaps reinforced by the inherent leadership weakness of commanders primarily chosen for their obedience. This assessment does not mean they will not win in Ukraine as time goes on, and the West gets tired or immersed into domestic political games and considerations—as vividly seen in the US.
The authors make clear they are not writing a comprehensive history of all conflicts, while their focus is on the evolution of warfare through strategy, tactics and weapons and what happened on major battlefields. When looking at warfare, the 20th century yielded more violent deaths than at any time since the beginning of the history of the world. 1945 and the end of WW2, a victory for a nascent West that would be solidified by the rising Cold War, was a time of hope. President Truman even abolished the OSS – Office of Strategic Services -, the predecessor of the soon to be CIA, in September 1945, within one month of the victory in the Pacific theater. Europe and the US were no longer at war, even if conflicts would ignite—such as with the Indian sub-continent partition that would give rise to Pakistan and the India we know, the Palestine conflict in 1948 (there to stay as we sadly see), and the Chinese civil war leading to the creation of an independent Taiwan (another sensitive spot 75 years later). Potential war on a large, if not unseen, scale then started gradually with the US and then Russia developing a nuclear arsenal, and MAD or the Mutually Assured Destruction strategy (during the Cold War, the US and Russia undertook 1,032 and 715 nuclear and then thermonuclear tests, incidentally leading to serious medical conditions in Kazakhstan where Moscow conducted 50% of its tests). One could say that MAD worked, as the two arch-enemies did not wage war directly for nearly half a century, before the Soviet Union collapsed, and globalization became the focus of all world powers.
In “The Death of the Dream of Peace” (1945-1953) the authors start with the world digesting the biggest conflict the world ever knew with the Chinese civil war, pitching Kuomintang leader Chiang vs. Communist Party leader Mao. This civil war, that few of us know well in the West, had started as the war against Japan was also waged, creating a very confusing overall battlefield. While Chiang’s Kuomintang had initially 2.5 million men under arms vs. half a million for Mao’s party, the latter leader inspired by Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” was far more agile tactically, avoiding direct confrontation when he could. Mao was also more in command than Chiang, with soldiers devoted to him and their cause, while the Kuomintang leaders were often more focused on internal politics and not caring so much about their forces. Mao was also more flexible—even using 200,000 soldiers who had fought for Japan—while being very rash in executing 150,000 soldiers opposing Communism. Chiang, supported by the West, lost a war that he should have won if only on sheer numbers, due to strategic and tactical mistakes that were not expected, and led to a retreat to Formosa and the Taiwan situation we still live with. The Chinese civil war, and its staggering six million deaths, showed that guerilla warfare carried out by much smaller Maoist forces could prevail against a Western-backed government much more powerful on paper. Then the Korean war broke out, when North Korea invaded south of the 38th parallel Blitzkrieg style with 135,000 forces following Kim Il-sung’s decision being blessed by then Soviet Stalin (Kim Ill-sung was the father of Kim Jong Il, himself the father of Kim Jong Un, the current leader – North Korea being a family business). The Korean War, as it became known, was the first invasion of a country and, with the Chinese Civil War, the largest commitment of forces since WW2. It was also the start of surprise attacks—that we saw for decades to come with the 1967 War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Falklands War, the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 9-11—where the attacker usually gets a much stronger response than its initial offensive however dreadful (a feature we still see to this day). It was also a war that unified most the West led by the US, (Truman having already lost China) via the UN, and so many of its members against one single enemy, which would keep its aggressive style in the Korean peninsula literally for generations. One of the amazing features of that war was the egotism of MacArthur who commanded the Western/United Nations (88% American) forces and the little-known fact that he was leading from Japan. The Korean War that started very well, ended up in a Western retreat that was only saved by General Ridgway who replaced MacArthur after his criticism of President’s Truman limited war and his many ineptitudes as a military commander. Petraeus and Roberts give us a forgotten account of one of the leading intelligence disasters post-WW2 when the Chinese were able to move massive forces into Korea undetected, and Russian fighter pilots assisted North Korea while passing for North Koreans. This war cemented the existence of the famed 38th parallel separating the two countries and led to what we still see today, with the aggressive moves and statements of Kim Jong Un.
The book is too rich and dense to keep within the scope of a regular Book Note, so I will keep the great contents to be discovered and thoroughly appreciated. In “Wars of decolonization” (1947-1975) the authors deal with the old British and French powers in Asia and Africa and the demise of their old empires. In “From the Sinai to Port Stanley” (1967-1982) the authors discuss the Six Day War up to the famed Falklands War, which saw Margaret Thatcher showing what Britain could do in 1982 to preserve its global power and historical reputation.
In “The Cold War Denouement” the authors deal with the most key event post-WW2, which is the end of the biggest rivalry of the 20th century leading to the end of the Soviet Union. In “The New World Disorder” (1991-1999) the authors cover a period where the rules are rewritten gradually and led by the US and by extension the West. In “The War of Afghanistan” (2001-2021) the authors do not deal with the Soviet war we all remember, but the one that started post-9-11 when US forces dislodged Al Qaeda and ended the Taliban rule for twenty years, only to let it back in two years ago—this with a reputational blow to US leadership and a disgrace for women and young girls. In “The Iraq War” the authors deal with another 9-11-related war. One that was also a continuation of the war that President George H.W. Bush did not want to end by seizing Baghdad in 1990, but his son orchestrated on the false premise Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (leading to Colin Powell losing some of his well-deserved aura as he famously made the wrong case). This war, opposed by Western countries like France, led to what became known as the Arab Spring with unimageable consequences for the Middle East. In “Vladimir Putin’s Existential War against Ukraine (2022-)” the authors focus on the return of history in Europe and a Russia going back to imperial delusion. Finally, the authors deal with the “The Wars of the Future”—conflicts that will involve expected tech features, where AI would not be absent. After the book was already published, history repeated itself putting Israel back at the forefront of Middle Eastern warfare with its global implications.
“Conflict” is a great book both in terms of history as well as tactical and strategic warfare, the latter being the focus for Petraeus and Roberts. It is not easy reading and is very detailed, one of the useful features being to remind us of many episodes of history that we might have forgotten, even if war is unexpectedly and sadly back on our menu these days. If anything, it reminds us, especially in Europe, that, while war is not desirable, it is not just a matter for history books. As the Roman author Publius Flavius Venetius Renatus used to say: “Si vis pacem para bellum” (if you want peace prepare for war), a quote that NATO, a reflection of the essential and hopefully enduring transatlantic alliance, would support, all the more in our Europe today.
Warmest regards,
Serge
Desperate Measures 